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In this work, we study a mathematical model for the spread of fake news on social networks. The model
includes a large number of agents attempting to learn an underlying true state of the world in an iterative
fashion. At each iteration, agents update their beliefs about the true state in a non-Bayesian fashion, using
noisy observations of the true state and the beliefs of a subset of other agents. These subsets may include
stubborn agents, who attempt to convince others of an erroneous true state (modeling users spreading fake
news). This process continues for a finite number of iterations we call the learning horizon.
In the first part of the paper, we characterize the learning outcome in terms of the learning horizon and
a quantity that describes the “density” of stubborn agents, assuming a certain generative model for the
underlying social network. Among other conclusions, our analysis shows that the learning outcome exhibits a
phase transition, wherein agents learn the true state on short horizons but suddenly forget the true state on
slightly longer horizons, and that adversaries deploying stubborn agents experience diminishing returns.
In the second part of the paper, we leverage our learning outcome analysis to devise optimal strategies for
seeding stubborn agents so as to disrupt learning. While our proofs of optimality rely on the same generative
graph model, we show empirically that these seeding strategies outperform intuitive heuristics on real social
networks not conforming to the generative model. Furthermore, the form of our proposed strategies is
non-obvious and yields novel insights into vulnerabilities of non-Bayesian learning models.
Keywords: social learning; stubborn agents; fake news; influence maximization; random walks; random
graphs; directed configuration model; discrete convexity
1 INTRODUCTION
With the rise of social networks like Twitter and Facebook, people increasingly receive news
through non-traditional sources. One recent study shows that two-thirds of American adults
have gotten news through social media [28]. Such news sources are fundamentally different than
traditional ones like print media and television, in the sense that social media users read and discuss
news on the same platform. As a consequence, users turning to these platforms for news receive
information not only from major publications but from others users as well; in the words of [4], a
user “with no track record or reputation can in some cases reach as many readers as Fox News,
CNN, or the New York Times.” This phenomenon famously reared its head during the 2016 United
States presidential election, when fake news stories were shared tens of millions of times [4].
In this paper, we study a mathematical model describing this situation. The model includes a
large number of agents attempting to learn an underlying true state of the world (e.g. which of
two candidates is better suited for office) using information from three sources. First, each agent
receives noisy observations of the true state, modeling e.g. news stories from major publications.
Second, each agent observes the opinions of a subset of other agents, modeling e.g. discussions
with other social media users. Third, each agent may observe the opinions of stubborn agents or
bots who aim to persuade others of an erroneous true state, modeling e.g. users spreading fake
news.1 Based on this information, agents iteratively update their beliefs about the true state in a
manner similar to the non-Bayesian social learning model of Jadbabaie et al. [20]. This iterative
process continues for a finite number of iterations that we refer to as the learning horizon.
1The term stubborn agents has been used in the social learning and consensus literature to describe such agents; the term
bots is used in reference to automated social media accounts spreading fake news while masquerading as real users [27].
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2 Daniel Vial and Vijay Subramanian
Under this model, two competing forces emerge as the learning horizon grows. On the one hand,
agents receive more observations of the true state, suggesting that they become more likely to learn.
On the other hand, the opinions of the bots gradually propagate through the system, suggesting
that agents become increasingly exposed to these opinions and thus less likely to learn. Hence,
while the horizon clearly affects the learning outcome, the nature of this effect – namely, whether
learning becomes more or less likely as the horizon grows – is less clear.
This effect of the learning horizon has often been ignored in works with models similar to ours.
For example, our model is nearly identical to that in the empirical work [6], in which the authors
show that polarized beliefs can arise when there are two types of bots with diametrically opposed
viewpoints. However, the experiments in [6] simply fix a large learning horizon and do not consider
the effect of varying it. Models similar to ours have also been treated analytically; for example,
[3, 18, 20] study non-Bayesian learning models similar to ours. However, these works consider a
fixed number of agents and an infinite learning horizon and thus also ignore timescale effects.
In our first set of results (see Section 3), we argue that the learning horizon plays a prominent role
in the learning outcome and therefore should not be ignored. In particular, we show that the learning
outcome depends on the relationship between the horizon Tn and a quantity pn that describes
the “density” of bots in the system, where both quantities may depend on the number of agents n.
Mathematically, letting θ ∈ (0, 1) denote the true state and θTn (i∗) denote the belief about the true
state for a uniformly random agent i∗ at the horizon Tn , we show (see Theorem 3.1)
θTn (i∗)
P−−−−→
n→∞

θ , Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
. (1)
Here pn is smaller when more bots are present and 0 is the erroneous true state promoted by
the bots. Hence, in words, (1) says the following: if there are sufficiently few bots, in the sense
that Tn(1 − pn) → 0, i∗ learns the true state; if there are sufficiently many bots, in the sense that
Tn(1 − pn) → ∞, i∗ adopts the extreme belief 0 promoted by the bots.
We note the result in (1) assumes a particular generative model for the graph connecting agents
and bots (a modification of the so-called directed configuration model). For such models, phase
transitions – wherein small changes to model parameters lead to starkly different behaviors – are
often observed. In this case, assuming Tn and pn are related by Tn = (1 − pn)−k for some k > 0, and
also assuming pn → 1, the learning outcome suddenly drops from θ to 0 as k changes from e.g.
0.99 to 1.01 (see Figure 1). Put differently, agents initially (at time (1 − pn)−0.99) learn the true state,
then suddenly (at time (1−pn)−1.01) “forget” the true state and adopt the extreme opinion 0. Hence,
the chosen learning horizon can lead to drastically different outcomes.
In light of this phase transition, it is natural to set k = 1 and “zoom in” to study the dynamics of
this sudden drop from θ to 0. Indeed, in Theorem 3.1, we also show that if Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞),
θTn (i∗)
P−−−−→
n→∞ θ (1 − e
−cη)/(cη), (2)
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a model parameter that dictates the weight agents place on other agents’ opinions
in their belief updates. The limit in (2) is depicted graphically as a function of c in Figure 1, which
offers an intuitive interpretation: if an adversary deploys bots in hopes of driving agent opinions to
0, the marginal benefit of deploying additional bots is smaller when c is larger (i.e. when more bots
have been deployed). In other words, the adversary experiences diminishing returns.
To conclude the first part of the paper, we show in Theorem 3.2 that all but o(n) agents adopt
opinion 0 in a certain sub-case of Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ (namely, the sub-case in which the “density”
of bots is non-vanishing). Hence, Theorem 3.2 is stronger than Theorem 3.1 and applies to fewer
cases; we also argue empirically that this stronger result likely fails in other cases.
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Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of (1)-(2) in the case Tn = c(1 − pn )−k ,pn → 1 (with η = θ = 0.5).
Our second set of results (see Section 4) consider a setting in which an adversary deploys bots in
hopes of disrupting learning. More specifically, the adversary chooses how many bots to connect
to each agent (subject to a budget constraint), with the aim of minimizing θTn (i∗). In the absence of
our first set of results, it is unclear how to even approach deriving the optimal adversary strategy.
Hence, we leverage these results to formulate the adversary’s problem as an integer programming
problem: by (1) and (2), an adversary can minimize beliefs (at least asymptotically) by minimizing
pn , viewed as a function of the number of bots connected to each agent.
Even after recasting the adversary’s problem as an integer program, it remains unclear if it can
be solved efficiently. Thus, in Section 4, we propose two solutions to this problem. First, we show
its objective function belongs to a special class of discrete-domain functions that can be minimized
in polynomial time, and we employ an existing algorithm to solve the integer program exactly.
However, this runtime is n2 even in the best case, which too high for social networks like Twitter
and Facebook (where n is on the order of 108). Thus, we also propose a randomized approximation
algorithm that runs in time n logn and that produces a constant-fraction approximation of the
optimal 1 − pn with high probability (see Theorem 4.3). Using this constant-fraction result, as
well as our analysis from the first part of the paper, we (roughly) show the following: if the most
sophisticated adversary can drive the typical belief to 0 (in the sense of (1)), then our randomized
scheme will drive the typical belief to 0 as well. See Corollary 4.4 for a formal statement.
While the exact solution can only be found algorithmically, our randomized scheme has a some-
what interpretable, and quite interesting, form. In particular, it suggests that successful adversaries
carefully balance agents’ influence and susceptibility to influence. For a social network like Twitter,
this means targeting users with many followers (i.e. influential users) who follow very few users
themselves (so that fake news tweeted by bots will appear prominently in the targeted users’
Twitter feeds). While this is somewhat intuitive, the precise form of the randomized scheme is far
from obvious. Furthermore, empirical results show that our scheme disrupts learning to a larger
degree than schemes that more obviously balance influence and susceptibility. Thus, we believe our
analysis provides new insights into vulnerabilities of news sharing platforms and (more generally)
non-Bayesian social learning models.
Finally, as alluded to above, we show empirically that our proposed adversary solutions outper-
form (in terms of minimizing θTn (i∗)) a number of intuitive heuristics on graphs representing real
social networks. This is somewhat remarkable, because our adversary solutions fundamentally
assume that minimizing θTn (i∗) amounts to minimizing pn , and we only verify this assumption for
a certain random graph model (and only in the limit as n grows to infinity). Thus, our empirical
results suggest that our insights regarding vulnerabilities in news sharing and social learning
extend beyond the random graph model considered in the rest of the paper.
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Before proceeding, we note several of our results also assume Tn = O(logn), which guarantees
that at the learning horizon, an agent’s belief is only affected by a vanishing fraction of other
agents and bots (at least in the sparse random graph model considered). This is why the title refers
to the learning as “local”. More specifically, our choice of Tn is dominated by the mixing time of
the random walk on this random graph. From a belief analysis perspective, this means we cannot
leverage global properties like the stationary distribution of this walk, in contrast to many works
on social learning (see Section 5). In fact, as shown in [9], this random walk exhibits cutoff, meaning
that at our learning horizon, the distribution of this walk can be maximally far from stationarity.
Hence, we cannot even use an approximation of the stationary distribution. Instead, we leverage the
fact that our random graph model has a well-behaved local structure, and we show that analyzing
beliefs amounts to analyzing hitting probabilities. Fundamentally, it is from three regimes of these
hitting probabilities that the three regimes in (1)-(2) arise (see Section 3.2).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the model studied
throughout the paper. We present our results concerning the learning outcome in Section 3. In
Section 4, we discuss the adversarial setting. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6. Proofs and experimental details are deferred to appendices.
Notational conventions: Most notation is standard or defined as needed, but we note here that the
following conventions are used frequently. For n ∈ N, we let [n] = {1, 2, . . . ,n}, and for n,k ∈ Nwe
let k+ [n] = [n]+k = {k+1,k+2, . . . ,k+n}. All vectors are treated as row vectors. We let ei denote
the vector with 1 in the i-th position and 0 elsewhere. We denote the set of nonnegative integers
by N0 = N ∪ {0}. We use 1(A) for the indicator function, i.e. 1(A) = 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise.
All random variables are defined on a common probability space (Ω,F ,P), with E[·] =
∫
Ω
· dP
denoting expectation, P−→ denoting convergence in probability, and a.s . meaning P−almost surely.
2 MODEL
2.1 Learning model
We begin by defining the model of social learning studied throughout the paper. The main ingredi-
ents are (1) a true state of the world, represented as a scalar, (2) a social network connecting two
sets of nodes, some who aim to learn the true state and some who wish to persuade others of an
erroneous true state, and (3) a learning horizon. We discuss each of these ingredients in turn.
The true state of the world is a constant θ ∈ (0, 1). For example, in an election between candidates
representing two political parties (say, Party 1 and Party 2), θ ≈ 0 can be interpreted as the Party 1
candidate being far superior, θ ≈ 1 means the Party 2 candidate is far superior, and θ ≈ 0.5 implies
the candidates are roughly equal. We emphasize that θ is a deterministic constant and does not
depend on time, nor on the number of nodes in the system (both of which will vary).
A directed graph G = (A ∪ B,E) connects disjoint sets of nodes A and B (details regarding the
graph structure are discussed in Section 2.2). We refer to elements of A as regular agents, or simply
agents, and elements of B as stubborn agents or bots. While agents attempt to learn the true state θ ,
bots aim to disrupt this learning and convince agents that the true state is instead 0. In the election
example, agents represent voters who study the two candidates to learn which is superior, while
bots are loyal to Party 1 and aim to convince agents that the corresponding candidate is superior
(despite possible evidence to the contrary). Edges in the graph represent connections in a social
network over which nodes share opinions in a manner that will be described shortly. An edge from
node i to node j, denoted i → j, will be interpreted to mean that j observes i’s opinion.
Agents and bots share opinions until a learning horizon T ∈ N. We will allow the horizon to
depend on the number of agents n ≜ |A| and will thus denote it by Tn at times. In the election
example, T represents the duration of the election season, i.e. the number of time units that agents
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can learn about the candidates and that bots can attempt to convince agents of the superiority of
the Party 1 candidate. Here Tn will be finite for each finite n, and we will let Tn tend to infinity
with n. In particular, we will chooseTn such that an agent’s opinion at timeTn only depends on the
opinions of a vanishing fraction of all agents and bots; namely, those within the agent’s Tn-step
incoming neighborhood in the social network G (see Section 3.4 for details).
It remains to specify how agents attempt to learn and how bots aim to disrupt this learning. We
begin with the agents. Initially, i ∈ A believes the state to be θ0(i) = α0(i)/(α0(i) + β0(i)), where
α0(i) ∈ [0, α¯] and β0(i) ∈ [0, β¯] for some α¯ , β¯ ∈ (0,∞) that do not depend on n (if α0(i) = β0(i) = 0,
we let θ0(i) = 0.5 by convention). We refer to α0(i), β0(i) as the prior parameters and will not specify
them beyond assuming they lie in the aforementioned intervals.2 In our running example, the
initial belief θ0(i) can encode i’s past opinions regarding the political parties, e.g. θ0(i) < 0.5 means
i historically prefers Party 1 and is predisposed towards the corresponding candidate before the
election season begins. At each time t ∈ [T ], i ∈ A receives a noisy observation of the true state (e.g.
i reads a news story regarding the candidates) and modifies its opinion based on this observation
and on the opinions of its incoming neighbors in G (e.g. i discusses the election with its social
connections). Mathematically, i ∈ A updates its belief as θt (i) = αt (i)/(αt (i) + βt (i)), where
αt (i) = (1 − η)(αt−1(i) + st (i)) + η
din(i)
∑
j ∈Nin (i)
αt−1(j), (3)
βt (i) = (1 − η)(βt−1(i) + (1 − st (i))) + η
din(i)
∑
j ∈Nin (i)
βt−1(j).
Here st (i) ∼ Bernoulli(θ ) is the noisy observation of the true state, Nin(i) ⊂ A ∪ B is i’s incoming
neighbor set in G, din(i) = |Nin(i)|, and η ∈ (0, 1) is a constant (independent of agent i and time t ).
We note that, as η grows, the effect of the network becomes stronger (i.e. the opinions of agent i’s
neighbors have a stronger effect on i’s own opinion); this will be reflected in our results. Also, as
discussed in Section 2.2, we will assume din(i) > 0 ∀ i ∈ A, so (3) is well-defined.
Before discussing the bots, we comment further on the belief update (3). First, assuming η =
α0(i) = β0(i) = 0 temporarily, we simply have θt (i) = ∑tτ=1 sτ (i)/t , which is an unbiased estimate
of the true state θ . Next, if we drop the assumption α0(i) = β0(i) = 0 (but still assume η = 0), θt (i)
is no longer an unbiased estimate. Instead, we can view θt (i) as the mean of a beta distribution
with parameters αt (i), βt (i); in this case, (3) is simply a Bayesian update of the prior distribution
Beta(αt−1(i), βt−1(i)) with a Bernoulli(θ ) signal. Finally, dropping the assumption η , 0 to obtain
the model we actually consider, (3) is no longer a Bayesian update, as alluded to by the title of our
work. This non-Bayesian model is closely related to others in the literature; see Section 5.
Having specified the behavior of agents, we turn to the bots. For i ∈ B, we simply set
αt (i) = 0, βt (i) = β¯ + (1 − η)t ∀ t ∈ [T ]. (4)
Hence, the opinion of i ∈ B is θt (i) = αt (i)/(αt (i) + βt (i)) = 0, e.g. bots believe the candidate from
Party 1 is far superior. To explain the precise form of (4), consider a system composed of only agents
(i.e. B = ∅). Since β0(i) ≤ β¯ , st (i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ A, it is easy to show via (3) that βt (i) ≤ β¯ + (1 − η)t and
αt (i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ A, t ∈ [T ]. Hence, not only are bots biased towards state 0, but their bias is maximal,
in the sense that their parameters αt (i), βt (i) are as extreme as an agent’s can be.
Note that we can define the bot behavior in an alternative way that will be more convenient
for our analysis. Specifically, for i ∈ B, we can set Nin(i) = {i} (i.e. i has a self-loop and no other
incoming edges in G), α0(i) = 0, β0(i) = β¯ , and st (i) = 0 ∀ t ∈ [T ]. Then, assuming i ∈ B updates
its parameters via (3), it is straightforward to show (4) holds. This alternative definition will be
2Appendix A.1 shows the effect of the prior parameters vanishes when Tn →∞ with n, so specifying them is unnecessary.
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used for the remainder of the paper. Finally, since all bots i ∈ B have the same behavior, we assume
(without loss of generality) that the outgoing neighbor set of i ∈ B is Nout (i) = {i, i ′} for some
i ′ ∈ A, i.e. in addition to its self-loop, each bot has a single outgoing neighbor from the agent set.
2.2 Graph model
Having defined our learning model, we next specify how the social network G is constructed. For
this, we use a modification of a well-studied random graph model called the directed configuration
model (DCM) [13]. The DCM is a means of constructing a graph with a specified degree sequence;
our modification is needed to account for the distinct node types at hand (agents and bots).
To begin, we realize a random sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈A called the degree sequence from
some distribution; here we let A = [n]. In the construction described next, i ∈ A will have dout (i)
outgoing neighbors (i will be observed by dout (i) other agents), dAin(i) incoming neighbors from the
A (i will observe dAin(i) agents), and dBin(i) incoming neighbors from B (i will observe dBin(i) bots).
Here the total in-degree of i is din(i) = dAin(i) + dBin(i) (as used in (4)). We assume
dout (i),dAin(i) ∈ N,dBin(i) ∈ N0 ∀ i ∈ A,
∑
i ∈A
dout (i) =
∑
i ∈A
dAin(i). (5)
In words, the first condition says i is observed by and observes at least one agent, and may observe
by one or more bots. The second condition says sum out-degree must equal sum in-degree in the
agent sub-graph; this will be necessary to construct a graph with the given degrees.
After realizing the degree sequence, we begin the graph construction.3 First, we attach dout (i)
outgoing half-edges, dAin(i) incoming half-edges labeled A, and dBin(i) incoming half-edges labeled
B, to each i ∈ A; we will refer to these half-edges as outstubs, A-instubs, and B-instubs, respectively.
We let OA denote the set of these outstubs. We then pair each outstub in OA with an A-instub to
form edges between agents in an iterative, breadth-first-search fashion that proceeds as follows:
• Sample i∗ from A uniformly. For each the dAin(i∗) A-instubs attached to i∗, sample an outstub
uniformly fromOA (resampling if the sampled outstub has already been paired), and connect
the instub and outstub to form an edge from some agent to i∗.
• Let A1 = {i ∈ A \ {i∗} : an outstub of i was paired with an A-instub of i∗}. For each i ∈ A1,
pair the dAin(i) A-instubs attached to i in the same manner the A-instubs of i∗ were paired.
• Continue iteratively until allA-instubs have been paired. In particular, during the l-th iteration,
we pair all A-instubs attached to Al , the set of agents at distance l from i∗ (by distance l , we
mean a path of length l exists, but no shorter path exists).
At the conclusion of this procedure, we obtain a graph with edges between agents, along with
unpaired B-instubs attached to some agents. It remains to attach these B-instubs to bots. For this,
we define B = n+ [∑i ∈A dBin(i)] to be the set of bots (hence, the node set isA∪B = [n+∑i ∈A dBin(i)]).
To each i ∈ B we add a single self-loop and a single unpaired outstub (as described at the end
of Section 2.1). This yields
∑
i ∈A dBin(i) unpaired outstubs attached to bots. Finally, we pair these
outstubs arbitrarily with the
∑
i ∈A dBin(i) unpaired B-instubs from above to form edges from bots to
agents (note the exact pairing can be arbitrary since all bots behave the same, per Section 2.1).
Before proceeding, we note that the pairing of A-instubs with outstubs from OA did not prohibit
us from forming agent self-loops (i.e. edges i → i for i ∈ A), nor did it prohibit multiple edges
from i ∈ A to i ′ ∈ A. This second observation means the set of edges E formed will in general be a
3This construction is presented more formally as Algorithm 3 in Appendix A.1.
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multi-set. For this reason, we re-define the parameter update equations (3) as
αt (i) = (1 − η)(αt−1(i) + st (i)) + η
∑
j ∈A∪B
|{j ′ → i ′ ∈ E : j ′ = j, i ′ = i}|
din(i) αt−1(j), (6)
βt (i) = (1 − η)(βt−1(i) + (1 − st (i))) + η
∑
j ∈A∪B
|{j ′ → i ′ ∈ E : j ′ = j, i ′ = i}|
din(i) βt−1(j),
i.e. we weigh the opinions of i’s incoming neighbors proportional to the number of edges pointing
to i . We also note that, instead of attaching bots to B-instubs after pairing all A-instubs as described
above, we can pair B-instubs iteratively along with the pairing of A-instubs. Finally, we note that
in the case dBin(i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ A, the construction described above reduces to the standard DCM.
3 LEARNING OUTCOME
Having defined our model, we now turn to our results concerning the learning outcome. We begin
by defining the required assumptions in Section 3.1. We then state and discuss two theorems, one
each in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, in Section 3.4, we return to comment on our assumptions.
3.1 Assumptions
To define the assumptions needed to prove our results, we require some notation. First, from the
given degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈A=[n], we define
f ∗n (i, j,k) =
1
n
n∑
a=1
1((dout (a),dAin(a),dBin(a)) = (i, j,k)) ∀ (i, j,k) ∈ N × N × N0, (7)
fn(i, j,k) =
n∑
a=1
dout (a)∑
a′∈A dout (a′)
1((dout (a),dAin(a),dBin(a)) = (i, j,k)) ∀ (i, j,k) ∈ N × N × N0.
Here f ∗n and fn , respectively, are the degree distributions for an agent sampled uniformly and
sampled proportional to out-degree, respectively. Note that, since the first agent i∗ added to the
graph is sampled uniformly from A, the degrees of i∗ are distributed as f ∗n . Furthermore, recall that,
to pair A-instubs, we sample outstubs uniformly from OA, resampling if the sampled outstub is
already paired. It follows that, each time we add a new agent to the graph (besides i∗), its degrees
are distributed as fn . We also note that, because the degree sequence is random, these distributions
are random as well. Using these random distributions, we also define the random variables
p˜∗n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n (i, j,k), p˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k), (8)
q˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k).
Following the discussion above, p˜∗n is the expected value (conditioned on the degree sequence) of
the ratio of A-instubs to total instubs for i∗; p˜n is the expected value of this same ratio, but for new
agents added to the graph (besides i∗). The interpretation of q˜n is similar, i.e. the expected ratio of
A-instubs to the square of total instubs for new agents (besides i∗). At the end of Section 3.2, we
discuss in more detail why these random variables arise in our analysis.
We now define the following four assumptions, which are needed to establish our results. Two
of these statements require the degree sequence to be well-behaved (with high probability) –
specifically, (A1) requires certain moments of the degree sequence to be finite, while (A3) requires
{p˜n}n∈N to be close to a deterministic sequence {pn}n∈N. The other two statements, (A2) and (A4),
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impose maximum and minimum rates of growth for the learning horizon Tn . In particular, Tn must
be finite for each finite n by (A2) and then grow to infinity with n by (A4), as mentioned in Section
2.1. We defer further discussion of these assumptions to Section 3.4.
(A1) limn→∞ P(Ωn,1) = 1, where, for some ν1,ν2,ν3,γ > 0 independent of n with ν3 > ν1,
Ωn,1 =
{∑ni=1 dout (i)n − ν1 < n−γ , ∑ni=1 dout (i)2n − ν2 < n−γ ,
∑ni=1 dout (i)dAin(i)n − ν3
 < n−γ
}
.
(A2) ∃ N ∈ N and ζ ∈ (0, 1/2) independent of n s.t. Tn ≤ ζ log(n)/log(ν3/ν1) ∀ n ≥ N .
(A3) limn→∞ P(Ωn,2) = 1, where, for some pn ∈ [0, 1] s.t. limn→∞ pn = p ∈ [0, 1], some 0 ≤ δn =
o(1/Tn), and some ξ ∈ (0, 1) independent of n,
Ωn,2 =
{ |pn − p˜n | < δn , p˜∗n ≥ p˜n , q˜n < 1 − ξ } .
(A4) limn→∞Tn = ∞.
3.2 General case
We can now present our first result, Theorem 3.1. The theorem states that the belief at time Tn of a
uniformly random agent converges in probability as n →∞. Interestingly, the limit depends on the
relative asymptotics of the time horizon Tn and the quantity pn defined in (A3). For example, this
limit is θ when Tn(1 − pn) → 0; note that Tn(1 − pn) → 0 requires pn to quickly approach 1 (since
Tn →∞ by (A4)), which by (A3) and (8) suggests the number of bots is small. Hence, i∗ learns the
true state when there are sufficiently few bots. (The other cases can be interpreted similarly.)
Theorem 3.1. Given (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4), we have for i∗ ∼ A uniformly,
θTn (i∗)
P−−−−→
n→∞

θ , Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη), Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ c ∈ (0,∞)
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
.
Before discussing the proof of the theorem, we make several observations:
• Suppose pn is fixed and consider varyingTn . To be concrete, let pn = 1−(logn)−1/2 and define
Tn,1 = (logn)1/4 andTn,2 = (logn)3/4 (noteTn,1,Tn,2 satisfy (A2), (A4)). ThenTn,1(1−pn) → 0
and Tn,2(1 − pn) → ∞, so by Theorem 3.1, the belief of i∗ converges to θ at time Tn,1 and to 0
at time Tn,2. In words, i∗ initially (at time (logn)1/4) learns the state of the world, then later
(at time (logn)3/4) forgets it and adopts the bot opinions!
• Alternatively, suppose Tn is fixed and consider varying pn . For example, let pn = 1 − c/Tn
for some c ∈ (0,∞). Here smaller c implies fewer bots, and Theorem 3.1 says the limiting
belief of i∗ is a decreasing convex function of c (see Figure 1). One interpretation is that, if an
adversary deploys bots in hopes of driving agent beliefs to 0, the marginal benefit of deploying
additional bots is smaller when c is larger, i.e. the adversary experiences “diminishing returns”.
It is also worth noting that, since (1 − e−cη)/(cη) → 1 as c → 0 and (1 − e−cη)/(cη) → 0 as
c →∞, the limiting belief of i∗ is continuous as a function of c .
• If Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞), consider the limiting belief of i∗ as a function of η. By Theorem
3.1, this belief tends to θ as η → 0 and tends to (1−e−c )/c as η → 1. This is expected from (6):
when η = 0, agents ignore the network (and thus avoid exposure to biased bot opinions) and
form opinions based only on unbiased signals; when η = 1, the opposite is true. Interestingly,
though, there is an asymmetry here: when η → 0, the belief approaches the Tn(1 − pn) → 0
case, but when η → 1, it does not approach the Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ case (since (1 − e−c )/c > 0).
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• If pn → p < 1, we must have Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ (since Tn → ∞ by (A4)), and the belief of i∗
tends to 0 by Theorem 3.1. Loosely speaking, this says that a necessary condition for learning
is that the bots vanish asymptotically (in the sense that pn → 1).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is lengthy; for readability, we outline it in Appendix A and defer
computational details to Appendix B. However, we next present a short argument to illustrate the
fundamental reason why the three cases of the limiting belief arise in Theorem 3.1. (As a disclaimer,
this argument is not entirely precise; we refer the reader to the appendices for a rigorous proof.)
At a high level, these three cases arise as follows. First, when Tn(1 − pn) → 0, the “density” of
bots within the Tn-step incoming neighborhood of i∗ is small. As a consequence, i∗ is not exposed
to the biased opinions of bots by timeTn and is able to learn the true state (i.e. θTn (i∗) → θ in P). On
the other hand, whenTn(1−pn) → ∞, this “density” is large; i∗ is exposed to bot opinions and thus
adopts them (i.e. θTn (i∗) → 0 in P). Finally, whenTn(1−pn) → c ∈ (0,∞), the “density” is moderate;
i∗ does not fully learn, nor does i∗ fully adopt bot opinions (i.e. θTn (i∗) → θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη) in P).
The explanation of the previous paragraph is not at all surprising; what is more subtle is what
precisely density of bots within the Tn-step incoming neighborhood of i∗ means. It turns out that the
relevant quantity (and what we mean by this “density”) is the probability that a random walker
exploring this neighborhood reaches the set of bots.
To illustrate this, we consider a random walk {Xl }l ∈N that begins at X0 = i∗ and, for l ≥ 0,
chooses Xl+1 uniformly from all incoming neighbors of Xl (agents and bots); note here that the
walk follows edges in the direction opposite their polarity in the graph. For this walk, it is easy to
see that, conditioned on the event Xl ∈ A, the event Xl+1 ∈ A occurs with probability
dAin(Xl )
dAin(Xl ) + dBin(Xl )
. (9)
Importantly, we can sample this walk and construct the graph simultaneously, by choosing which
instub of Xl−1 to follow before actually pairing these instubs. Assuming they are later paired with
uniform agent outstubs, and hence connected to agents chosen proportional to out-degree, we can
average (9) over the out-degree distribution to obtain that Xl+1 ∈ A occurs with probability∑
a∈A
dAin(a)
dAin(a) + dBin(a)
dout (a)∑
a′∈A dout (a′)
= p˜n . (10)
Now since bots have a self-loop and no other incoming edges, they are absorbing states on this walk.
It follows that XTn ∈ A if and only if Xl ∈ A ∀ l ∈ [Tn]; by the argument above, this latter event
occurs with probability p˜Tnn . Since p˜n ≈ pn by (A3), we thus obtain that XTn ∈ A with probability
p˜Tnn ≈ pTnn ≈
(
1 − limn→∞Tn(1 − pn)
Tn
)Tn
≈ e− limn→∞ Tn (1−pn ).
From this final expression, the three regimes of Theorem 3.1 emerge: when Tn(1 − pn) → 0, the
random walker remains in the agent set with probability ≈ 1; this corresponds to i∗ avoiding
exposure to bot opinions and learning the true state. Similarly, Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ means the walker
is absorbed into the bot set with probability ≈ 1, corresponding to i∗ adopting bot opinions. Finally,
Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞) means the walker stays in the agent set with probability ≈ e−c ∈ (0, 1),
corresponding to i∗ not fully learning nor fully adopting bot opinions.
We note that the actual proof of Theorem 3.1 does not precisely follow the foregoing argument.
Instead, we locally approximate the graph construction with a certain branching process; we then
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study random walks on the tree resulting from this branching process.4 However, the foregoing
argument illustrates the basic reason why the three distinct cases of Theorem 3.1 arise.
Finally, we observe that the argument leading to (10) shows why p˜n enters into our analysis.
The other random variables defined in (8) enter similarly. Specifically, p˜∗n arises in almost the same
manner, but pertains only to the first step of the walk; this distinction arises since the walk starts
at i∗, the degrees of which relate to p˜∗n . On the other hand, q˜n arises when we analyze the variance
of agent beliefs. This is because analyzing the variance involves studying two random walks; by an
argument similar to (10), the probability of both walks visiting the same agent is∑
a∈A
dAin(a)
dAin(a) + dBin(a)
1
dAin(a) + dBin(a)
dout (a)∑
a′∈A dout (a′)
= q˜n .
3.3 Special case
While Theorem 3.1 establishes convergence for the belief of a typical agent, a natural question
to ask is how many agents have convergent beliefs. Our second result, Theorem 3.2, provides a
partial answer to this question. To prove the result, we require slightly stronger assumptions than
those required for Theorem 3.1 (we will return shortly to comment on why these are needed).
First, we strengthen (A1) and (A3) to include particular rates of convergence for the probabilities
P(Ωn,i ), i ∈ {1, 2}. Second, we strengthen (A4) with a minimum rate at whichTn →∞ (specifically,
Tn = Ω(logn)). Third, and perhaps most restrictively, we require pn → p < 1 in (A1). As a result,
Theorem 3.2 only applies to the case Tn(1 − pn) → ∞, for which Theorem 3.1 states the belief of a
uniform agent converges to zero. In this setting, Theorem 3.2 provides an upper bound on how
many agents’ beliefs do not converge to zero. In particular, this bound is O(nk ) for some k < 1.
Theorem 3.2. Assume ∃ κ, µ > 0 and N ′ ∈ N independent of n s.t. the following hold:
• (A1), with P(Ωn,1) = O(n−κ ).
• (A2).
• (A3), with P(Ωn,2) = O(n−κ ) and p < 1.
• (A4), with Tn ≥ µ logn ∀ n ≥ N ′.
Then for any ϵ > 0, k > 1 − min{(1/2) − ζ , µ(ϵη(1 − p)/θ )2/16,κ}, and K > 0, all independent of n,
lim
n→∞P
({i ∈ [n] : θTn (i) > ϵ} > Knk ) = 0.
We reiterate that ζ < 1/2 by (A2) and µ,κ > 0 by the theorem statement. Hence, min{(1/2) −
ζ , µ(ϵη(1 − p)/θ )2/16,κ} > 0, so one can choose k < 1 in Theorem 3.2 to show that the size of the
non-convergent set of agents vanishes relative to n. We suspect that such a result is the best one
could hope for; in particular, we suspect that showing all agent beliefs converge to zero is impossible.
This is in part because our assumptions do not preclude the graph from being disconnected. Hence,
there may be small connected components composed of agents but no bots; in such components,
agent beliefs will converge to θ (not zero). Additionally, while the lower bound for k in Theorem
3.2 is somewhat unwieldy, certain terms are easily interpretable: the bound sharpens as η grows
(i.e. as agents place less weight on their unbiased signals), as p decays (i.e. as the number of bots
grows), and as θ decays (i.e. as signals are more likely to be zero, pushing beliefs to zero).
As for Theorem 3.1, the proof of Theorem 3.2 is outlined in Appendix A with details provided in
Appendix B. The crux of the proof involves obtaining a sufficiently fast rate for the convergence
4This is necessary because the argument leading to (10) assumes instubs are paired with with uniform outstubs, which is
not true if resampling of outstubs occurs in the construction from Section 2.2.
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in Theorem 3.1; namely, we show that for some γ > 0, P(θTn (i∗) > ϵ) = O(n−γ ).5 At a high level,
obtaining such a bound requires bounding three probabilities by O(n−γ ), which also helps explain
the stronger assumptions of Theorem 3.2:
• As for Theorem 3.1, we first locally approximate the graph construction with a branching
process so as to analyze the belief process on a tree. Here strengthening (A1) with P(Ωn,1) =
O(n−κ ) is necessary to ensure this approximation fails with probability at most O(n−γ ).
• To analyze the belief process on a tree, we first condition on the random tree structure and
treat the belief as a weighted sum of i.i.d. signals using an approach similar to Hoeffding’s
inequality. Namely, we obtain the Hoeffding-like tail O(e−2ϵ 2Tn ); strengthening (A4) with
Tn ≥ µ logn is necessary to show this tail is O(e−2ϵ 2µ logn) = O(n−2ϵ 2µ ) = O(n−γ ).
• Finally, after conditioning on the tree structure, we show this structure is close to its mean.
More specifically, letting E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] denote the expected belief for the root node in the tree
conditioned on the random tree structure (see Appendix A for details), we show
P(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) = O (n−γ ) .
Note the only source of randomness in E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] is the random tree; because this tree
is recursively generated, it has a martingale-like structure that can be analyzed using an
approach similar to the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for bounded-differencemartingales. Here
we require P(Ωn,2) = O(n−κ ) to ensure the degree sequence is ill-behaved with probability at
most O(n−γ ); we also require pn → p < 1 in this step (and only in this step).
We now address the most notable difference between Theorems 3.1 and 3.2; namely, that the
latter only applies when pn → p < 1. We believe this reflects a fundamental distinction between
the cases pn → p < 1 and pn → 1 and is not an artifact of our analysis. An intuitive reason for
this is that more bots are present in the former case, so fewer random signals are present (recall
we model bot signals as being deterministically zero). As a result, θTn (i∗) is “less random”, so its
concentration around its mean is stronger. Towards a more rigorous explanation, we first note that
Appendix A.4.1 provides the following condition for extending Theorem 3.2 to other cases of pn :
∃ γ ′ > 0 s .t . P(|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| > ϵ) = O
(
n−γ
′)
, (11)
where L(pn) is the limit from Theorem 3.1 based on the relative asymptotics of Tn and pn , i.e.
L(pn) =

θ , Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη), Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ c ∈ (0,∞)
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
.
It is the convergence of |E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| in (11) that we suspect is fundamentally different
in the cases pn → p < 1 and pn → 1. To illustrate this, we provide empirical results in Figure 2. In
the leftmost plot, we show 1− p˜n versusTn ; here the plot is on a log-log scale, so a line with slopem
means (1 − p˜n) ∝ Tmn . Hence, we are comparing four cases:m ≈ 0, so that pn ≈ p < 1 (blue circles);
m ≈ −0.5, so that Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ and pn → 1 (orange squares);m ≈ −1, so that Tn(1 − pn) → 1
(yellow diamonds); andm ≈ −1.5, so thatTn(1−pn) → 0 (purple triangles). The second plot reflects
the corresponding cases of L(pn): E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] decays to zero in the first two cases, grows towards
θ = 0.5 in the fourth case, and approaches an intermediate limit in the third case. The final two
5One may wonder why we derive a separate bound for Theorem 3.2, since we have already bounded P(θTn (i∗) > ϵ ) to
prove Theorem 3.1. The reason for this is that the bound for Theorem 3.1 does not decay quickly enough as n →∞ to prove
Theorem 3.2; on the other hand, the bound for Theorem 3.2 does not decay at all as n →∞ for the caseTn (1−pn ) → [0, ∞)
and therefore cannot be used for all cases of Theorem 3.1. See Appendix A.4.2 for details.
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Fig. 2. Empirical comparison of the cases pn → p < 1, Tn (1 − pn ) → ∞ with pn → 1, Tn (1 − pn ) → 1, and
Tn (1 − pn ) → 0 (leftmost plot). On average, E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] approaches the corresponding limit from Theorem
3.1 in all cases (second plot from left). However, the error term |E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn )| behaves markedly
differently in the case pn → p < 1, with a faster decay on average (second plot from right) and a strikingly
lower variance (rightmost plot); we believe this is why Theorem 3.2 only applies in this case.
plots illustrate the convergence (or lack thereof) in (11). Here the empirical mean of the error
term |E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| decays quickly for the first case but decays more slowly (or is even
non-monotonic) in the other cases. More strikingly, the empirical variance of this error term is
several orders of magnitude smaller in the first case. This suggests that P(|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]−L(pn)| > ϵ)
decays much more rapidly in the case pn → p < 1, which is why we believe this is the only case for
which (11) is satisfied. (We point the reader to Appendix E for further details on this experiment.)
3.4 Comments on assumptions
We now return to comment on the assumptions needed to prove our results. First, (A1) states that
certain empirical moments of the degree distribution – namely, for i∗ ∼ A uniformly, the first two
moments of dout (i∗) and the correlation between dout (i∗) and dAin(i∗) – converge to finite limits.
Roughly speaking, this says our graph lies in a sparse regime, where typical node degrees do not
grow with the number of nodes.6 We also note ν3 > ν1 in (A1) is minor and simply eliminates an
uninteresting case. To see this, first note that when Ωn,1 holds, we have (roughly)
ν3
ν1
≈
∑n
i=1 dout (i)dAin(i)/n∑n
i=1 dout (i)/n
=
n∑
i=1
dout (i)∑n
i′=1 dout (i ′)
dAin(i) ≥ 1, (12)
where we have used the assumed inequality dAin(i) ≥ 1 ∀ i ∈ [n]. Hence, ν3 < ν1 cannot occur, so
assuming ν3 > ν1 simply eliminates the case ν3 = ν1. This remaining case is uninteresting because
ν3/ν1 is the limiting number of offspring for each node in the branching process we analyze; thus,
if ν3 = ν1, the tree resulting from this process is simply a line graph.
Next, (A2) states Tn = O(logn). Together with (A1), these assumptions are standard given our
analysis approach, which, as discussed previously, locally approximates the graph construction
with a branching process. We also note that, with the interpretation of ν3/ν1 above, it follows that
the number of agents within the Tn-step neighborhood of i∗ can be upper bounded by
(ν3/ν1)Tn = O
(
(ν3/ν1)ζ log(n)/log(ν3/ν1)
)
= O
(
nζ
)
= o(n).
6This is analogous to e.g. an Erdős-Rényi model with edge formation probability λ/n for some λ > 0 independent of n, in
which degrees converge in distribution to Poisson(λ) random variables that have finite mean and variance.
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In words, the size of the aforementioned neighborhood vanishes relative to n. As mentioned in
the introduction, this is why our title refers to the learning as “local”: only a vanishing fraction of
other agents (those within this neighborhood) affect the belief of i∗.
The remaining statements are needed to establish belief convergence on the tree resulting
from the branching process. (A4) states Tn → ∞ with n, which is an obvious requirement for
convergence. (A3) essentially says that three events occur with high probability. First, p˜n should be
close to a convergent, deterministic sequence pn ; this is necessary since the asymptotics of pn play a
prominent role in Theorem 3.1. Second, p˜∗n ≥ p˜n essentially says that bots prefer to attach to agents
with higher out-degrees, i.e. more influential agents; this is the behavior one would intuitively
expect from bots aiming to disrupt learning. Third, q˜n < 1 − ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a minor assumption; for
example, if all agents have total in-degree at least 2, q˜n ≤ 1/2.
4 ADVERSARIAL SETTING
In the previous two sections, we defined and then analyzed the following model:
(I) A degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n] is realized.
(II) From {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n], an agent sub-graph is constructed.
(III) To each i ∈ [n], dBin(i) bots are connected (each also containing a self-loop).
(IV) A learning process occurs on the graph connecting agents and bots.
We next consider an adversarial model, which modifies steps (I) and (III) of this model as follows:
in (I), only {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n] is realized, and in (III), an adversary chooses {dBin(i)}i ∈[n] (subject
to a budget constraint). Put differently, we first construct a graph of agents attempting to learn; an
adversary then deploys bots in hopes of disrupting this learning.
In this adversarial model, we will assume the adversary observes {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n] but does
not observe the agent sub-graph. This is a reasonable assumption for social networks like Twitter,
where follower and followee counts (i.e. out- and in-degree) are displayed on each user’s profile,
but where the actual graph of follower/followee relationships is not publicly available. Under this
assumption, our adversarial model can be equivalently defined by replacing (I) with (I’) in the
model above (but otherwise proceeding as above), where
(I’) A sequence {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n] is realized and observed by the adversary, who then chooses
{dBin(i)}i ∈[n], yielding the degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n].
To be clear, we will assume (as in previous sections) that the observed sequence satisfies
dout (i),dAin(i) ∈ N ∀ i ∈ [n],
∑
i ∈[n]
dout (i) =
∑
i ∈[n]
dAin(i),
and that the adversary’s choice satisfies dBin(i) ∈ N0 ∀ i ∈ [n], i.e. the full sequence satisfies (5).
The adversary’s goal is to disrupt learning, by which we mean minimizing the average belief at
the learning horizon θTn (i∗), subject to the budget constraint
∑n
i=1 d
B
in(i) ≤ bn (here bn is a given
non-negative integer). At first glance, it is far from obvious how the adversary should deploy bots to
achieve this goal. Hence, we appeal to Theorem 3.1: to achieve this goal asymptotically, the adversary
should deploy bots so as to minimize pn . In particular, if the adversary can drive pn to e.g. 1−T −1+ϵn
for some ϵ > 0, Theorem 3.1 ensures θTn (i∗) → 0 in P (when our assumptions hold). Furthermore, if
the adversary’s choice of {dBin(i)}i ∈[n] yields a degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n] satisfying
the assumptions of Theorem 3.17, minimizing pn is asymptotically equivalent to minimizing p˜n
(since |pn − p˜n | → 0 with high probability by (A3)). Hence, we will assume the adversary’s goal is
7We cannot actually verify these assumptions in the general case, as the structures of our forthcoming proposed solutions
are not amenable to analysis. Thus, there is a slight gap in our argument that minimizing θTn (i∗) amounts to minimizing
p˜n . However, we show empirically in Section 4.3 that θTn (i∗) and p˜n are closely correlated in practice.
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to minimize p˜n after observing the realization of {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n]. More concretely, we first let
mn =
∑n
i=1 dout (i) and (with slight abuse of notation) define the function p˜n : Nn0 → [0, 1] by
p˜n(d) =
n∑
i=1
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + d(i)
dout (i)
mn
∀ d = (d(1), . . . ,d(n)) ∈ Nn0 , (13)
which is simply p˜n , as defined in (8), viewed as a function of the bot in-degrees d(i) ≜ dBin(i)8. In
light of the preceding discussion, we then define the adversary’s problem as
min
d ∈Nn0
p˜n(d) s .t .
n∑
i=1
d(i) ≤ bn . (14)
While a solution to (14) exists, it is not clear if it can be found efficiently, since the minimization is
over a discrete set that grows exponentially in n. Thus, in the remainder of this section, we propose
two approaches to efficiently solve (or approximate the solution of) (14). The first, discussed in
Section 4.1, employs an existing algorithm for so-called M-convex minimization, which computes
the solution of (14) exactly. When accounting for the separable nature of our objective function p˜n ,
this approach is somewhat efficient, with computational complexity between O(n2) and O(n2bn).
However, this complexity is too high for social networks like Twitter, where n is on the order of 108.
Hence, our second approach, discussed in Section 4.2, is a randomized algorithm that approximates
the solution of (14) withO(n logn+bn) complexity and provably high accuracy. In addition to these
advantages, the randomized scheme has a non-obvious but interpretable form, which provides new
insights regarding vulnerabilities in non-Bayesian social learning models.
4.1 Exact solution
For the exact solution, we first rewrite (14) as mind ∈Zn pˆn(d), where
pˆn(d) =
{
p˜n(d), d(i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n],∑ni=1 d(i) = bn
∞, otherwise .
In words, we incorporated the constraints from (14) into the objective; we also used the (obvious)
fact that the solution of (14) satisfies the budget constraint with equality. In this equivalent problem,
the objective pˆn belongs to a special class of discrete-domain functions that can be efficiently
minimized. This class is the set of M-convex functions, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. [23, Section 1.4.2] Let f : Zn → R ∪ {∞} be a function with effective domain
dom(f ) = {x ∈ Zn : f (x) ∈ R}. Then f is called M-convex if for any x ,y ∈ dom(f ) and any i ∈ [n]
satisfying x(i) > y(i), there exists j ∈ [n] satisfying
y(j) > x(j), f (x) + f (y) ≥ f (x − ei + ej ) + f (y + ei − ej ).
To verify that our objective is M-convex, first note that by definition,
dom (pˆn) =
{
d ∈ Zn : d(i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n],
n∑
i=1
d(i) = bn
}
.
Now let d,d ′ ∈ dom(pˆn), i ∈ [n] s.t. d(i) > d ′(i). Then since∑nk=1 d(k) = ∑nk=1 d ′(k) = bn , we clearly
have d ′(j) > d(j) for some j ∈ [n]. From ∑nk=1 d(k) = ∑nk=1 d ′(k) = bn and d(i),d ′(j) ≥ 1, it is also
8Here and for the remainder of the section, we suppress the sub- and super-scripts to avoid cumbersome notation.
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ALGORITHM 1: Exact solution of (14)
1 Let d ∈ dom(pˆn ), compute pˆn (d) (in practice, we use a rounded version of the relaxed solution (17))
2 while 1 do
3 Compute pˆn (d − ei + ej ) ∀ i, j ∈ [n] s.t. i , j (using pˆn (d) and (15), this requires O(1) time per i, j pair)
4 Let (i∗, j∗) ∈ arg min(i, j)∈[n]2:i,j pˆn (d − ei + ej )
5 if pˆn (d) ≤ pˆn (d − ei∗ + ej∗ ) then terminate (since d is a solution of (14) by Theorem 4.2)
6 else Set d = d − ei∗ + ej∗
7 end
clear that d − ei + ej ,d ′ + ei − ej ∈ dom(pˆn). Hence, letting µ(k) = dout (k)dAin(k)/mn ,
pˆn(d − ei + ej ) =
∑
k ∈[n]\{i, j }
µ(k)
dAin(k) + d(k)
+
µ(i)
dAin(i) + d(i) − 1
+
µ(j)
dAin(j) + d(j) + 1
(15)
= pˆn(d) + µ(i)(dAin(i) + d(i) − 1)(dAin(i) + d(i))
− µ(j)(dAin(j) + d(j) + 1)(dAin(j) + d(j))
,
where we have simply used the definitions of pˆn , p˜n . Similarly, we obtain
pˆn(d ′ + ei − ej ) = pˆn(d ′) − µ(i)(dAin(i) + d ′(i) + 1)(dAin(i) + d ′(i))
+
µ(j)
(dAin(j) + d ′(j) − 1)(dAin(j) + d ′(j))
.
Adding the previous two equations, and using the inequalities d(i) ≥ d ′(i) + 1,d ′(j) ≥ d(j) + 1
(where the first holds since d(i) > d ′(i) and d(i),d ′(i) ∈ Z, and the second holds similarly) gives
pˆn(d − ei + ej ) + pˆn(d ′ + ei − ej ) ≤ pˆn(d) + pˆn(d ′), i.e. pˆn is M-convex.
Any M-convex function f satisfies the following optimality criterion, which says x minimizes f
if and only if f cannot be decreased by an “exchange”, wherein x is replaced by x − ei + ej .
Theorem 4.2. [23, Theorem 6.26] Let f be M-convex, and let x ∈ dom(f ). Then
f (x) ≤ f (y) ∀ y ∈ Zn ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (x − ei + ej ) ∀ i, j ∈ [n].
From Theorem 4.2, our exact solution emerges: we begin with an initial bot deployment d ;
we then iteratively “exchange” bots and check whether or not the objective has decreased. More
formally, our exact solution is Algorithm 1; it is taken from [23, Section 10.1.1], where it is called
steepest descent. Note that the algorithm terminates precisely when the optimality criterion of
Theorem 4.2 is satisfied; thus, Algorithm 1 provides an exact solution of mind ∈Zn pˆn(d) (equivalently,
of (14)).
We offer several remarks on the algorithm’s complexity:
• The complexity of each iteration is dominated by Line 3. If done naively, this requires O(n)
time per i, j , so each iteration has O(n3) complexity. However, by (15), we can accelerate this
by computing pˆn(d − ei + ej ) in O(1) time, which yields O(n2) complexity per iteration.
• In the best case, the initial choice of d is actually a solution. However, it still requires one
iteration to verify this, so the best-case complexity is O(n2).
• In the general case, [23, Section 10.1.1] provides a tie-breaking rule for the choice of (i∗, j∗) that
guarantees termination in max{∥d −d ′∥1 : d,d ′ ∈ dom(pˆn)} = O(bn) iterations. Furthermore,
this tie-breaking does not increase each iteration’s runtime (in an order sense). Thus, for an
arbitrary choice of initial d , the complexity is O(n2bn).
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ALGORITHM 2: Approximate solution of (14)
1 Compute dr eln (i) as in (17) and set drandn (i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ [n]
2 for j = 1 to bn do
3 SampleWj from the distribution dr eln /
∑n
k=1 d
r el
n (k), i.e. P(Wj = i) = dr eln (i)/
∑n
k=1 d
r el
n (k) ∀ i ∈ [n]
4 end
5 Set drandn (i) =
∑bn
j=1 1(Wj = i) ∀ i ∈ [n]
4.2 Approximation algorithm
We now turn to our approximation algorithm. The idea to first solve the relaxed problem
min
d ∈Rn+
p˜n(d) s .t .
n∑
i=1
d(i) ≤ bn , (16)
and then to sample bot locations in proportion to the relaxed solution. More formally, our approxi-
mate solution drandn is constructed via Algorithm 2. We note that, as shown in Appendix C.1, the
solution of the relaxed problem (16) is
dr eln (i) = dAin(i)
(√
r (i)
h∗
− 1
)
+
∀ i ∈ [n], (17)
where x+ = x1(x > 0), r (i) = dout (i)/dAin(i) ∀ i ∈ [n], h∗ = maxx ∈R+ h(x), and
h(x) =
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥x 2
√
dout (i)dAin(i)
bn +
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥x 2 dAin(i)
∀ x ∈ R+. (18)
While this randomized scheme is somewhat opaque, it in fact yields useful insights. In particular,
the randomized and relaxed solutions drandn and dr eln are equal in expectation, and the relaxed
solution dr eln satisfies some intuitive properties:
• dr eln (i) grows with r (i) = dout (i)/dAin(i), i.e. the adversary targets agents i with large dout (i)
and small dAin(i) under the relaxed solution. Here large dout (i) means i is influential (e.g. i
has many Twitter followers), while small dAin(i) means i is susceptible to influence (e.g. i has
few Twitter followees, so bot tweets will appear prominently in i’s Twitter feed).
• If r (i) < (h∗)2, then dr eln (i) = drandn (i) = 0. Hence, if i is sufficiently non-influential, and/or
sufficiently non-susceptible, then targeting i gives no value to the adversary.
• If r (i) = r (j) > (h∗)2, the relaxed solution yields
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + dr eln (i)
=
h∗√
r (i)
=
h∗√
r (j)
=
dAin(j)
dAin(j) + dr eln (j)
.
In our Twitter example, this can be interpreted as follows: the adversary strives for a similar
proportion of fake news in the feeds of users with similar ratios of influence to susceptibility.
In short, our approximate solution strives to balance influence and susceptibility. While somewhat
intuitive, the precise manner in which this balance occurs (in particular, the precise form of (17)-
(18)) is highly non-obvious. Thus, in the absence of Theorem 3.1 and the subsequent optimization
formulation of the adversary problem (14), one would not have arrived at this solution.
We now turn to the analysis of the randomized scheme. For the complexity analysis, first
observe that by definition of h, {h(x)}x ∈R+ = {h(
√
r (i))}i ∈[n]. Furthermore, {h(
√
r (i))}i ∈[n], and
thus {h(x)}x ∈R+ , can be computed in time O(n logn) as follows:
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• Compute a vector containing {r (i)}i ∈[n] sorted in decreasing order (O(n logn) time).
• Using this vector, iteratively compute the sums in (18) at each x ∈ {√r (i)}i ∈[n] (O(n) time).
• Using these sums, compute {h(√r (i)) : i ∈ [n]} (O(n) time).
In summary, {h(x)}x ∈R+ (which contains at most n elements) can be computed in O(n logn) time.
After computing this set, h∗, and subsequently dr eln , can each be computed in linear time. Thus,
computing the relaxed solution (17) requiresO(n logn) complexity. Finally, assuming we can obtain
one sample from dr eln in O(1) time after O(n logn) pre-processing time (using e.g. the alias method
[29, 30],[21, Section 3.4.1]), Algorithm 2 has total complexity O(n logn + bn).
Analyzing the accuracy of Algorithm 2 is more difficult, so we state an accuracy guarantee here
and defer the proof to the appendices. The guarantee says that with high probability, and ∀ δ > 0,
p˜n
(
drandn
)
<
1 + δ + p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
2 + δ ⇔ 1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
> 1 −
1 + δ + p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
2 + δ =
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
2 + δ ,
where doptn is any solution of (14), i.e. 1 − p˜n(drandn ) provides a constant-factor approximation of
1 − p˜n(doptn ) with high probability. More formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Assume the following holds:
∃ {xn}n∈N ⊂ [0,∞) s .t . lim
n→∞xn = ∞, limn→∞P
(
mn(1 − p˜n(doptn ))
maxj ∈[n] r (j) ≥ xn
)
= 1. (19)
Then for any δ > 0,
lim
n→∞P
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
We reiterate that p˜n(doptn ) and p˜n(drandn ) are both random variables; the former some complicated
function of the given (random) degrees {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n], the latter also depending on the random
sampling in Algorithm 2. To prove Theorem 4.3, we first condition on the given degrees – so that the
only randomness is the Algorithm 2 sampling – and bound the probability that p˜n(drandn ) exceeds
(1+δ+p˜n(doptn ))/(2+δ ) (viewed as a fixed quantity when conditioning on the given degrees).We then
average over the realization of {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n] and use (19) to show that this tail bound decays
in n. In particular, the conditional tail bound almost surely decays inmn(1− p˜n(doptn ))/maxj ∈[n] r (j);
this is a complicated function of the given degrees and thus a difficult random variable to understand,
so we assume it behaves as in (19) to prove concentration of p˜n(drandn ).
In light of this proof approach, one may think (19) simply “assumes away” the difficulty of the
proof, but we argue that this assumption is in fact minor. Indeed, in the setting of Theorem 3.1, and
in particular by the sparsity assumption (A1), the following occur with high probability:
mn ≈ ν1n, max
j ∈[n]
r (j) ≤ max
j ∈[n]
dout (j) = max
j ∈[n]
√
dout (j)2 <
√∑
j=1
dout (j)2 ≈ √ν2n.
Thus, assumption (19) in Theorem 4.3 holds if (A1) holds and with high probability,
√
n
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
))
−−−−→
n→∞ ∞. (20)
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If instead (20) fails, assumption (19) may fail as well. However, if (20) does fail, the Tn = O(logn)
assumption of Theorem 3.1 implies
Tn
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
))
= O
(
logn/√n
)
−−−−→
n→∞ 0,
which, by Theorem 3.1, suggests that agents successfully learn.9 In short, (19) only eliminates cases
in which even the most sophisticated adversary (i.e. one using the optimal strategy) cannot prevent
learning. This is an uninteresting case of the adversarial setting, so (19) is a minor assumption.
As a corollary of Theorem 4.3 (and of the Theorem 3.1 analysis), we can prove the following.
It essentially says that if the most sophisticated adversary can drive the typical belief to zero, then
the randomized scheme will drive the typical belief to zero as well. It also establishes the reverse
implication; while this is intuitively obvious, it requires some work to prove (though no additional
effort than is needed to establish the forward implication, so we include it for completeness). Here
we write θoptt (i) and θ randt (i), respectively, for the belief of agent i ∈ [n] at time t ∈ [Tn] in the
graphs with bot degrees doptn and drandn , respectively.
Corollary 4.4. Assume (A1), (A2), (A4), and (19) hold. Then for i∗ ∼ [n] uniformly,
θ
opt
Tn
(i∗) P−−−−→
n→∞ 0 ⇔ θ
rand
Tn (i∗)
P−−−−→
n→∞ 0.
Proof. See Appendix D. □
Note the corollary assumes (A1), (A2), and (A4); this allows us to leverage the branching process
approximation from the Theorem 3.1 proof. Importantly, these assumptions only involve the
learning horizon Tn and the given degrees {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n], not the bot degrees {dBin(i)}i ∈[n].
We again assume (19), but as discussed above, this is minor in the context of (A1), (A2).
4.3 Empirical results
A fundamental assumption in our adversary solutions is that p˜n and θTn (i∗) are correlated, in the
sense that minimizing p˜n also minimizes θTn (i∗). While Theorem 3.1 states this correlation holds
for the random graph model of Section 2.2, it is unclear if this correlation occurs in practice. To
conclude this section, we present empirical results suggesting that this indeed occurs.
In our experiments, we compare our proposed solutions against some natural heuristics:
• A naive baseline, which uses Algorithm 2 but samples eachWj uniformly from [n].
• Three schemes which similarly use Algorithm 2, along with the observed degrees: sampling
Wj proportional to dout (i.e. targeting influential nodes), dAin (i.e. targeting susceptible nodes),
and dout/dAin (i.e. naively balancing influence and susceptibility).
• SamplingWj proportional to PageRank(ϵ) [24], defined as10
PageRank(ϵ) = ϵ1n
n
∞∑
j=0
(1 − ϵ)j
(
PTA
) j
,
where ϵ ∈ (0, 1), 1n is the length-n ones vector, and PA is the agent sub-graph’s column-
normalized adjacency matrix, i.e. the n × n dimensional matrix with (i, j)-th element
PA(i, j) = 1(i → j ∈ En)
dAin(j)
∀ i, j ∈ [n].
9Theorem 3.1 only “suggests” and does not prove this owing to the gap in our argument concerning p˜n, pn ; see Footnote 7.
10In experiments, we compute the first ⌈log(0.99)/log(1 − ϵ )⌉ summands, which guarantees an l1 error bound of 0.01.
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Table 1. Dataset details
Name Description n |En |
Gnutella Peer-to-peer network 6,301 20,777
Wiki-Vote Wikipedia administrator elections 7,115 103,689
Pokec Slovakian social network 1,632,803 30,622,564
LiveJournal Blogging platform 4,847,571 68,993,773
PageRank is a commonly-used measure of influence/centrality for graphs in many domains
[17] (and a richer such measure than dout ).
We compare our proposed solutions with these heuristics using four datasets from [22], described
in Table 1. We chose these datasets so we could test our proposed solutions on real social networks
of two scales: Gnutella and Wiki-Vote have n < 104, a scale at which the exact solution Algorithm
1 is feasible; Pokec and LiveJournal have n > 106, a scale that renders Algorithm 1 infeasible but
that more closely resembles massive social networks of interest.
For the experiments, we set θ = 0.5 (the case of maximal variance for the underlying signals),
η = 0.9 (to emphasize the effect of the network), and Tn = 101 (to ensure the code had reasonable
runtime). We set bn = ⌈|En |/400⌉, so that (roughly) 0.25% of all agent in-edges are connected to
bots. For each graph and each of five experimental trials, we chose {dBin(i)}i ∈[n] as described above,
added bots to the original graph accordingly, and simulated the learning process from Section 2.1.
In Figure 3, we plot the mean and standard deviation (across experimental trials) of θt (i∗) as a
function of t (to avoid cluttering the plot, we only show θt (i∗) for t ∈ {1, 11, . . . , 101 = Tn}). For all
datasets, our proposed solutions outperform all heuristics, in the sense that our solutions yield the
lowest average θt (i∗) for most values of t . More specifically, we note the following:
• Across all datasets, our solutions outperform PageRank(ϵ) for all values of ϵ tested. This is
quite surprising, because PageRank uses the entire graph structure, whereas our solutions
only use degree information. Also, as ϵ becomes increasingly smaller, PageRank(ϵ) performs
increasingly better, but this comes at the cost of higher runtime to estimate PageRank(ϵ).
• Among the heuristics using (at most) degree information, dout/dAin performs best – but still
worse than Algorithm 2 – across all datasets. Put differently, naively balancing influence and
susceptibility is not enough; the non-obvious form of Algorithm 2 yields better performance.
• For Gnutella and Wiki-Vote, Algorithm 1 noticeably outperforms Algorithm 2. Though the
former is an exact solution and the latter is an approximation, this is still surprising, since it
is unclear that these schemes are even optimizing the correct objective for real graphs.
While Figure 3 only considers one choice of bn , we believe our conclusions are robust. In
particular, we also tested the cases bn = ⌈b˜ |En |⌉ for each b˜ ∈ { 11600 , 1800 , 1400 , 1200 , 1100 }, so that
between ≈ 0.0625% and ≈ 1% of edges connected to bots (thus, Figure 3 shows the middle case
b˜ = 1400 ). Appendix E contains a figure analogous to Figure 3 for the other choices of b˜; the plots
are qualitatively similar. In Figure 4, we also summarize this set of results by plotting the final
average belief θTn (i∗) as a function of bn . Generally speaking, the gap between our solutions and the
heuristics increases as bn decreases. Put differently, if an adversary with a limited budget spends this
budget intelligently (i.e. using our proposed solutions), they can still disrupt learning; in contrast,
an adversary with a large budget need not be as careful. Also, as expected, θTn (i∗) decreases in bn
in Figure 4.
We have thus far shown that our solutions outperform heuristics, even those using graph structure.
This is somewhat remarkable: our solutions were derived under the fundamental assumption that
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Fig. 3. Average belief over time when simulating our learning model on real datasets; our proposed solutions
(Algorithms 1 and 2) outperform heuristics, even those using graph structure (i.e. PageRank).
Fig. 4. Average belief at the learning horizon versus budget on real datasets. Generally, the improvement of
our solutions over heuristics increases as bn decreases (and, as expected, θTn (i∗) decreases in bn ).
Fig. 5. As suggested by Figures 3 and 4, θTn (i∗) and p˜n are closely correlated for real social networks.
minimizing θTn (i∗) amounts to minimizing p˜n , but we only verified this assumption for a class
of random graphs. Thus, our empirical results suggest that even for real social networks, this
assumption holds. Indeed, in Figure 5 we show scatter plots of θTn (i∗) against p˜n (each dot represents
one experimental trial). For all datasets, the two quantities are closely correlated.
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5 RELATEDWORK
Before closing, we discuss some connections between existing work and ours. First, from a modeling
perspective, we note our belief update (3) is closely related to the popular non-Bayesian social
learning model from [20]. In that model, agent beliefs are distributions over a finite set of possible
states of the world (not simply scalars, as in our model), but belief updates are similar. Specifically,
at time t agent i updates its belief µt (i) as
µt (i) = ηiiBU(µt−1(i),ωt (i)) +
∑
j ∈Nin (i)
ηi jµt−1(j),
where ωt (i) is the signal received by i at t , BU(µt−1(i),ωt (i)) means a Bayesian update of the prior
belief µt−1(i) with the observed signal ωt (i), and ∑j ∈Nin (i)∪{i } ηi j = 1. In [20, Proposition 3], it is
shown that, under certain assumptions, including the graph being fixed and strongly connected,
these distributions converge to point masses on the true state as t →∞.
Per the discussion following (3) in Section 2.1, our model can be viewed as a variant of this one, in
which all agents have beta beliefs and Bernoulli signals, communicate parameters of distributions
instead of the distributions themselves, and average parameters instead of distributions. From this
viewpoint, our quantity of interest θt (i) is simply the mean of agent i’s belief. However, the crucial
assumptions of strong connectedness and an infinite learning horizon from [20] are violated in our
model (the former since bots have self-loops but no other incoming edges; the latter since we take
Tn = O(logn)). This necessitates a different analysis, which in turn requires us to simplify the model
from [20] by communicating scalars and by taking a simple form of the weights {ηi j }j ∈Nin (i)∪{i } .
We also note our variant of the model from [20] is quite similar to the model in the working
paper [6]. In fact, our belief update and inclusion of bots are both taken from this work (with
minor differences to bot behavior). However, this work only includes theoretical results in the case
B = ∅; the case B , ∅ is studied empirically. This allows [6] to use a slightly richer model than ours,
including a time-varying graph structure, agent-dependent mixture parameters
∑
j ∈Nin (i)∪{i } ηi j ,
and three types of nodes (bots, agents who observe bots, and agents who do not observe bots).
Notably, the empirical results from [6] for the caseB , ∅ fix a learning horizon and do not investigate
the effects of different timescales; in particular, the delicate relationship between timescale and bot
prevalence that we describe in Theorem 3.1 is not brought to light in [6].
While our paper, [20], and [6] refer to the belief update as “non-Bayesian”, perhaps amore accurate
term is “quasi-Bayesian”, since it combines a Bayesian update with (non-Bayesian) averaging. A
different quasi-Bayesian model was considered in [5], in which agents exchange beliefs and perform
Bayesian updates, but treat neighbors’ beliefs as independent. Stubborn agents are not considered
in [5], so it would be interesting to incorporate them and study the effect on learning.
From an analytical perspective, our approach of analyzing beliefs by studying random walks is
not new. Perhaps the most obvious example is the classical deGroot model [14], in which agent
i updates its (scalar) belief as θt (i) = ∑j θt−1(j)W (j, i) for some column-stochastic matrix W .
Collecting beliefs in vector form yields θt = θt−1W = · · · = θ0W t , where θ0 is the vector of initial
beliefs. From here, it is clear that beliefs relate closely to random walks, since the i-th column of
W t gives the distribution of a t-step random walk from i on the weighted graph defined byW . This
observation has been exploited in the literature; see the surveys [19, Section 3] and [2, Section 4],
and the references therein. For example, assumingW is irreducible and aperiodic, and therefore has
a well-defined stationary distribution π , [18] establishes conditions for learning using the fact that
θt (i) = θ0W teTi ≈ θ0πT ∀ i when t is large. Beyond the deGroot model and deGroot-like models
such as ours, random walk interpretations have also been leveraged in Bayesian learning models.
For example, [25] considers a model for which agents perform a Bayesian update using their own
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signal but using the prior of a randomly-chosen neighbor. Exchanging priors with neighbors yields
a natural connection to random walks; assuming strong connectedness, the authors exploit the fact
that the walk visits every agent infinitely often (i.o.) to derive conditions for learning.
Similar to [20], these works typically assume strong connectedness and long learning horizons
so as to leverage properties such as stationary distributions and i.o. visits. This is a fundamental
distinction from our work. Indeed, even if we disregard stubborn agents, so that the random walk
converges to a stationary distribution, it does not converge within our local learning horizon. This
is because, as shown in [9], the sparse DCM we consider has mixing time that exceeds
logn∑
i ∈[n] log(dAin(i)) dout (i)∑i′∈A dout (i′) ≥
logn
log(∑i ∈[n] dAin(i) dout (i)∑i′∈A dout (i′) ) ≈ lognlog(ν3/ν1) ,
where the inequality is Jensen’s and the approximate equality is (12). The final expression exceeds
Tn by (A2), i.e. our learning horizon occurs before the underlying random walk mixes. In fact, [9]
shows that the random walk on the DCM exhibits cutoff, meaning that the Tn-step distribution of
this walk can be maximally far from the stationary distribution (i.e. the total variation distance
between these distributions can be 1 for certain starting locations of the walk). Hence, not only
can we not use this stationary distribution, we cannot even use an approximation of it. Again,
this means our analysis cannot leverage global properties typically used when relating beliefs to
random walks and thus requires a different approach. We also note that our idea to simultaneously
construct the graph and sample the walk (as discussed in Section 3.2) is taken from [9].
Some other works have considered social learning with stubborn agents. For example, [3] studies
a model in which agents meet and either retain their own (scalar) beliefs, adopt the average of
their beliefs, or adopt a weighted average; the agent whose belief has a larger weight is called
a “forceful” agent. Here the authors show that all agent beliefs converge to a common random
variable and study its deviation from the true state. A crucial difference between this work and ours
is that [3] assumes even forceful agents occasionally observe other agents’ opinions. This yields an
underlying Markov chain that is irreducible (unlike ours, in which stubborn agents are absorbing
states); the analysis then relies on this chain having a well-defined stationary distribution.
Stubborn agents have also been considered in the consensus setting. This setting is similar to the
social learning setting we consider, but instead of asking whether agents learn an underlying state,
one asks whether agent beliefs converge to a common value, i.e. a consensus. For example, [1]
considers a model in which regular agents adopt weighted averages of beliefs upon meeting other
agents (regular or stubborn), while stubborn agents always retain their own beliefs. This intuitively
prohibits a consensus from forming; indeed, it is shown that agent beliefs fail to converge, and
therefore that disagreement can persist indefinitely. Another example is [16], in which an agent’s
belief at time t + 1 is a weighted average of their own belief at time 0 and their neighbors’ beliefs
at time t . In this model, stubborn agents place all weight on their own belief from time 0 and
thus do not update their beliefs. The analysis in [16] is similar to ours as it relates agent beliefs
to hitting probabilities of the stubborn agent set, but it differs as the learning horizon is infinite
in [16]. Also in the consensus setting, [26] investigates protocols for robust consensus that may
lessen the undesirable effects of stubborn agents in e.g. [1, 16].
Finally, we note that the random graph model we consider was proposed and analyzed in [13].
As mentioned in Appendix A, our analysis uses a branching process approximation of this model
that draws from the analysis of [12]. The directed configuration model is a natural extension of the
undirected configuration model, the study of which originated in [7, 8, 31].
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we analyzed a model for social learning in the presence of stubborn agents. Our
learning outcome analysis identified a close relationship between the learning horizon, the “density”
of stubborn agents, and the learning outcome. We also considered an adversarial setting which,
paired with our learning outcome analysis, yielded insights regarding social learning vulnerabilities.
Several extensions of our learning outcome analysis can be considered. First, it would be useful to
generalize our model to allow for agent- and/or time-dependent mixture parameters (i.e. allowing
η to vary with i and/or t in (6)). Allowing agent dependence suggests a more heterogeneous model
in which some agents place more value on private observations, while others place more value on
the opinions of their social connections. Allowing time dependence, and specifically allowing ηt to
vanish as t grows, suggests a model in which agents become more “set in their ways” over time.
Second, one could keepTn finite for each finite n but allow it to asymptotically dominate our “local”
O(logn) horizon. Here our branching process approximation fails, so this would require a different
analysis. However, it would be interesting to see if the three regimes of Theorem 3.1 still hold for
such Tn , or if a different phenomenon emerges when global effects of the network take hold. Third,
as mentioned in Section 5, it would be interesting to perform a learning outcome analysis like ours
for other quasi-Bayesian models, such as the one from [5].
Each of these extensions of our model would likely yield a different learning outcome, and thus a
different objective function in the adversarial setting. Hence, each may require a different analysis
to determine optimal or near-optimal bot strategies. Subsequently, each may also yield new and
useful insights regarding the sensitivity of the associated models.
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREMS 3.1 AND 3.2 (OUTLINE)
The proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 proceed in two steps. First, we show that the graph construction
can be locally approximated by a certain branching process. Second, we analyze the beliefs of agents
in the graph by instead analyzing the beliefs of agents in the tree resulting from the branching
process. We note that studying tree agent beliefs rather than graph agent beliefs is advantageous
because the tree has a comparatively simple structure that is more amenable to analysis.
The first step is identical for both theorems, while the second step requires a different analysis for
each theorem. In Appendix A.1, we outline the first step, and in Appendices A.2 and A.3, respectively,
we outline the second step for Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. To highlight the key ideas of
our analysis, we defer many details to Appendix B; in particular, proofs pertaining to Appendices
A.1, A.2, and A.3 , respectively, can be found in Appendices B.1, B.2, and B.3, respectively. Finally,
we note that throughout the analysis we use Pn and En , respectively, to denote probability and
expectation, respectively, conditioned on the degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n].
A.1 Branching process approximation (Step 1 for proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2)
We first show that the belief of any agent in the graph depends (asymptotically) only on the structure
of the agent’s local neighborhood and on certain signals realized within this neighborhood. This
will facilitate the definition of the branching process with which we will approximate the graph
construction. Importantly, the graph agent’s belief will not depend on the prior parameters α0, β0
(asymptotically). This is necessary as we have not specified these priors (beyond assuming they are
bounded by some α¯ , β¯ independent of n, as discussed in Section 2.1).
To begin, we require some notation. Let P denote the graph’s column-normalized adjacency
matrix, i.e. P(i, j) = |{i ′ → j ′ ∈ E : i ′ = i, j ′ = j}|/din(j), and set Q = (1 − η)I + ηP , where I is the
identity matrix of appropriate dimension. (Recall from Section 2.2 that E is in general a multi-set;
hence, the numerator in P(i, j) may exceed 1.) Next, for t ∈ N, let st denote the collection of signals
{st (i)}i ∈A∪B in vector form. Finally, for i ∈ A define
ϑTn (i) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
sTn−tQ
teTi . (21)
We note that (21) can be rewritten as
ϑTn (i) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
∑
j ∈A
sTn−t (j)ejQteTi , (22)
where we have used the fact that st (j) = 0 ∀ t ∈ N, j ∈ B. From this expression, it is clear that ϑTn (i)
only depends on the structure of the Tn-step neighborhood into i (since only this sub-graph affects
the ejQteTi terms) and on certain signals within this neighborhood, as mentioned above. We can
then establish the following.
Lemma A.1. Given (A4), ∀ ϵ > 0 ∃ N s.t. ∀ n ≥ N , |θTn (i) − ϑTn (i)| < ϵ a.s . ∀ i ∈ A.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1. □
Before defining the aforementioned branching process, we formally define the graph construction
described in Section 2.2. For this, we will use the following additional notation.
• We let Al , l ∈ N0 denote the set of agents at distance l from the initial agent i∗, i.e. i ∈ Al
means a path from i to i∗ of length l exists, but no shorter path exists (hence, A0 = {i∗},
A1 = Nin(i∗), etc.). Similarly, we let Bl , l ∈ N0 denote the set of bots at distance l from i∗.
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• We let {(i, j) : j ∈ [dout (i)]} denote the set of outstubs belonging to i ∈ A; we let OA denote
the set of all such outstubs.
• For each (i, j) ∈ OA, we define a label д((i, j)) ∈ {1, 2, 3} as follows:
д((i, j)) =

1, i does not yet belong to graph
2, i belongs to graph but (i, j) has not been paired
3, i belongs to graph and (i, j) has been paired
. (23)
We will explain the utility of these labels shortly.
With this notation in place, we present the formal graph construction as Algorithm 3. We offer
some further comments to help explain the algorithm:
• The algorithm takes as input the degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈A, which is used
in Line 1 to define OA. Also in Line 1, we label all outstubs as 1 (since no agents have been
added to the graph), and we initialize the set of bots to the empty set.
• In Line 2, we sample the agent i∗ from which the graph construction begins. Since i∗ then
belongs to the graph, we change the labels of its outstubs to 2.
• For the remainder of the algorithm, we proceed in a breadth-first-search fashion, looping
over distance l and agents i at distance l from i∗. For each such agent, we do the following:
– For each of the dAin(i) instubs of i intended for pairing with agent outstubs, we sample an
agent outstub uniformly (Line 7), resampling until an unpaired outstub (i.e. one with label 1
or 2) has been found (Line 9). Upon finding such an outstub, denoted (i ′, j ′), we pair it with
i’s instub to form an edge from i ′ to i (Line 10). Note that д((i ′, j ′)) = 1 implies i ′ was added
to the graph when edge i ′ → i was formed; hence, because i ∈ Al , i ′ is at distance l + 1
from i∗ and must be added to Al+1 (Line 11). Finally, we update the labels of the outstubs
of i ′ via (23) (Lines 11-12). (Line 8 will be used in the branching process approximation and
will be discussed shortly.)
– For each of the dBin(i) instubs of i intended for pairing with bot outstubs, we add a new
bot with a self-loop and an unpaired outstub to the set of bots, updating Bl+1 accordingly
(Line 15), and then add an edge from the new bot to i (Line 16). Note here that B = ∅ at
the start of the construction; it follows that the k-th bot added to the graph is n + k + 1, so
B = n + [∑i ∈A dBin(i)] is the set of bots at the end of the construction.
– Finally, if all agent outstubs have been paired, the construction terminates (Line 18).
We now return to discuss Line 8 of Algorithm 3. Here τn denotes the first iteration at which an
outstub with label 2 or 3 is sampled for pairing with an instub. Put differently, τn > l means that
for the first l iterations of the construction, only outstubs with label 1 have been sampled. This has
two consequences. First, no edges have been added between two nodes both at distance ≤ l from
i∗, i.e. the l-step incoming neighborhood of i∗ is a tree (except for the self-loops attached to bots).
Second, no resampling of outstubs has occurred (Line 9); this implies that the outstub (i ′, j ′) paired
in Line 10 is chosen uniformly fromOA, so the degrees (dout (i ′),dAin(i ′),dBin(i ′)) of i ′ are distributed
according to the out-degree distribution fn defined in (7).
These observations motivate a tree construction that we define next. In particular, we will
construct a tree (except for bot self-loops) with edges pointing towards the root. Agents will be
added to the tree with degrees sampled from fn , except for the root node, whose degrees are
sampled from f ∗n (also defined in (7)), corresponding to the degrees of i∗ in the graph construction.
The tree construction requires further notation. First, we let Aˆl (Bˆl , respectively) denote agents
(bots, respectively) at distance l from the tree’s root. We also set Aˆ = ∪∞l=0Aˆl , Bˆ = ∪∞l=0Bˆl . (Here and
moving forward, we use ·ˆ to distinguish tree-related objects from similarly-defined graph-related
ones.) At times, we will use branching process terminology and e.g. refer to Aˆl as the l-th generation
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ALGORITHM 3: Graph-Construction
1 Set OA = {(i, j) : i ∈ A, j ∈ [dout (i)]}, д((i, j)) = 1 ∀ (i, j) ∈ OA, B = ∅
2 Sample i∗ uniformly from A; set д((i∗, j)) = 2 ∀ j ∈ [dout (i∗)]; set A0 = {i∗}
3 for l = 0 to∞ do
4 Set Al+1 = Bl+1 = ∅
5 for i ∈ Al do
6 for j = 1 to dAin (i) do
7 Sample (i ′, j ′) from OA uniformly
8 if д((i ′, j ′)) , 1 and τn = ∞ then set τn = l
9 while д((i ′, j ′)) = 3 do sample (i ′, j ′) from OA uniformly
10 Add directed edge from i ′ to i
11 if д((i ′, j ′)) = 1 then set Al+1 = Al+1 ∪ {i ′}, д((i ′, j ′)) = 3, д((i ′, j ′′)) = 2 ∀ j ′′ ∈ [dout (i ′)] \ {j ′}
12 else if д((i ′, j ′)) = 2 then set д((i ′, j ′)) = 3
13 end
14 for j = 1 to dBin (i) do
15 Add bot b = n + |B | + 1 with self-loop and unpaired outstub, set B = B ∪ {b},Bl+1 = Bl+1 ∪ {b}
16 Add directed edge from b to i
17 end
18 if д((i ′, j ′)) = 3 ∀ (i ′, j ′) ∈ OA then return
19 end
20 end
of agents. We let ϕ denote the root node, so that Aˆ0 = {ϕ}. We will denote generic node in Aˆl ∪ Bˆl
as i ∈ Nl ; here i = (i1, . . . , il ) encodes the ancestry of i, i.e. (i1, . . . , il ) is the child of (i1, . . . , il−1),
who is in turn the child of (i1, . . . , il−2), etc. Finally, for such i and for j ∈ N, (i, j) = (i1, . . . , il , j) is
the concatenation operation and i|j = (i1, . . . , i j ) denotes i’s ancestor in generation j, with i|0 = ϕ
by convention (note also that i|l = i for such i).
With this notation in place, we define the tree construction in Algorithm 4. We offer several
more explanatory comments:
• Lines 2 and 6-11 define a particular random walk that will be used in Appendix A.2; they do
not affect the tree structure and we defer further explanation to Appendix A.2.
• As mentioned above, the root node ϕ has degrees sampled from f ∗n (Line 1), while all other
agents have degrees sampled from fn (Line 13).
• In Line 14, a directed edge is added from (i, j) to i; the other dout ((i, j)) − 1 outstubs of (i, j)
are left unpaired so that the tree structure is preserved (except for bot self-loops).
• At the conclusion of the l-th iteration, i ∈ Aˆl has incoming neighbor set (offspring, in
the branching process terminology) {(i, j) : j ∈ [dAin(i) + dBin(i)]}. More specifically, the
subset (i, 1), . . . , (i,dAin(i)) of i’s incoming neighbors are agents (Line 14), while the subset
(i,dAin(i) + 1), . . . , (i,dAin(i) + dBin(i)) of i’s incoming neighbors are bots (Line 17).
• Unlike the graph construction, the tree construction continues indefinitely, yielding an infinite
tree (except for bot self-loops) with edges pointing towards the root node ϕ.
Having defined the tree construction, we also define ϑˆTn (ϕ) as in (21) but using the tree from
Algorithm 4 instead of the graph from Algorithm 3. Specifically, we let
ϑˆTn (ϕ) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
sˆTn−tQˆ
teTϕ =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈Aˆ
sˆTn−t (i)eiQˆteTϕ , (24)
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ALGORITHM 4: Tree-Construction
1 Define fn , f ∗n via (7), set Aˆ0 = {ϕ}, sample (dout (ϕ),dAin (ϕ),dBin (ϕ)) from f ∗n
2 Set X 10 = X
2
0 = ϕ
3 for l = 0 to∞ do
4 Set Aˆl+1 = Bˆl+1 = ∅
5 for i ∈ Aˆl do
6 for k ∈ {1, 2} do
7 if Xkl = i then
8 Sample j∗ from [dAin (i) + dBin (i)] uniformly, set Xkl+1 = (i, j∗)
9 if j∗ > dAin (i) then set Xkl ′ = (i, j∗) ∀ l ′ ∈ {l + 2, l + 3, · · · }
10 end
11 end
12 for j = 1 to dAin (i) do
13 Sample (dout ((i, j)),dAin ((i, j)),dBin ((i, j))) from fn
14 Add directed edge from (i, j) to i, set Aˆl+1 = Aˆl+1 ∪ {(i, j)}
15 end
16 for j = 1 to dBin (i) do
17 Add bot b = (i,dAin (i) + j) with self-loop and unpaired outstub, set Bˆl+1 = Bˆl+1 ∪ {b}
18 Add directed edge from b to i
19 end
20 end
21 end
where sˆt (i) ∼ Bernoulli(θ ) ∀ t ∈ N, i ∈ Aˆ; sˆt (i) = 0 ∀ t ∈ N, i ∈ Bˆ; Qˆ = (1 − η)I + ηPˆ ; and Pˆ is the
column-normalized adjacency matrix of the tree from Algorithm 4. We pause to note that
0 ≤ ϑˆTn (ϕ) ≤
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
1QˆteTϕ = 1, (25)
where the first inequality holds since (24) is a sum of nonnegative terms, the second follows since∑
i∈Aˆ sˆTn−t (i)ei ≤ 1 component-wise (where 1 is the all ones vectors) and since QˆteTϕ is element-wise
nonnegative, and the equality holds by column stochasticity of Qˆ .
We can now state Lemma A.2, which relates the belief of a uniformly random agent in the graph
with the belief of the root node in the tree. For the first statement in the lemma, we argue that,
conditioned on τn > Tn , the Tn-step neighborhood of i∗ in the graph and the Tn-step neighborhood
of ϕ in the tree are constructed via the same procedure; since the signals are defined in the same
manner as well, this implies ϑTn (i∗) and ϑˆTn (ϕ) have the same distribution. The second statement
of the lemma says that the condition τn > Tn occurs with high probability; it is essentially implied
by [12, Lemma 5.4]. We note that the assumptions (A1) and (A2) are required for this second
statement to hold, and are standard assumptions needed to locally approximate a sparse random
graph construction with a branching process. Finally, we recall ζ < 1/2 by (A2), which is why the
limit shown in Lemma A.2 holds.
Lemma A.2. Assume (A1) and (A2) hold, and let D= denote equality in distribution. Then
ϑTn (i∗)|{τn > Tn} D= ϑˆTn (ϕ), P(τn ≤ Tn |Ωn,1) = O
(
nζ −1/2
)
−−−−→
n→∞ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2. □
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We can now state and prove Lemma A.3, which is the main result for Step 1 of the proofs of the
theorems. This result will allow us to analyze convergence of θTn (i∗) (the graph agent belief) by
instead analyzing convergence of ϑˆTn (ϕ) (the tree agent belief).
Lemma A.3. Assume (A1), (A2), and (A4) hold. Then ∀ x ∈ R and all n ∈ N sufficiently large,
P(|θTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ) ≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − x | > ϵ/2) + P(ΩCn,1) +O
(
nζ −1/2
)
.
Proof. First, given ϵ > 0, we have for sufficiently large n,
P(|θTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ) ≤ P(|θTn (i∗) − ϑTn (i∗)| + |ϑTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ) ≤ P(|ϑTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ/2),
where the first inequality uses the triangle inequality and in the second we used Lemma A.1 to
bound |θTn (i∗) − ϑTn (i∗)| by ϵ/2 a.s . Furthermore, by the law of total probability, we have
P(|ϑTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ/2) ≤ P(|ϑTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ/2|τn > Tn) + P(τn ≤ Tn |Ωn,1) + P(ΩCn,1).
Combining the previous two inequalities and using Lemma A.2 (which applies since (A1), (A2) are
assumed to hold), we obtain
P(|θTn (i∗) − x | > ϵ) ≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − x | > ϵ/2) +O
(
nζ −1/2
)
+ P(ΩCn,1),
which is what we set out to prove. □
Before proceeding, we state another lemma that will be used in Step 2 of the proofs for both
theorems. This lemma uses the fact that each agent in the tree has a unique path to the root. As a
result, we can obtain an alternate expression for the terms eiQˆteTϕ appearing in (24).
Lemma A.4. For each n ∈ N,
ϑˆTn (ϕ) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
sˆTn−t (i)
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1 a.s ., (26)
where by convention
∏l−1
j=0 din(i|j)−1 = 1 when l = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3. □
A.2 Step 2 for proof of Theorem 3.1
Our next goal is to establish convergence of ϑˆTn (ϕ), fromwhich convergence ofθTn (i∗)will follow via
Lemma A.3. For this, we will use Chebyshev’s inequality, so we begin with two lemmas describing
the limiting behavior of the mean and variance of ϑˆTn (ϕ). Here and moving forward, for random
variables X and Y we use Varn(X ) = En[X 2] − (En[X ])2 and Covn(X ,Y ) = En[XY ] − En[X ]En[Y ]
to denote variance and covariance conditional on the degree sequence.
Lemma A.5. Given (A3) and (A4), we have the following:
lim
n→∞Tn(1 − pn) = 0 ⇒ limn→∞ |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] − θ |1(Ωn,2) = 0 a.s .
lim
n→∞Tn(1 − pn) = c ∈ (0,∞) ⇒ limn→∞
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] − θ 1 − e−cηcη  1(Ωn,2) = 0 a.s .
lim
n→∞Tn(1 − pn) = ∞⇒ limn→∞ |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)]|1(Ωn,2) = 0 a.s .
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1. □
Lemma A.6. Given (A3) and (A4), limn→∞ Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ))1(Ωn,2) = 0 a.s .
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.2. □
Before proceeding, we briefly describe our approach to proving these lemmas. First, we note
that in analyzing the moments of ϑˆTn (ϕ), the i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables sˆTn−t (i) in (26) are
easily dealt with; the difficulty arises from the
∏l−1
j=0 din(i|j)−1 terms. Luckily, there is a simple
interpretation of these terms that guides our analysis and that proceeds as follows. First, define
a random walk {X 1l }l ∈N0 with X 10 = ϕ and X 1l chosen uniformly from the incoming neighbors of
X 1l−1, for each l ∈ N. Then, as shown in (45) in Appendix B.2.1,
E
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1 = P(X 1l ∈ Aˆl ).
In short, computing the mean of ϑˆTn (ϕ) amounts to computing hitting probabilities of the form
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆl ). Similarly, to analyze the second moment of ϑˆTn (ϕ), we compute hitting probabilities of
the form P(X 1l ∈ Aˆl ,X 2l ∈ Aˆl ), where X 2l is defined in the same manner as X 1l and is conditionally
independent of X 1l given the tree structure. We note that, in principal, the k-th moment of ϑˆTn (ϕ)
can be computed by analyzing k walks. However, the calculations become exceedingly complex as
k grows, and because we only require two moments, we do not study any case k > 2.
This interpretation explains Lines 2 and 6-11 of Algorithm 4: in Line 2, we begin two random
walks at the root node ϕ; each time Lines 6-11 are reached, we advance the random walks one step.
Importantly, we simultaneously sample the walks and construct the tree. In particular, the l-th step
of the walk is taken at Line 8, before the degrees of the corresponding node are realized in Line 13;
this is crucial to our computation of the aforementioned hitting probabilities. Finally, we note that
in Line 9 of Algorithm 4, the condition j∗ > dAin(i) implies the walk reaches the set of bots Bˆ; since
bots have self-loops but no other incoming edges, they act as absorbing states on the walk. This is
why the entire future trajectory of the walk can be defined in Line 9.
In Lemmas A.7 and A.8, we compute the hitting probabilities needed for the proofs of Lemmas
A.5 and A.6. We note that, in addition to the random variables p˜n , p˜∗n , q˜n defined in (8) in Section 3.1,
Lemma A.8 requires the definition of several similar random variables; we define these in (27) (and
also recall the definitions of p˜n , p˜∗n , q˜n for convenience). We discuss these in more detail shortly.
p˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k)
q˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k)
r˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
j − 1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k)
p˜∗n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n (i, j,k)
q˜∗n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n (i, j,k)
r˜ ∗n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
j − 1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n (i, j,k)
(27)
Lemma A.7. We have
Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ) =
{
p˜∗np˜l−1n , l ∈ N
1, l = 0
.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.4. □
Lemma A.8. For l ′ > l , we have
Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ) =
{
Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ)p˜l
′−l
n , l ∈ N
p˜∗np˜l
′−1
n , l = 0
.
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Furthermore,
Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ) =

r˜ ∗np˜
2(l−1)
n +
∑l
t=2 q˜
∗
nq˜
t−2
n r˜np˜
2(l−t )
n + q˜
∗
nq˜
l−1
n , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
r˜ ∗n + q˜∗n , l = 1
1, l = 0
. (28)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.5. □
Before proceeding, we comment on the form of (28), which helps explain the definitions in (27).
Namely, in (28), r˜ ∗np˜
2(l−1)
n is the probability of the two random walks visiting different agents on the
first step of the walk (r˜ ∗n term), then separately remaining in the agent set for the next l − 1 steps of
the walk (p˜2(l−1)n term); similarly, q˜∗nq˜t−2n r˜np˜
2(l−t )
n is the probability of the walks visiting the same
agents for t − 1 steps (q˜∗nq˜t−2n term), then visiting a different agent on the t-th step (r˜n term), then
separately remaining in the agent set for l − t steps (p˜2(l−t )n term); finally, q˜∗nq˜l−1n is the probability of
the walks remaining together and in the agent set for l steps. Each of these arguments follows from
(27): p˜n gives the probability of a single walk proceeding to an agent (j/(j + k) term), q˜n gives the
probability of two walks proceeding to the same agent (j/(j + k) term for the first walk, 1/(j + k)
term for the second walk), and r˜n gives the probability of two walks proceeding to different agents
(j/(j + k) term for the first walk, (j − 1)/(j + k) term for the second walk). Similar arguments apply
to p˜∗n , q˜∗n , r˜ ∗n , except these pertain to the first steps of the walks.
Equipped with Lemmas A.5 and A.6, we can prove Theorem 3.1. First, suppose Tn(1 − pn) → 0.
Given ϵ > 0, we can use Lemma A.3 to obtain (provided the limits exist)
lim
n→∞P(|θTn (i
∗) − θ | > ϵ) ≤ lim
n→∞
(
P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2) + P(ΩCn,1) +O
(
nζ −1/2
))
(29)
= lim
n→∞P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2),
where we have used P(ΩCn,1) → 0 by (A1) and ζ < 1/2 by (A2). Next, using total probability,
P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2) ≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2,Ωn,2) + P(ΩCn,2). (30)
We can further expand the first summand in (30) as
P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2,Ωn,2) ≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − EnϑˆTn (ϕ)| + |EnϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2,Ωn,2)
≤ P
(
|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − EnϑˆTn (ϕ)| >
ϵ
4 ,Ωn,2
)
+ P
(
|EnϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | >
ϵ
4 ,Ωn,2
)
, (31)
where we have simply used the triangle inequality and the union bound. Now for the first summand
in (31), we have (via total expectation and the conditional form of Chebyshev’s inequality)
P
(
|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − EnϑˆTn (ϕ)| >
ϵ
4 ,Ωn,2
)
= E
[
Pn
(
|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − EnϑˆTn (ϕ)| >
ϵ
4
)
1(Ωn,2)
]
(32)
≤ 16
ϵ2
E
[
Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ))1(Ωn,2)
]
−−−−→
n→∞ 0,
where the limit holds by Lemma A.6. For second summand in (31), we write
P
(
|EnϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | >
ϵ
4 ,Ωn,2
)
= E
[
1
(
|EnϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | >
ϵ
4
)
1(Ωn,2)
]
(33)
≤ 4
ϵ
E[|EnϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ |1(Ωn,2)] −−−−→n→∞ 0,
where the first two lines use total expectation and the inequality 1(x > y) ≤ x/y for x ,y > 0 (which
is easily proven by considering the cases x > y and x ≤ y), and the limit holds by Lemma A.5.
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Finally, combining (29), (30), (31), (32), and (33), and recalling that P(ΩCn,2) → 0 by (A3), we obtain
0 ≤ lim
n→∞P(|θTn (i
∗) − θ | > ϵ) ≤ lim
n→∞P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2) = 0.
Since ϵ > 0 was arbitrary, we conclude that θTn (i∗) converges to θ in probability, completing the
proof in the case Tn(1 − pn) → 0. For the cases Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞) and Tn(1 − pn) → ∞,
respectively, we can replace θ with θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη) and 0, respectively (the corresponding cases
from Lemma A.5), but otherwise follow the same approach.
A.3 Step 2 for proof of Theorem 3.2
Similar to the second step in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we begin by analyzing the limiting behavior
of ϑˆTn (ϕ). However, we will use a different approach than that used in Theorem 3.1. This approach
is made possible by the stronger assumptions of Theorem 3.2, and it will yield a fast rate of
convergence that will allow us to prove the theorem.
To explain our approach, we first recall that Lemma A.4 states
ϑˆTn (ϕ) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
sˆTn−t (i)
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1.
Hence, letting T denote the collection of random variables defining the tree structure,
E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
E[sˆTn−t (i)|T ]
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1 (34)
=
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1,
where we have simply used the fact that the signals are i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ ) random variables. Our
basic approach will now proceed in two steps. First, in Lemma A.9 we condition on the tree structure,
so that ϑˆTn (ϕ) is simply a weighted sum of i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ ) random variables; the lemma shows
that this weighted sum is close to its conditional mean E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] with high probability. Second,
in Lemma A.10, we show that the conditional mean E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] converges to zero in probability.
Before proceeding, we also note that an argument similar to (25) implies
0 ≤ E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] ≤ θ a.s ., (35)
which will be used in the proofs of the lemmas in this section.
We now state Lemma A.9. As mentioned, the proof involves analyzing a weighted sum of i.i.d.
random variables; hence, our analysis is similar to the derivation of Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma A.9. Assume ∃ µ > 0 and N ′ ∈ N independent of n s.t. the following hold:
• (A4), with Tn ≥ µ logn ∀ n ≥ N ′.
Then ∀ ϵ > 0,
P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]| > ϵ) = O
(
n−2ϵ
2µ
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1. □
Lemma A.10 states that conditional mean E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] converges to zero in probability. Note
that the only source of randomness in E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] is the tree structure. Since the tree structure
is generated recursively, E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] has a martingale-like structure; this allows us to use an
approach similar to the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for bounded-difference martingales.
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Lemma A.10. Assume ∃ κ, µ > 0 and N ′ ∈ N independent of n s.t. the following hold:
• (A3), with P(Ωn,2) = O(n−κ ) and p < 1.
• (A4), with Tn ≥ µ logn ∀ n ≥ N ′.
Then ∀ ϵ > 0,
P(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) = O
(
n−min{µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2,κ }
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.2. □
With Lemmas A.9 and A.10 in place, we can prove Theorem 3.2. First, since θTn (i∗), ϑˆTn (ϕ) ≥ 0,
taking x = 0 in Lemma A.3 yields
P(θTn (i∗) > ϵ) ≤ P(ϑˆTn (ϕ) > ϵ/2) + P(ΩCn,1) +O
(
nζ −1/2
)
= P(ϑˆTn (ϕ) > ϵ/2) +O (n−κ ) +O
(
nζ −1/2
)
, (36)
where the equality is by the theorem assumptions. For the first summand in (36), we write
P(ϑˆTn (ϕ) > ϵ/2) = P((ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]) + E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ/2)
≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]| + E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ/2)
≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]| > ϵ/4) + P(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ/4)
= O
(
n−ϵ
2µ/8 + n−min{µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2/16,κ }
)
= O
(
n−min{µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2/16,κ }
)
,
where the first equality adds and subtracts a term, the first inequality is immediate, the second
inequality uses the union bound, the second equality uses Lemmas A.9 and A.10, and the final
equality holds since η,p ∈ (0, 1) implies ϵ2µ/8 > µ(ϵη(1 − p)/θ )2/16. Substituting into (36),
P(θTn (i∗) > ϵ) = O
(
n−min{(1/2)−ζ ,µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2/16,κ }
)
. (37)
We can then write
E
{i ∈ [n] : θTn (i) > ϵ} = ∑
i ∈[n]
E1(θTn (i) > ϵ) =
∑
i ∈[n]
P(θTn (i) > ϵ)
= nP(θTn (i∗) > ϵ) = O
(
n1−min{(1/2)−ζ ,µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2/16,κ }
)
,
where we have used (37). Hence, by Markov’s inequality,
P
({i ∈ [n] : θTn (i) > ϵ} > Knk ) ≤ K−1n−kE {i ∈ [n] : θTn (i) > ϵ}
= O
(
n−k+(1−min{(1/2)−ζ ,µ(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2/16,κ })
)
−−−−→
n→∞ 0,
where the limit holds by the assumption on k in the statement of the theorem.
A.4 Other remarks
A.4.1 A sufficient condition for extending Theorem 3.2. Here we show that the condition (11)
from Section 3.3 is sufficient to extend Theorem 3.2 to other cases of pn . Recall this condition is
∃ γ ′ > 0 s .t . P(|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| > ϵ) = O
(
n−γ
′)
, (38)
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where L(pn) is the limit from Theorem 3.1 based on the relative asymptotics of Tn and pn , i.e.
L(pn) =

θ , Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη), Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ c ∈ (0,∞)
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
. (39)
Suppose (38) holds in the case Tn(1 − pn) → 0, so that L(pn) = θ . In this case, we have
P(|θTn (i∗) − θ | > ϵ) ≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − θ | > ϵ/2) +O
(
n−min{κ,(1/2)−ζ }
)
≤ P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]| > ϵ/4) + P(|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − θ | > ϵ/4) +O
(
n−min{κ,(1/2)−ζ }
)
≤ O
(
n−ϵ
2µ/8
)
+O
(
n−γ
′)
+O
(
n−min{κ,(1/2)−ζ }
)
= O
(
n−min{ϵ
2µ/8,γ ′,κ,(1/2)−ζ }
)
,
where the first inequality is Lemma A.3 (which holds for all cases of pn ) with P(Ωn,1) = O(n−κ ) and
the third uses Lemma A.9 (which holds for all cases ofpn ) and the sufficient condition (38). Hence, by
the argument following (37), we obtain for any ϵ > 0,K > 0, andk ′ > 1−min{ϵ2µ/8,γ ′,κ, (1/2)−ζ },
P
(
|{i ∈ [n] : |θTn (i) − θ | > ϵ}| > Knk
′) −−−−→
n→∞ 0,
i.e. Theorem 3.2 holds with k replaced by k ′. The same argument shows that Theorem 3.2 holds
(with only a change of k) in the cases Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞) and Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ with pn → 1.
A.4.2 Comparing Step 2 for proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. As shown in Appendices A.2 and
A.3, Step 2 for the proofs of both theorems involves bounding P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − L(pn)| > ϵ/2) for the
appropriate L(pn). One may wonder why we have conducted a different analysis for the two
theorems. The reason is that, as shown in Appendix B.3.3, the analysis for Step 2 of Theorem 3.2
yields a bound that does not decay with n in the case Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ [0,∞). Hence, we have
derived a bound for Theorem 3.1 that encompasses all cases of limn→∞Tn(1 − pn). On the other
hand, the bound from Theorem 3.1 only states P(|ϑˆTn (ϕ) − L(pn)| > ϵ/2) → 0 but does not provide
a rate of convergence so cannot be used to prove Theorem 3.2. We also note Appendix B.3.3 shows
that, while the bound for Step 2 of Theorem 3.2 does decay in n for the case Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ with
pn → 1, it does not decay quickly enough to establish (11).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREMS 3.1 AND 3.2 (DETAILS)
B.1 Branching process approximation (Step 1 for proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2)
B.1.1 Proof of LemmaA.1. For t ∈ N0, letαt , βt denote the parameters {αt (i)}i ∈A∪B , {βt (i)}i ∈A∪B
in vector form, and let 1 denote the all ones vector. We claim
αt = (1 − η)
t∑
τ=1
sτQ
t−τ + α0Qt , βt = (1 − η)
t∑
τ=1
(1 − sτ )Qt−τ + β0Qt ∀ t ∈ N. (40)
We prove (40) for αt ; the proof for βt follows the same approach. First, we use the parameter update
equations (6), and the definitions of P and Q from Appendix A.1 (P being the column-normalized
adjacency matrix and Q = (1 − η)I + ηP ) to write the parameter update equation in vector form as
αt = (1 − η)(αt + st ) + ηαt−1P = (1 − η)st + αt−1Q . (41)
Local non-Bayesian social learning with stubborn agents 35
We next use induction. For t = 1, (40) is equivalent to (41). Assuming (40) holds for t − 1, we have
αt = (1 − η)st + αt−1Q = (1 − η)st +
(
(1 − η)
t−1∑
τ=1
sτQ
(t−1)−τ + α0Qt−1
)
Q
= (1 − η)st + (1 − η)
t−1∑
τ=1
sτQ
t−τ + α0Qt = (1 − η)
t∑
τ=1
sτQ
t−τ + α0Qt ,
which completes the proof. Next, recalling ei is the vector with 1 in the i-th position and 0 elsewhere,
θTn (i) =
αTn (i)
αTn (i) + βTn (i)
=
(1 − η)∑Tnτ=1 sτQTn−τ eTi + α0QTneTi
(1 − η)∑Tnτ=1 1QTn−τ eTi + (α0 + β0)QTneTi
=
(1 − η)∑Tnτ=1 sτQTn−τ eTi + α0QTneTi
(1 − η)Tn + (α0 + β0)QTneTi
=
1
Tn
∑Tn
τ=1 sτQ
Tn−τ eTi +
1
(1−η)Tn α0Q
TneTi
1 + 1(1−η)Tn (α0 + β0)QTneTi
,
where the equalities hold by definition, by (40), since the columns of Q sum to 1 by definition,
and by multiplying numerator and denominator by 1(1−η)Tn , respectively. Next, recall from Section
2.1 that α0(j) ∈ [0, α¯] ∀ j ∈ A ∪ B for some α¯ > 0. Hence, α0 is element-wise upper bounded by
α¯1, so α0QTneTi ≤ α¯1QTneTi = α¯ , where we have used column stochasticity of Q . Additionally,
α0Q
TneTi ≥ 0 (since the three terms in the product are elementwise nonnegative). By a similar
argument, 0 ≤ β0QTneTi ≤ β¯ . Taken together, we can use the previous equation to obtain
1
Tn
∑Tn
τ=1 sτQ
Tn−τ eTi
1 + α¯+β¯(1−η)Tn
≤ θTn (i) ≤
1
Tn
Tn∑
τ=1
sτQ
Tn−τ eTi +
α¯
(1 − η)Tn .
Finally, recall from Section 2.1 that α¯ and β¯ are independent of n. Hence, because Tn → ∞ as
n → ∞ (by (A4) in the statement of the lemma), α¯/Tn , β¯/Tn → 0 as n → ∞. It follows that, for
given ϵ > 0 and n sufficiently large, |θTn (i) − 1Tn
∑Tn
τ=1 sτQ
Tn−τ eTi | < ϵ . Finally, by changing the
index of summation, it is clear that 1Tn
∑Tn
τ=1 sτQ
Tn−τ eTi = ϑTn (i), completing the proof.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma A.2. We begin by arguing ϑTn (i∗)|{τn > Tn} D= ϑˆTn (ϕ). For this, first
consider the sub-graph containing only edges between two agents formed during the first Tn
iterations of Algorithm 3. Conditioned on τn > Tn , this sub-graph is constructed as follows:
• The initial agent i∗ is sampled uniformly from A (Line 2), which implies its degrees (dout (i∗),
dAin(i∗),dBin(i∗)) are distributed as f ∗n . (In fact, this holds even if τn ≤ Tn .)
• Each time an edge is added to the sub-graph (Line 10), the paired outstub (i ′, j ′) is sampled
uniformly fromOA (else, τn > Tn is contradicted by Line 8-9), so the degrees (dout (i ′),dAin(i ′),
dBin(i ′)) of the corresponding agent i ′ are distributed as fn .
• The initial agent i∗ has no paired outstubs, while all other agents in the sub-graph have one
paired outstub (otherwise, an outstub with label 2 was paired within the first Tn iterations,
contradicting τn > Tn by Line 8); in particular, the sub-graph has | ∪Tnl=0 Al | nodes and
| ∪Tnl=0 Al | − 1 edges. Also, every agent in the sub-graph has a path to i∗ by the breadth-first-
search nature of the construction, so, neglecting edge polarities, we obtain a connected graph
with | ∪Tnl=0 Al | nodes and | ∪Tnl=0 Al | − 1 edges, i.e. a tree. Finally, since all edges point towards
i∗ (see Line 10), the sub-graph is a directed tree pointed towards i∗.
In summary, the sub-graph is a directed tree pointing towards an agent with degrees distributed as
f ∗n , in which all other nodes have degrees distributed as fn . This is precisely the procedure used
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to construct the sub-graph of agents during the first Tn iterations of Algorithm 4. Additionally,
Algorithms 3 and 4 add bots in the same manner (Lines 15-16 in Algorithm 3, Lines 17-18 in
Algorithm 4). Taken together, we conclude that, conditioned on τn > Tn , the Tn-step neighborhood
into i∗ is constructed in the same manner in Algorithm 3 as the Tn-step neighborhood into ϕ
is constructed in Algorithm 4. Furthermore, by (22) and (24), it is clear that ϑTn (i) and ϑˆTn (ϕ),
respectively, depend only on these respective neighborhoods, and on the signals sTn−t (i) and
sˆTn−t (i), respectively. Since the signals sTn−t (i) and sˆTn−t (i) are also defined in the same manner
(sTn−t (i), sˆTn−t (i) ∼ Bernoulli(θ ) for i ∈ A, i ∈ Aˆ; sTn−t (i) = sˆTn−t (i) = 0 for i ∈ B, i ∈ Bˆ), we
ultimately conclude that ϑTn (i∗) and ϑˆTn (ϕ) have the same distribution when τn > Tn holds.
We next argue {τn > Tn} occurs with high probability when Ωn,1 holds. For this, we note that
Algorithm 3 is nearly identical to the graph construction described in [12, Section 5.2]. More
specifically, the only difference is that the construction in [12] does not include the pairing of agent
instubs with bots in Lines 15-16 of Algorithm 3. However, these lines do not affect τn . Moreover,
when (A1) holds, the assumptions of [12, Lemma 5.4] are satisfied. This lemma states that, if
tn < (logn)/(2 log(ν3/ν1)) and ν3 > ν1 (with ν1,ν3 defined as in (A1)), then P(τn ≤ tn |Ωn,1) =
O((ν3/ν1)tn/√n). In particular, by (A2) we have Tn ≤ ζ log(n)/log(ν3/ν1) for n sufficiently large,
with ζ ∈ (0, 1/2) independent of n; substituting gives
P(τn ≤ Tn |Ωn,1) = O
( (ν3/ν1)ζ log(n)/log(ν3/ν1)√
n
)
= O
(
nζ −1/2
)
.
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma A.4. We first claim that for l ∈ N0 and i ∈ Aˆl ,
eiPˆ
l ′eϕ =
{∏l−1
j=0 din(i|j)−1, l ′ = l
0, l ′ ∈ N0 \ {l}
. (42)
(Recall Pˆ is the column-normalized adjacency matrix.) We prove (42) separately for l = 0 and l ∈ N.
When l = 0, the only case is i = ϕ (since Aˆ0 = {ϕ}); if l ′ = 0, the left side is clearly 1 and the right
side is 1 by convention; if l ′ ∈ N, the left side is 0 since eϕ Pˆ l ′ = 0 (ϕ has no outgoing neighbors in
the tree). Next, we aim to prove (42) for i ∈ Aˆl and l ∈ N. For such i, there is a unique path from i
to ϕ with length l that visits the nodes i|l = i, i|l − 1, . . . , i|0 = ϕ. By definition of Pˆ , it follows that
eiPˆ
leϕ = Pˆ(i|l , i|l − 1)Pˆ(i|l − 1, i|l − 2) · · · Pˆ(i|1, i|0) = 1
din(i|l − 1)
1
din(i|l − 2) · · ·
1
din(ϕ) .
On the other hand, if l ′ , l , no path of length l ′ from i to ϕ exists, so eiPˆ l
′
eϕ = 0. This proves (42).
Recalling that Qˆ = (1 − η)I + ηPˆ , we next claim that ∀ t ∈ N0,
Qˆt =
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l Pˆ l . (43)
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We prove (43) inductively: both sides equal I when t = 0; assuming (43) is true for t , we have
Qˆt+1 = ((1 − η)I + ηPˆ)
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l Pˆ l
=
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t+1−l Pˆ l +
t+1∑
l=1
(
t
l − 1
)
ηl (1 − η)t+1−l Pˆ l
= (1 − η)t+1I +
t∑
l=1
((
t
l
)
+
(
t
l − 1
))
ηl (1 − η)t+1−l Pˆ l + ηt+1Pˆ t+1
= (1 − η)t+1I +
t∑
l=1
(
t + 1
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t+1−l Pˆ l + ηt+1Pˆ t+1,
where in the first line we have used the definition of Qˆ and the inductive hypothesis, the second
line simply uses the distributive property, the third rearranges summations, and the fourth uses
Pascal’s rule ([t +1] has (t+1l ) subsets of cardinality l ; ( tl−1) that contain 1 and (tl ) that do not contain
1). This completes the proof of (43).
Having established (43) and (42), we can combine them to obtain ∀ t ∈ N0, i ∈ Aˆl ,
eiQˆ
teϕ =
{(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l ∏l−1j=0 din(i|j)−1, l ≤ t
0, l > t
.
Finally, substituting the previous equation into (24), and recalling Aˆ = ∪∞l=0Aˆl , we obtain
ϑˆTn (ϕ) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
∑
i∈Aˆl
sˆTn−t (i)
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1,
which completes the proof.
B.2 Step 2 for proof of Theorem 3.1
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma A.5. First, letting D denote the degree sequence and T denote the set of
random variables defining the tree structure, we can use Lemma A.4 to write
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−lEn

∑
i∈Aˆl
E[sˆTn−t (i)|D,T]
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1

=
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−lEn

∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
 =
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−lPn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ),(44)
where the first equality uses the tower property of conditional expectation and the fact that Aˆl and
d(i|j)−1 are fixed given the tree structure, the second uses the fact that sˆTn−t (i) ∼ Bernoulli(θ ), and
the third holds by the tower property and the definition of X 1l , i.e.
Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ) = En[P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|D,T)] = En

∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
 . (45)
Here we have also used the fact that {X 1l }l ∈N is a random walk starting at the root of a directed
tree; hence, for i ∈ Aˆl , P(X 1l = i|D,T) is the probability of the lone path from ϕ to i, which is
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j=0 din(i|j)−1, and X 1l ∈ Aˆ⇔ X 1l = i for some i ∈ Aˆl . Next, using (44) and Lemma A.7, we obtain
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] =
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
(
t∑
l=1
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l p˜∗np˜l−1n + (1 − η)t
)
, (46)
where by convention the summation over l is zero when t = 0. Adding and subtracting (1−η)t p˜∗n/p˜n ,
the previous equation can be rewritten as
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] =
θ
Tn
p˜∗n
p˜n
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
(ηp˜n)l (1 − η)t−l + θ
Tn
(
1 − p˜
∗
n
p˜n
) Tn−1∑
t=0
(1 − η)t (47)
=
θ
Tn
p˜∗n
p˜n
Tn−1∑
t=0
(1 − η(1 − p˜n))t + θ
Tn
(
1 − p˜
∗
n
p˜n
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
=
θ
Tn
p˜∗n
p˜n
1 − (1 − η(1 − p˜n))Tn
η(1 − p˜n) +
θ
Tn
(
1 − p˜
∗
n
p˜n
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
,
where we have simply used the binomial theorem and computed two geometric series.
Next, we assume temporarily that pn → 1 as n →∞. By (A3), we have for ω ∈ Ωn,2
p˜n(ω) ∈ (pn − δn ,pn + δn).
Hence, by pn → 1, and since δn → 0 by (A3), we have for γ1 > 0, n sufficiently large, and such ω
1 − γ1 < p˜
∗
n(ω)
p˜n(ω) < 1 + γ1,
where we have also used the fact that 1 ≥ p˜∗n ≥ p˜n on Ωn,2 by (A3). Also, by (A4), it is clear that
(1 − (1 − η))Tn/Tn → 0, so for given γ2 > 0 and n sufficiently large,
0 < θ
Tn
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
< γ2.
Combining the previous four equations implies that for n sufficiently large and ω ∈ Ωn,2,
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) < (1 + γ1)
θ
Tn
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn
η(1 − pn − δn) + γ1γ2, (48)
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) > (1 − γ1)
θ
Tn
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn + δn))Tn
η(1 − pn + δn) − γ1γ2.
We complete the proof for the case Tn(1 − pn) → 0; the proof for the other two cases is similar. In
this case, we can use Lemma B.1 from Appendix B.4 to obtain for any γ3 > 0 and for n large enough
1 − γ3 < 1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))
Tn
Tnη(1 − pn − δn) < 1 + γ3,
1 − γ3 < 1 − (1 − η(1 − pn + δn))
Tn
Tnη(1 − pn + δn) < 1 + γ3.
Combining the previous two equations gives for n large and ω ∈ Ωn,2
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) < θ (1 + γ1)(1 + γ3) + γ1γ2 = θ + θ (γ1 + γ3 + γ1γ3) + γ1γ2,
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) > θ (1 − γ1)(1 − γ3) − γ1γ2 = θ − θ (γ1 + γ3 − γ1γ3) − γ1γ2.
Hence, for given γ > 0, we can find γ1,γ2,γ3 sufficiently small and n sufficiently large such that, for
ω ∈ Ωn,2, |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) − θ | < γ . This clearly also implies |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) − θ |1(Ωn,2)(ω) < γ for
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such ω. On the other hand, for ω < Ωn,2, it is trivial that |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) − θ |1(Ωn,2)(ω) = 0 < γ .
This completes the proof for the case Tn(1 − pn) → 0.
We now return to the case pn → p ∈ [0, 1). In this case, it follows from (A4) that Tn(1 − pn) →
[0,∞) cannot occur, i.e. we need only consider the case Tn(1 − pn) → ∞. First, note that since
pn → p < 1 and δn → 0, we have pn +δn < 1−γ1 for some γ1 > 0 and n sufficiently large. For such
n, and for ω ∈ Ωn,2, we then obtain p˜n(ω) < 1 − γ1; substituting into (46) (evaluated at ω) gives
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) <
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
(
t∑
l=1
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l (1 − γ1)l−1 + (1 − η)t
)
(49)
<
θ
Tn
1
1 − γ1
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l (1 − γ1)l = θ
Tn
1
1 − γ1
1 − (1 − ηγ1)Tn
ηγ1
<
θ
Tn
1
1 − γ1
1
ηγ1
where in the first inequality we used p˜n(ω) < 1 − γ1 and p˜∗n(ω) ≤ 1, in the second we used
1−γ1 ∈ (0, 1) (so that (1−η)t < (1−η)t/(1−γ1)), for the equality we used the binomial theorem and
computed a geometric series, and the final inequality is immediate. Since θ ,η,γ1 are independent
of n, while Tn →∞ as n →∞ by (A4), it is clear from this final expression that, for given γ > 0, n
sufficiently large, andω ∈ Ωn,2, 0 ≤ En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) < γ . It follows that |En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)]|1(Ωn,2) → 0 a.s .,
completing the proof.
B.2.2 Proof of Lemma A.6. First, suppose pn → p ∈ [0, 1). Then, since ϑˆTn (ϕ) ≤ 1 a.s . (see (25)
and the following argument), Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ)) ≤ EnϑˆTn (ϕ)2 ≤ EnϑˆTn (ϕ). Furthermore, since Tn →∞
by (A4), the fact thatpn → p ∈ [0, 1)means only the caseTn(1−pn) → ∞ can occur. In this case, since
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)]1(Ωn,2) → 0 a.s . by Lemma A.5, we immediately obtain from Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ)) ≤ En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)]
that Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ))1(Ωn,2) → 0 a.s . as well. Hence, it only remains to prove the lemma in the case
pn → 1, which we assume to hold for the remainder of the proof.
Towards this end, lettingD denote the degree sequence and T denote the set of random variables
defining the tree structure (as in Appendix B.2.1), we have
Varn(ϑˆTn (ϕ)) = En[Var(ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T)] + Varn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T]). (50)
We next consider the two summands in (50) in turn. In particular, we aim to show that each
summand multiplied by 1(Ωn,2) tends to zero a.s . as n tends to infinity.
For the first summand in (50), we use the fact that the signals are i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ ) given the tree
structure, as well as Lemma A.4, to write
Var(ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T) =
1
T 2n
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
∑
i∈Aˆl
Var(sˆTn−t (i)|D,T)
((
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
)2
=
1
T 2n
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
∑
i∈Aˆl
θ (1 − θ )
((
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
)2
≤ 1
T 2n
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1 ≤ 1
Tn
,
where in the final step we have used
∑
i∈Aˆl
∏l−1
j=0 din(i|j)−1 ≤ 1 and
∑t
l=0
(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l = 1. It
immediately follows that 0 ≤ En[Var(ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T)]1(Ωn,2) ≤ 1/Tn a.s . Hence, because Tn → ∞
as n →∞ by (A4), analysis of the first summand in (50) is complete.
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For the second summand in (50), we first use the argument of (44) to write
E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T] =
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
=
θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
l=0
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
Tn−1∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l ≜ θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
l=0
YluTn,l ,
where we have defined Yl =
∑
i∈Aˆl
∏l−1
j=0 din(i|j)−1 and uTn,l =
∑Tn−1
t=l
(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l . Therefore,
Varn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T]) =
θ 2
T 2n
(
Tn−1∑
l=0
u2Tn,lVarn(Yl ) + 2
Tn−1∑
l=0
uTn,l
Tn−1∑
l ′=l+1
uTn,l ′Covn(Yl ,Yl ′)
)
. (51)
It remains to compute the variance and covariance terms in (51). First, for any l , l ′ ∈ N, we note
En[YlYl ′] = En
[
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|D,T)P(X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D,T)
]
(52)
= En
[
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D,T)
]
= Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ),
where we have used the argument of (45) and the fact that {X 1i }∞i=1 and {X 2i }∞i=1 are independent
random walks given the tree structure. By a similar argument, En[Yl ] = Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ). Hence, using
Lemmas A.7 and A.8, and assuming for the moment that l > 1, we have
Varn(Yl ) = Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ) − (Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ))2
= r˜ ∗np˜
2(l−1)
n +
l∑
t=2
q˜∗nq˜
t−2
n r˜np˜
2(l−t )
n + q˜
∗
nq˜
l−1
n − (p˜∗np˜l−1n )2
=
r˜ ∗n
p˜2n
p˜2ln +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜4n
p˜2ln
l−2∑
l=0
(
q˜n
p˜2n
)t
+
q˜∗n
q˜n
q˜ln −
(p˜∗n)2
p˜2n
p˜2ln
=
r˜ ∗n
p˜2n
p˜2ln +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜4n
p˜2ln
1 − (q˜n/p˜2n)l−1
1 − (q˜n/p˜2n)
+
q˜∗n
q˜n
q˜ln −
(p˜∗n)2
p˜2n
p˜2ln
=
r˜ ∗n
p˜2n
p˜2ln +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n
p˜2ln
1 − (q˜n/p˜2n)l−1
p˜2n − q˜n
+
q˜∗n
q˜n
q˜ln −
(p˜∗n)2
p˜2n
p˜2ln
=
r˜ ∗n
p˜2n
p˜2ln +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n(p˜2n − q˜n)
p˜2ln −
q˜∗nr˜n
q˜n(p˜2n − q˜n)
q˜ln +
q˜∗n
q˜n
q˜ln −
(p˜∗n)2
p˜2n
p˜2ln
=
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
p˜2ln +
q˜∗n
q˜n
(
1 − r˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
)
q˜ln . (53)
Next, using (27) and Jensen’s inequality, we have
r˜n =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
(
j
j + k
)2∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k) − q˜n ≥ ©­«
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn(i, j,k)ª®¬
2
− q˜n = p˜2n − q˜n , (54)
and so 1 − r˜n/(p˜2n − q˜n) ≤ 0, i.e. the second term in (53) is non-positive, so ∀ l > 1,
Varn(Yl ) ≤ 1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
p˜2ln . (55)
Local non-Bayesian social learning with stubborn agents 41
In the case l = 1, we have (again by Lemmas A.7 and A.8)
Varn(Yl ) = (r˜ ∗n + q˜∗n) − p˜∗n ≤ r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2 =
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
p˜2ln ,
where the inequality is (54) and p˜∗n ≤ 1; hence, (55) holds for l = 1 as well. Finally, since Y0 = 1 a.s .,
it is immediate that (55) also holds for l = 0. We next analyze the covariance terms in (51). First, if
l ′ > l > 0, we can use (52) and Lemmas A.7 and A.8 to obtain
En[YlYl ′] = Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ) = p˜l
′−l
n Pn(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ) = p˜l
′−l
n En[Y 2l ],
En[Yl ′] = P(X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ) = p˜∗np˜l
′−1
n = p˜
∗
np˜
l−1
n p˜
l ′−l
n = P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ)p˜l
′−l
n = En[Yl ]p˜l
′−l
n ,
⇒ Covn(Yl ,Yl ′) = p˜l ′−ln
(
En[Y 2l ] − (En[Yl ])2
)
= p˜l
′−l
n Varn(Yl ).
On the other hand, if l ′ > l = 0, we have Yl = 1 a.s ., so Covn(Yl ,Yl ′) = 0 = p˜l ′nVarn(Y0). Hence,
combined with (55), we have argued
Covn(Yl ,Yl ′) = p˜l ′−ln Varn(Yl ) ≤
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
p˜l+l
′
n ∀ l ∈ N0, l ′ > l . (56)
Hence, combining (51), (55), and (56), we obtain
Varn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T])
≤ 1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
θ 2
T 2n
(
Tn−1∑
l=0
u2Tn,l p˜
2l
n + 2
Tn−1∑
l=0
uTn,l
Tn−1∑
l ′=l+1
uTn,l ′p˜
l+l ′
n
)
≤ 1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
1
T 2n
(
Tn−1∑
l=0
u2Tn,l + 2
Tn−1∑
l=0
uTn,l
Tn−1∑
l ′=l+1
uTn,l ′
)
=
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
) (
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
l=0
uTn,l
)2
=
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
,
where the second inequality is simply θ , p˜n ≤ 1, the first equality is immediate, and the second
equality holds by definition of uTn,l . It clearly follows that
Varn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|D,T])1(Ωn,2) ≤
1
p˜2n
(
r˜ ∗n +
q˜∗nr˜n
p˜2n − q˜n
− (p˜∗n)2
)
1(Ωn,2), (57)
and so we can complete the proof by showing the right side of (57) tends to zero a.s . Clearly, the
right side is zero ifω < Ωn,2; we aim to also show that, given γ > 0, ∃ N s.t. for n > N andω ∈ Ωn,2,
1
p˜n(ω)2
(
r˜ ∗n(ω) +
q˜∗n(ω)r˜n(ω)
p˜n(ω)2 − q˜n(ω) − p˜
∗
n(ω)2
)
< γ . (58)
To prove (58), we first recall that by (A3), we have for ω ∈ Ωn,2, p˜∗n(ω) ≥ p˜n(ω) > pn − δn . Hence,
since we are assuming pn → 1, and since δn → 0 by (A3), we have for γ ′ > 0, n sufficiently large,
and such ω, p˜n(ω)2, p˜∗n(ω)2 > 1 − γ ′. We thus obtain for n large and ω ∈ Ωn,2,
1
p˜n(ω)2
(
r˜ ∗n(ω) +
q˜∗n(ω)r˜n(ω)
p˜n(ω)2 − q˜n(ω) − p˜
∗
n(ω)2
)
<
1
1 − γ ′
(
r˜ ∗n(ω) +
q˜∗n(ω)r˜n(ω)
1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) − (1 − γ
′)
)
. (59)
To further upper bound the right side of (59), we note r˜n ≤ 1 − q˜n a.s . by the first equality in (54).
The same argument gives r˜ ∗n ≤ 1 − q˜∗n a.s . Note, however, that to use the second bound, we must
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ensure 1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) > 0. To this end, recall that q˜n(ω) < 1 − ξ for ω ∈ Ωn,2 by (A3). Hence,
assuming we choose γ ′ < ξ , we obtain 1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) > 0 for such ω. Thus,
1
p˜n(ω)2
(
r˜ ∗n(ω) +
q˜∗n(ω)r˜n(ω)
p˜n(ω)2 − q˜n(ω) − p˜
∗
n(ω)2
)
<
1
1 − γ ′
(
(1 − q˜∗n(ω)) +
q˜∗n(ω)(1 − q˜n(ω))
1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) − (1 − γ
′)
)
=
1
1 − γ ′
(
q˜∗n(ω)
(
1 − q˜n(ω)
1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) − 1
)
+ γ ′
)
=
1
1 − γ ′
(
q˜∗n(ω)
(
γ ′
1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω)
)
+ γ ′
)
=
γ ′
1 − γ ′
(
q˜∗n(ω)
1 − γ ′ − q˜n(ω) + 1
)
<
γ ′
1 − γ ′
(
q˜∗n(ω)
ξ − γ ′ + 1
)
≤ γ
′
1 − γ ′
(
1
ξ − γ ′ + 1
)
, (60)
where the first inequality uses (59) and the bounds from the previous paragraph, the equalities are
straightforward, the second inequality uses q˜n(ω) < 1 − ξ for ω ∈ Ωn,2 by (A3), and the third uses
q˜∗n(ω) ≤ 1 (recall we have chosen γ ′ < ξ ). Finally, it is straightforward to see the final bound in (60)
tends to zero with γ ′. Hence, for sufficiently small γ ′, (58) follows, completing the proof.
B.2.3 Notation for proofs of Lemmas A.7 and A.8. In the next two subsections, we prove Lemmas
A.7 and A.8. For these proofs, we let D denote the degree sequence {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n], and
we let D denote a realization of this set. Note that the random variables defined in (27) are all
functions of D; for a realization D of D, we let e.g. p˜n,D denote the realization of p˜n . We similarly
define fn,D , f ∗n,D for realizations of fn , f
∗
n , defined in (7). Finally, letting д(D) = P(·|D = D), we
have Pn(·) = д(D) by definition of Pn . Hence, to prove Lemma A.7, it suffices to show
P(Xl ∈ Aˆ|D = D) =
{
p˜∗n,Dp˜
l−1
n,D , l ∈ N
1, l = 0
.
while to prove Lemma A.8, it suffices to show
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D = D) =
{
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|D = D)p˜l
′−l
n,D , l ∈ N
p˜∗n,Dp˜
l ′−1
n,D , l = 0
, (61)
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|D = D) =

r˜ ∗n,Dp˜
2(l−1)
n,D +
∑l
t=2 q˜
∗
n,Dq˜
t−2
n,D r˜n,Dp˜
2(l−t )
n,D + q˜
∗
n,Dq˜
l−1
n,D , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
r˜ ∗n,D + q˜
∗
n,D , l = 1
1, l = 0
.
(62)
B.2.4 Proof of Lemma A.7. The l = 0 case is trivial, since X 10 = ϕ ∈ Aˆ, so we assume l ∈ N
moving forward. First, since AˆC = Bˆ is an absorbing set, we have X 1l ∈ Aˆ⇒ X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ, so
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D)P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ|D = D). (63)
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For the first term in (63), we have
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D) (64)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|dAin(X 1l−1) = j,dBin(X 1l−1) = k,X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D)
× P(dAin(X 1l−1) = j,dBin(X 1l−1) = k |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D)
=
{∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j+k
∑
i ∈N fn,D (i, j,k) = p˜n,D , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j+k
∑
i ∈N f ∗n,D (i, j,k) = p˜∗n,D , l = 1
,
where the second equality holds by Algorithm 4. More specifically, for l > 1, the degrees of
X 1l−1 are sampled from fn,D (Line 13 in Algorithm 4) after realizing X
1
l−1 (Line 8), yielding the∑
i ∈N fn,D (i, j,k) term; further, X 1l is chosen uniformly from the incoming neighbors of X 1l−1 (Line
8) after realizing the degrees of X 1l−1, yielding the j/(j +k) term (the l = 1 case is similarly justified).
Combining (63) and (64), and using the fact that X 10 = ϕ ∈ Aˆ by definition, completes the proof in
the case l = 1. For l > 1, we again use (63) and (64) to obtain
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = p˜n,DP(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = · · · = p˜l−1n,DP(X 11 ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = p˜l−1n,Dp˜∗n,D ,
which completes the proof.
B.2.5 Proof of Lemma A.8. We begin by proving the first statement in the lemma, i.e. (61). First,
we note that for the l = 0 case, X0 = ϕ ∈ Aˆ by definition, so P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = P(X 2l ′ ∈
Aˆ|D = D), and the statement holds by Lemma A.7. For the l ∈ N case, we first write
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D = D)
= P(X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D)P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ|D = D),
where the first equality holds since AˆC = Bˆ is an absorbing set (i.e. X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ⇒ X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ) and the
second simply rewrites a conditional probability. Next, by the same argument as (64),
P(X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ,D = D) = p˜n,D ,
where we have used the l ′ > 1 case of (64), since l ′ > l ≥ 1. Hence, the previous two equations give
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′ ∈ Aˆ|D = D) = p˜n,DP(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ′−1 ∈ Aˆ|D = D)
= · · · = p˜l ′−ln,DP(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|D = D).
This completes the proof of (61). For the second statement, i.e. (62), the l = 0 case is trivial, since
X 10 = X
2
0 = ϕ ∈ Aˆ by definition, so we assume l ∈ N for the remainder of the proof. First, let
τ = inf{t ∈ N0 : X 1t , X 2t } denote the first step at which the two walks diverge. Note that
X 10 = X
2
0 = ϕ by definition, so τ ∈ N a.s .; also, due to the tree structure, the walks remain apart
forever after diverging, i.e. X 1τ+1 , X 2τ+1,X 1τ+2 , X 2τ+1, . . . a.s . Next, for l ∈ N, we write
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|D = D) (65)
=
l∑
t=1
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D) + P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ > l |D = D)
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We begin by computing the second term in (65). Here we have
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ > l |D = D) (66)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l ,X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 ,D = D)
× P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 ,D = D)
× P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,τ > l − 1|D = D),
where the first and last equalities hold by definition of τ and the second holds since AˆC = Bˆ is an
absorbing set. Now for l > 1, we obtain
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 ,D = D) (67)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1,D = D)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l = X 2l |dAin(X 1l−1) = j,dBin(Xl−1) = k,X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1,D = D)
× P(dAin(X 1l−1) = j,dBin(Xl−1) = k |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1,D = D)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn,D (i, j,k) = q˜n,D ,
where the first equality uses independence and eliminates repetitive events, and the third follows
an argument similar to that following (64). Combining (66) and (67),
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ > l |D = D) = q˜n,DP(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,τ > l − 1|D = D) (68)
= · · · = q˜l−1n,DP(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 21 ∈ Aˆ,τ > 1|D = D).
Finally, by an argument similar to (67), we have
P(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 21 ∈ Aˆ,τ > 1|D = D) = P(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D) (69)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
P(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 11 = X 21 |dAin(ϕ) = j,dBin(ϕ) = k,D = D)P(dAin(ϕ) = j,dBin(ϕ) = k |D = D)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n,D (i, j,k) = q˜∗n,D .
Hence, combining (68) and (69) gives
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ > l |D = D) = q˜∗n,Dq˜l−1n,D ∀ l ∈ N. (70)
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For the first term in (65), we first consider the t = l summand. For l > 1, similar to (67),
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ = l |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l , X 2l ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l , X 2l ,X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l , X 2l |X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 ,D = D)
× P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 = X 2l−1, . . . ,X 11 = X 21 |D = D)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
j − 1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn,D (i, j,k)P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,τ > l − 1|D = D) = r˜n,Dq˜l−2n,Dq˜∗n,D ,
where in the final step we have also used (70). Similarly, for l = 1,
P(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 21 ∈ Aˆ,τ = 1|D = D) = P(X 11 ∈ Aˆ,X 21 ∈ Aˆ,X 11 , X 21 |D = D)
=
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
j − 1
j + k
∑
i ∈N
f ∗n,D (i, j,k) = r˜ ∗n,D .
To summarize, we have shown
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ = l |D = D) =
{
q˜∗n,Dq˜
l−2
n,D r˜n,D , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
r˜ ∗n,D , l = 1
. (71)
Next, we consider the t < l summands in (65) (such summands are present only for l > 1). We have
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 , X 2l−1,τ = t |D = D)
= P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 , X 2l−1,τ = t ,D = D)
× P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 , X 2l−1,τ = t |D = D)
=
2∏
h=1
P(Xhl ∈ Aˆ|X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 , X 2l−1,τ = t ,D = D)
× P(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D),
where in the first equality we used the fact that AˆC = Bˆ is an absorbing set and the fact that once
the walks diverge they remain apart; in the second equality we used the fact that X 1l and X
2
l are
conditionally independent given the event X 1l−1 , X
2
l−1. Further, for h ∈ {1, 2},
P(Xhl ∈ Aˆ|X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 1l−1 , X 2l−1,τ = t ,D = D) =
∑
j ∈N,k ∈N0
j
j + k
∑
i ∈N
fn,D (i, j,k) = p˜n,D ,
and so, combining the previous two equations and applying recursively yields
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D) = p˜2n,DP(X 1l−1 ∈ Aˆ,X 2l−1 ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D) (72)
= · · · = p˜2(l−t )n,D P(X 1t ∈ Aˆ,X 2t ∈ Aˆ,τ = t |D = D)
=
{
q˜∗n,Dq˜
t−2
n,D r˜n,Dp˜
2(l−t )
n,D , t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , l − 1}
r˜ ∗n,Dp˜
2(l−1)
n,D , t = 1
∀ l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}.
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where the final equality uses (71). Finally, combining (65), (70), (71), and (72) yields
P(X 1l ∈ Aˆ,X 2l ∈ Aˆ|D = D) =
{
r˜ ∗n,Dp˜
2(l−1)
n,D +
∑l
t=2 q˜
∗
n,Dq˜
t−2
n,D r˜n,Dp˜
2(l−t )
n,D + q˜
∗
n,Dq˜
l−1
n,D , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
r˜ ∗n,D + q˜
∗
n,D , l = 1
,
which is what we set out to prove.
B.3 Step 2 for proof of Theorem 3.2
B.3.1 Proof of Lemma A.9. We first write
P
(ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) = E [P (ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ T )]
= E
[
P
(
ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ
T ) + P (E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − ϑˆTn (ϕ) > ϵ T )] (73)
where the first equality uses the law of total expectation and the second is immediate. For the first
summand in the expectation in (73), we fix λ > 0 and write
P
(
ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ
T ) = P (exp(λ(ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ])) > e−λϵ T )
≤ e−λϵE
[
exp(λ(ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ])
T ]
= e−λϵ
Tn−1∏
t=0
t∏
l=0
∏
i∈Aˆl
E
[
exp
(
λ
Tn
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1(sˆTn−t (i) − θ )
)T
]
≤ e−λϵ
Tn−1∏
t=0
t∏
l=0
∏
i∈Aˆl
exp ©­«18
(
λ
Tn
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
)2ª®¬
≤ e−λϵ
Tn−1∏
t=0
t∏
l=0
∏
i∈Aˆl
exp
(
λ2
8T 2n
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1
)
= exp ©­«−λϵ + λ
2
8Tn
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
∑
i∈Aˆl
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1ª®¬
= exp
(
−λϵ + λ
2
8Tnθ
E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]
)
≤ exp
(
−λϵ + λ
2
8Tn
)
. (74)
Here the first equality holds by monotonicity of x 7→ eλx , the first inequality is Markov’s, the
second equality holds by (34), the second inequality uses Lemma B.3 from Appendix B.4, the third
inequality uses
(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l ,∏l−1j=0 din(i|j)−1 ≤ 1, the third equality is immediate, the fourth
equality again uses (34), and the fourth inequality uses (35). Since the preceding argument holds
∀ λ > 0, we choose λ = 4ϵTn to minimize the bound. Upon substituting into (74), we obtain e−2ϵ 2Tn .
The same argument holds for the second summand in the expectation of (73). We also note that the
bound e−2ϵ 2Tn is non-random, so we may discard the expectation. In summary, we have shown
P
(ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) ≤ 2e−2ϵ 2Tn .
Hence, for n sufficiently large, we have by assumption on Tn
P
(ϑˆTn (ϕ) − E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) ≤ 2e−2ϵ 2µ logn = 2n−2ϵ 2µ = O (n−2ϵ 2µ ) ,
which is what we set out to prove.
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B.3.2 Proof of Lemma A.10. We begin by deriving a bound conditioned on the degree sequence.
First, we fix λ˜ > 0 and use monotonicity of x 7→ e λ˜x and Markov’s inequality to write
Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) ≤ e−λ˜ϵEn exp(λ˜E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]). (75)
The bulk of the proof will involve bounding the expectation term. For this, we first note
En exp(λ˜E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]) = En exp ©­«λ˜ θTn
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l=0
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1ª®¬
= En exp
©­« λ˜θTn
Tn−1∑
l=0
(
Tn−1∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l
) ©­«
∑
i∈Aˆl
l−1∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1ª®¬ª®¬ = En
Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ),
where the first equality holds by (34), the second rearranges summations, and in the third we have
defined λ = λ˜θ/Tn , uTn,l =
∑Tn−1
t=l
(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l , and Yl = ∑i∈Aˆl ∏l−1j=0 din(i|j)−1. For the remainder
of the proof, we use En,l to denote conditional expectation with respect to the degree sequence
and the set of random variables realized during the first l iterations of Algorithm 4 (i.e. the random
variables defining the first l generations of the tree). Using this notation, we have
En
[ Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )
]
= En
[
En,Tn−2
[ Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )
] ]
(76)
= En
[ Tn−2∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )En,Tn−2
[
exp(λuTn,Tn−1YTn−1)
] ]
= En
[ Tn−3∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ) exp(λ(uTn,Tn−2 + uTn,Tn−1p˜n)YTn−2)
× En,Tn−2
[
exp(λuTn,Tn−1(YTn−1 − p˜nYTn−2))
] ]
,
where in the third equality we have multiplied and divided exp(λuTn,Tn−1p˜nYTn−2). Next, we note
YTn−1 =
∑
i′∈AˆTn−2
∑
i∈AˆTn−1:i |(Tn−2)=i′
Tn−2∏
j=0
din(i|j)−1 =
∑
i′∈AˆTn−2
∑
i∈AˆTn−1:i |(Tn−2)=i′
Tn−2∏
j=0
din(i′ |j)−1 (77)
=
∑
i′∈AˆTn−2
Tn−2∏
j=0
din(i′ |j)−1 |{i ∈ AˆTn−1 : i|(Tn − 2) = i′}| =
∑
i′∈AˆTn−2
Tn−3∏
j=0
din(i′ |j)−1din(i′)−1dAin(i′),
where in the first equality we rewrote the sum based on the construction of AˆTn−1 in Algorithm 4,
in the second we have used the fact that i|j = i′ |j for j ∈ {0, . . . ,Tn − 2} by Algorithm 4 (in words,
i and i′ share the same ancestry in the tree), in the third we have recognized that the i-th summand
does not depend on i, and in the fourth we have used i′ |(Tn − 2) = i′ (since i′ ∈ AˆTn−2) and the
construction of the agent offspring of i′ in Algorithm 4. It follows that
En,Tn−2YTn−1 =
∑
i′∈AˆTn−2
Tn−3∏
j=0
din(i′ |j)−1En,Tn−2(dAin(i′)/din(i′)) =
Tn−3∏
j=0
din(i′ |j)−1p˜n = YTn−2p˜n ,
where En,Tn−2(dAin(i′)/din(i′)) = p˜n holds by definition of dAin(i′),din(i′) in Algorithm 4 and of p˜n
from (27). In summary, we have argued En,Tn−2(YTn−1 − YTn−2p˜n) = 0. On the other hand, we
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note 0 ≤ YTn−1 ≤ YTn−2 ≤ · · · ≤ Y0 = 1, where the first inequality holds since YTn−1 is a sum of
nonnegative terms and the second holds by (77) (using din(i′) = dAin(i′) + dBin(i′) ≥ dAin(i′)), and
where Y0 = 1 by definition. Hence, we can use Lemma B.3 from Appendix B.4 to obtain
En,Tn−2 exp(λuTn,Tn−1(YTn−1 − p˜nYTn−2)) ≤ eλ
2u2Tn ,Tn−1/8. (78)
Substituting into (76) then yields
En
[ Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )
]
(79)
≤ En
[ Tn−3∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ) exp(λ(uTn,Tn−2 + uTn,Tn−1p˜n)YTn−2)
]
exp
(
λ2
8 u
2
Tn,Tn−1
)
.
We can then iteratively apply the preceding argument. Namely, we have
En
[ Tn−3∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ) exp(λ(uTn,Tn−2 + uTn,Tn−1p˜n)YTn−2)
]
exp
(
λ2
8 u
2
Tn,Tn−1
)
= En
[ Tn−4∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ) exp(λ(uTn,Tn−3 + uTn,Tn−2p˜n + uTn,Tn−1p˜2n)YTn−3)
× En,Tn−3
[
exp(λ(uTn,Tn−2 + uTn,Tn−1p˜n)(YTn−2 − p˜nYTn−3))
] ]
exp
(
λ2
8 u
2
Tn,Tn−1
)
≤ En
[ Tn−4∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl ) exp(λ(uTn,Tn−3 + uTn,Tn−2p˜n + uTn,Tn−1p˜2n)YTn−3)
]
(80)
× exp
(
λ2
8
(
(uTn,Tn−2 + uTn,Tn−1p˜n)2 + u2Tn,Tn−1
))
(81)
≤ · · · ≤ En
[
exp(λuTn,0Y0) exp
(
λ
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n Y1
) ]
exp ©­«λ
2
8
Tn−1∑
l=2
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬ . (82)
(The precise form of the summations in (82) can be verified by considering the case Tn = 4 in (80)
and (81).) Note that the final step of the iteration is slightly different; this is because the root node
has degrees sampled from f ∗n (the uniform distribution) instead of fn (the size-biased distribution) in
Algorithm 4. Nevertheless, a similar argument holds: here we have En,0Y1 = p˜∗nY0 andY1 ∈ [0, 1] a.s .,
so by an argument similar to that leading to (78),
En
[
exp(λuTn,0Y0) exp
(
λ
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n Y1
) ]
= En
[
exp
(
λ
(
uTn,0 + p˜
∗
n
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n
)
Y0
)
En,0
[
exp
(
λ
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n (Y1 − p˜∗nY0)
) ] ]
≤ En
[
exp
(
λ
(
uTn,0 + p˜
∗
n
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n
)
Y0
) ]
exp ©­«λ
2
8
(
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n
)2ª®¬ .
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Combining the previous inequality with (79) and (82) then yields
En
[ Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )
]
≤ En
[
exp
(
λ
(
uTn,0 + p˜
∗
n
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n
)
Y0
) ]
exp ©­«λ
2
8
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬
Next, we recall Y0 = 1 by definition. Additionally, we have
uTn,0 + p˜
∗
n
Tn−1∑
l=1
uTn,l p˜
l−1
n =
Tn−1∑
t=0
(1 − η)t + p˜∗n
Tn−1∑
l=1
Tn−1∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l p˜l−1n
=
Tn−1∑
t=0
(
l∑
t=1
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l p˜∗np˜l−1n + (1 − η)t
)
=
Tn
θ
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)],
where the first equality uses the definition of uTn,l , the second rearranges summations, and the
third uses (46). Combining the previous two equations therefore yields
En
[ Tn−1∏
l=0
exp(λuTn,lYl )
]
≤ exp ©­«λTnθ En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] + λ
2
8
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬ .
Hence, recalling that λ = λ˜θ/Tn , and substituting into (75), we have shown
Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) ≤ exp ©­«−λ˜ϵ + λ˜En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] + λ˜
2θ 2
8T 2n
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬ . (83)
Clearly, this inequality still holds if we multiply both sides by 1(Ωn,2). Additionally, by (A3),
p˜n(ω) < pn + δn for ω ∈ Ωn,2, where pn → p and δn → 0; since we additionally assume p < 1 in
the statement of the lemma, we conclude p˜n(ω) < pn + δn < 1 for ω ∈ Ωn,2 and n sufficiently large.
For such n, we can therefore write
Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ)1(Ωn,2)
≤ exp ©­«−λ˜ϵ + λ˜En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] + λ˜
2θ 2
8T 2n
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′(pn + δn)l
′−l
)2ª®¬ 1(Ωn,2)
≤ exp
(
−λ˜ϵ + λ˜En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] +
λ˜2θ 2
8Tnη2(1 − (pn + δn))2
)
1(Ωn,2),
where the second inequality uses Lemma B.2 from Appendix B.4. Additionally, since pn → p < 1,
we can use the argument leading to (49) to obtain En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)](ω) < c/Tn (for some c independent
of n) whenever ω ∈ Ωn,2 and n is sufficiently large. For such n, we obtain
Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ)1(Ωn,2) ≤ exp
(
−λ˜ϵ + λ˜c
Tn
+
λ˜2θ 2
8Tnη2(1 − (pn + δn))2
)
1(Ωn,2), (84)
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Now since λ˜ > 0 was arbitrary, we can choose λ˜ = 4Tnϵη2(1 − (pn + δn))2/θ 2. Upon substituting
into the exponent in the previous equation, this exponent becomes
− λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2
8Tnη2(1 − (pn + δn))2 +
λ˜c
Tn
= −2Tnϵ2η2(1 − (pn + δn))2/θ 2 + 4cϵη2(1 − (pn + δn))2/θ 2
= −2Tnϵ2η2
((1 − pn)2 − 2(1 − pn)δn + δ 2n ) /θ 2 + 4cϵη2(1 − (pn + δn))2/θ 2
= −2Tnϵ2η2(1 − pn)2/θ 2 + 2Tnϵ2η2δn(2(1 − pn) − δn)/θ 2 + 4cϵη2(1 − (pn + δn))2/θ 2
≤ −2Tnϵ2η2(1 − pn)2/θ 2 + 4Tnϵ2η2δn/θ 2 + 4cϵη2/θ 2, (85)
where the inequality simply uses pn ,δn > 0 and pn + δn ∈ (0, 1) (for large n). Now note that
since pn → p, we have (for example) (1 − pn)2 > (1 − p)2/2 for n sufficiently large. Additionally,
since δn = o(1/Tn), we have (for example) Tnδn < c/ϵ for n sufficiently large. Combining these
observations, we can upper bound (85) as
−2ϵ2Tnη2(1 − pn)2/θ 2 + 4η2ϵ2Tnδn/θ 2 + 4η2ϵc/θ 2 ≤ −(ϵη(1 − p))2Tn/θ 2 + 8cϵη2/θ 2.
Hence, substituting into (84) gives
Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ)1(Ωn,2) ≤ exp(8cϵη2/θ 2) exp(−(ϵη(1 − p)/θ )2Tn)1(Ωn,2). (86)
Finally, we write
P(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ) = E[Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ)1(Ωn,2) + Pn(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] > ϵ)1(ΩCn,2)]
≤ O
(
e−(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2Tn
)
+ P(ΩCn,2) = O
(
e−(ϵη(1−p)/θ )
2µ logn + n−κ
)
,
where the first equality is the law of total expectation, the inequality uses (86) and upper bounds a
probability by 1, and the second equality uses the assumptions in the statement of the lemma.
B.3.3 Where the proof fails in the casepn → 1. As shown in Appendix A.4.1, extending Theorem
3.2 to the case pn → 1 amounts to showing that for some γ ′ > 0,
P(|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| > ϵ) = O
(
n−γ
′)
, (87)
where L(pn) is the appropriate limit from (39). Here we show (roughly) why the approach from
the preceding proof fails to establish (87) in the case pn → 1. To begin, we note we first used the
assumption pn → p < 1 following (83). Hence, in the case pn → 1, we can still follow the approach
leading to (83) to obtain the (one-sided) bound
P(E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn) > ϵ)1(Ωn,2) ≤ exp(−λ˜(ϵ + L(pn))E exp(λ˜E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ])1(Ωn,2)
≤ exp ©­«−λ˜ϵ + λ˜
(
−L(pn) + En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)]
)
+
λ˜2θ 2
8T 2n
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬ 1(Ωn,2)
≈ exp ©­«−λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2θ 2
8T 2n
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2ª®¬ 1(Ωn,2), (88)
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where the approximate equality uses En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] ≈ L(pn) on Ωn,2 by Lemma A.5. We next note
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−l
n
)2
≥
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=1
uTn,l ′p˜
l ′−1
n
)2
=
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=1
(
Tn−1∑
t=l ′
(
t
l ′
)
ηl
′(1 − η)t−l ′
)
p˜l
′−1
n
)2
= (p˜∗n)−2
(
Tn−1∑
t=1
t∑
l ′=1
(
t
l ′
)
ηl
′(1 − η)t−l ′p˜∗np˜l
′−1
n
)2
= (p˜∗n)−2
(
Tn
θ
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] −
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
)2
,
where the inequality discards nonnegative terms, the first equality is by definition of uTn,l ′ , the
second rearranges summations and multiplies/divides by (p˜∗n)2, and the third uses (46). Hence, we
have shown (88) is (roughly) lower bounded by
exp
(
−λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2
8
(
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] −
θ (1 − (1 − η)Tn )
Tnη
)2)
1(Ωn,2),
where we have also used p˜∗n ≈ 1 for large n on Ωn,2 when pn → 1 by (A3). Now we consider three
cases for the exponent in the previous expression:
• Tn(1 − pn) → 0: Here Lemma A.5 states En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] ≈ θ for large n on Ωn,2; for such n, the
exponent is roughly
−λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2θ 2
8
(
1 − θ (1 − (1 − η)
Tn )
Tnη
)2
≥ −λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2θ 2
16 = −
4ϵ2
θ 2
,
where the inequality holds for large n (so that θ (1− (1−η)Tn )/(Tnη) < 1− 1/
√
2, which holds
since Tn → ∞) and the equality holds by choosing the minimizing λ˜ (namely, λ˜ = 8ϵ/θ 2).
Since this lower bound is constant in n, (88) does not decay as n grows.
• Tn(1 − pn) → c ∈ (0,∞): Here Lemma A.5 states En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] ≈ θ (1 − e−cη)/(cη) for large n
on Ωn,2. An argument similar to the previous case shows (88) does not decay as n grows.
• Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ with pn → 1: Here we consider an example to show (88) does not decay
sufficiently quickly for the general case. In particular, we assume Tn = c¯ logn for some
constant c¯ that satisfies the theorem assumptions and we set pn = 1 − (logn)−0.9. Then since
δn = o((logn)−1) per (A3), we have e.g. 1 − pn + δn < (1 − pn)/2 for large n. Hence,
En[ϑˆTn (ϕ)] ≳
θ (1 − (1 − η(1 − pn + δn))Tn )
ηTn(1 − pn + δn)
>
θ (1 − (1 − (η/2)(logn)−0.9)c¯ logn)
(c¯η/2)(logn)0.1 >
c˜
(logn)0.1 ,
where the first inequality holds by (48) in Appendix B.2.1 (where γ1,γ2 are arbitrarily small,
hence the approximate inequality), the second holds for our chosen Tn ,pn ,δn , and the third
holds for some constant c˜ and for large n. Hence, the exponent is (roughly) lower bounded by
−λ˜ϵ + λ˜
2
8
c˜2
(logn)0.2 = −
2ϵ2
c˜2
(logn)0.2,
where the equality holds for the minimizer λ˜ = (4ϵ/c˜2)(logn)0.2. From here it follows that
(88) cannot be O(n−γ ′): if it is, we have for all large n and for some constant C˜ ,
exp
(
−2ϵ
2
c˜2
(logn)0.2
)
< C˜n−γ
′ ⇒ exp
(
−2ϵ
2
c˜2
(logn)0.2 + γ ′ logn
)
< C˜ .
The final inequality is a contradiction, since −(2ϵ2/c˜2)(logn)0.2 + γ ′ logn →∞ as n →∞.
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B.4 Auxiliary results
In this appendix, we collect several auxiliary results used in other proofs. (These results are either
cited from other sources, or their proofs are computationally heavy but elementary, so we collect
them here to avoid cluttering other parts of our analysis.)
Lemma B.1. For Tn →∞, pn → 1, and δn → 0 s.t. δn = o(1/Tn), we have
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) −−−−→n→∞

1, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
(1 − e−cη)/(cη), Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ c ∈ (0,∞)
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
, (89)
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn + δn))Tn
ηTn(1 − pn + δn) −−−−→n→∞

1, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ 0
(1 − e−cη)/(cη), Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ c ∈ (0,∞)
0, Tn(1 − pn) −−−−→
n→∞ ∞
. (90)
Proof. We consider the three cases of (89) in turn; the proof of (90) follows the same approach.
First, suppose limn→∞Tn(1 − pn) = ∞. Then since Tnδn → 0 and Tn(1 − pn) → ∞, we have
Tnδn < 1 < Tn(1−pn) for sufficiently large n, which implies (1−pn −δn) > 0 for such n. Clearly, we
also have (1−pn −δn) < 1 for all n. Taken together, it follows that 1− (1−η(1−pn −δn))Tn ∈ (0, 1)
for n large. For such n, we can then write
0 < 1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))
Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) <
1
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) ,
where we used (1 − pn − δn) > 0 in the denominator. Now since Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ and Tnδn → 0,
Tn(1 − pn − δn) → ∞, so taking n →∞ in the above inequality gives the result.
Next, suppose limn→∞Tn(1−pn) = c ∈ (0,∞). Since ηTn(1−pn −δn) → ηc byTn(1−pn) → c and
Tnδn → 0, it suffices to show (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn → e−ηc as n →∞. First, since Tn(1 − pn) → c ,
∀ ϵ1 > 0 ∃ N1 s.t. c − ϵ1 < Tn(1 − pn) < c + ϵ1 ∀ n ≥ N1. Further, since Tnδn → 0, ∀ ϵ2 > 0 ∃ N2 s.t.
−ϵ2 < Tnδn < ϵ2 ∀ n ≥ N2. Hence, ∀ n ≥ max{N1,N2},(
1 − η(c + ϵ1 + ϵ2)
Tn
)Tn
< (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn <
(
1 − η(c − ϵ1 − ϵ2)
Tn
)Tn
.
Next, we note
lim
n→∞
(
1 − η(c + ϵ1 + ϵ2)
Tn
)Tn
= e−η(c+ϵ1+ϵ2), lim
n→∞
(
1 − η(c − ϵ1 − ϵ2)
Tn
)Tn
= e−η(c−ϵ1−ϵ2).
Hence, ∀ ϵ3 > 0 ∃ N3 s.t. ∀ n ≥ N3,
e−η(c+ϵ1+ϵ2) − ϵ3 <
(
1 − η(c + ϵ1 + ϵ2)
Tn
)Tn
,
(
1 − η(c − ϵ1)
Tn
)Tn
< e−η(c−ϵ1−ϵ2) + ϵ3.
Combining these arguments, we obtain ∀ n ≥ max{N1,N2,N3}
e−η(c+ϵ1+ϵ2) − ϵ3 < (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn < e−η(c−ϵ1−ϵ2) + ϵ3.
Since both bounds converge to e−ηc as ϵ1, ϵ2, ϵ3 → 0, (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn → e−ηc follows.
Finally, suppose limn→∞Tn(1 − pn) = 0. First, we observe
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) =
1
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
(1 − η(1 − pn − δn))t ≤ 1, (91)
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where the inequality holds for n s.t. (1 − pn − δn) > 0 (which indeed occurs for large n; see proof of
Tn(1 − pn) → ∞ case), since then the sum is over Tn terms, each upper bounded by 1. On the other
hand, we can use the binomial theorem to write
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) =
1 −∑Tnt=0 (Tnt )(−η(1 − pn − δn))t
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) (92)
= 1 −
Tn∑
t=2
(Tn − 1) · · · (Tn − t + 1)(−1)t (η(1 − pn − δn))t−1
t ! .
Next, we observe (assuming (1 − pn − δn) > 0) as above)
Tn∑
t=2
(Tn − 1) · · · (Tn − t + 1)(−1)t (η(1 − pn − δn))t−1
t ! (93)
<
Tn∑
t=2
(Tn − 1) · · · (Tn − t + 1)(η(1 − pn − δn))t−1
t ! <
Tn∑
t=2
(Tn(1 − pn − δn))t−1
(t − 2)!
= Tn(1 − pn − δn)
Tn−2∑
t=0
(Tn(1 − pn − δn))t
t ! < Tn(1 − pn − δn)e
Tn (1−pn−δn ),
where the first inequality replaces negative terms with positive ones; the second inequality uses
η < 1, (t −2)! < t !, and (Tn − j) < Tn for j > 0; and the third inequality upper bounds the summation
by replacing its upper limit with infinity. Hence, (91), (92), and (93) yield
1 ≥ 1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))
Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) > 1 −Tn(1 − pn − δn)e
Tn (1−pn−δn )
⇒ 1 ≥ lim
n→∞
1 − (1 − η(1 − pn − δn))Tn
ηTn(1 − pn − δn) ≥ 1 − limn→∞Tn(1 − pn − δn)e
Tn (1−pn−δn ) = 1,
where the final equality holds since Tn(1 − pn),Tnδn → 0 by assumption. □
Lemma B.2. Let uTn,l =
∑Tn−1
t=l
(t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l . Then for any x ∈ (0, 1),
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′x
l ′−l
)2
≤ Tn
η2(1 − x)2 .
Proof. For l ∈ N0, definewl = ∑Tn−1l ′=l uTn,l ′x l ′−l . Then
wl = uTn,l + x
Tn−1∑
l ′=l+1
uTn,l ′x
l ′−(l+1) = uTn,l + xwl+1.
Assuming temporarily that uTn,l ′ ≥ uTn,l ′′ whenever l ′ ≤ l ′′ (which we will return to prove),
wl+1 ≤ uTn,l
Tn−1∑
l ′=l+1
x l
′−(l+1) = uTn,l
Tn−l−2∑
l ′=0
x l
′ ≤ uTn,l
∞∑
l ′=0
x l
′
=
uTn,l
1 − x .
Hence, using the previous two equations, we obtainwl+1 −wl = (1 − x)wl+1 − uTn−l ≤ 0, i.e. the
sequence {wl } decreases in l . It is also clearly nonnegative. Therefore,
Tn−1∑
l=1
(
Tn−1∑
l ′=l
uTn,l ′x
l ′−l
)2
=
Tn−1∑
l=1
w2l ≤ Tnw20 .
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To further bound the right hand side, we note
w0 =
Tn−1∑
l ′=0
(
Tn−1∑
t=l ′
(
t
l ′
)
ηl
′(1 − η)t−l ′
)
x l
′
=
Tn−1∑
t=0
t∑
l ′=0
(
t
l ′
)
(ηx)l ′(1 − η)t−l ′
=
Tn−1∑
t=0
(ηx + (1 − η))t =
Tn−1∑
t=0
(1 − η(1 − x))t ≤
∞∑
t=0
(1 − η(1 − x))t = 1
η(1 − x) ,
where the first equality uses the definition of uTn,l ′ , the second rearranges summations, the third
uses the binomial theorem, the fourth is immediate, the inequality is immediate, and the final
equality computes a geometric series. Combining the previous two inequalities proves the lemma.
We return to prove uTn,l ′ ≥ uTn,l ′′ whenever l ′ ≤ l ′′. For this, we first claim
t ∗∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1−η)t−l −
t ∗+1∑
t=l+1
(
t
l + 1
)
ηl+1(1−η)t−(l+1) =
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
)
ηl (1−η)t ∗+1−l ∀ t∗ ∈ N, l ∈ {1, . . . , t∗}.
(94)
We prove (94) by induction on t∗. First, when t∗ = 1, the only case to prove is l = 1; when t∗ = l = 1,
it is immediate that both sides of (94) equal η(1 − η). Next, assume (94) holds for t∗ − 1. If l = t∗,
both sides of (94) equal ηt ∗ (1 − η). If l ∈ {1, . . . , t∗ − 1}, we write
t ∗∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l −
t ∗+1∑
t=l+1
(
t
l + 1
)
ηl+1(1 − η)t−(l+1)
=
(
t ∗−1∑
t=l
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l −
t ∗∑
t=l+1
(
t
l + 1
)
ηl+1(1 − η)t−(l+1)
)
+
(
t∗
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t ∗−l −
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
)
ηl+1(1 − η)t ∗+1−(l+1)
=
((
t∗
l + 1
)
ηl (1 − η)t ∗−l
)
+
(
t∗
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t ∗−l −
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
)
ηl+1(1 − η)t ∗−l
= ηl (1 − η)t ∗−l
((
t∗
l + 1
)
+
(
t∗
l
)
− η
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
))
= ηl (1 − η)t ∗−l
((
t∗ + 1
l + 1
)
− η
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
))
=
(
t∗ + 1
l + 1
)
ηl (1 − η)t ∗+1−l ,
where the first equality simply writes the final summands separately, the second uses the inductive
hypothesis on the term in parentheses, the third is immediate, the fourth uses Pascal’s rule ([t∗ + 1]
has
(t ∗+1
l+1
)
subsets of cardinality l + 1;
(t ∗
l
)
that contain 1 and
( t ∗
l+1
)
that do not contain 1), and the
fifth is immediate. This establishes (94). We then write
uTn,l ′ − uTn,l ′+1 =
Tn−1∑
t=l ′
(
t
l ′
)
ηl
′(1 − η)t−l ′ −
Tn−1∑
t=l ′+1
(
t
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′+1(1 − η)t−(l ′+1)
=
Tn−1∑
t=l ′
(
t
l ′
)
ηl
′(1 − η)t−l ′ −
Tn∑
t=l ′+1
(
t
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′+1(1 − η)t−(l ′+1) +
(
Tn
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′+1(1 − η)Tn−(l ′+1)
=
(
Tn
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′(1 − η)Tn−l ′ +
(
Tn
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′+1(1 − η)Tn−(l ′+1) =
(
Tn
l ′ + 1
)
ηl
′(1 − η)Tn−(l ′+1) ≥ 0,
Local non-Bayesian social learning with stubborn agents 55
where the first equality holds by definition of uTn,l ′ , the second adds and subtracts a term, and the
third uses (94). This shows uTn,l ′ ≥ uTn,l ′+1, iterating gives uTn,l ′ ≥ uTn,l ′′ whenever l ′ ≤ l ′′. □
Lemma B.3. Let Z be a random variable satisfying EZ = 0 and Z ∈ [a,b] a.s ., and let λ > 0. Then
EeλZ ≤ eλ2(b−a)2/8.
Proof. See e.g. [15, Lemma 5.1]. □
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
The proof relies on three lemmas we state in turn, with proofs deferred to the end of this appendix.
Also, throughout the proof, we use P˜n and E˜n , respectively, to denote probability and expectation,
respectively, conditioned on {dout (i),dAin(i)}i ∈[n]] (i.e. the degrees observed by the adversary).
In the first lemma, we solve the relaxed problem. The proof is standard and primarily amounts
to verifying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (see e.g. [11, Section 5.5.3]).
Lemma C.1. The solution of the relaxed problem (16) is, almost surely,
dr eln (i) = dAin(i)
(√
r (i)
h∗
− 1
)
+
∀ i ∈ [n],
where x+ = x for x > 0 and x+ = 0 for x ≤ 0. Furthermore, ∑ni=1 dr eln (i) = bn .
Proof. See Appendix C.1. □
Recall that our randomized scheme assigns each bot to agent i with probability dr eln (i). Thus, the
randomized scheme is (in expectation) the relaxed solution. The next lemma shows that also the
randomized scheme objective is (in expectation) close to the relaxed solution objective.
Lemma C.2. The following inequalities hold almost surely:
p˜n
(
dr eln
)
≤ p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
≤ E˜np˜n
(
drandn
)
<
1
2
(
1 + p˜n
(
dr eln
))
≤ 12
(
1 + p˜n
(
d
opt
n
))
.
Proof. See Appendix C.2. □
The third and final lemma provides a tail bound for this randomized scheme objective. The proof
shows that an affine transform of this objective is a self-bounding function of independent random
variables [10, Section 3.3] and uses an existing concentration inequality for such functions.
Lemma C.3. For any δ > 0, ∃ cδ > 0 independent of n such that, almost surely,
P˜n
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)
≤ exp
(
−cδmn(1 − p˜n(d
opt
n ))
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
)
.
Proof. See Appendix C.3 □
With Lemma C.3 in place, we can prove the theorem. First, by the assumption (19), we can find a
sequence {xn}n∈N ⊂ [0,∞) satisfying xn →∞ and P(Exn ) → 1, where Exn is the event
Exn =
{
mn(1 − p˜n(doptn ))
maxj ∈[n] r (j) ≥ xn
}
.
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Thus, by the law of total expectation and Lemma C.3,
P
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)
= E
[
P˜n
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)]
≤ E
[
P˜n
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)Exn
]
+ P
(
ECxn
)
≤ exp (−cδxn) + P
(
ECxn
)
−−−−→
n→∞ 0.
C.1 Proof of Lemma C.1
First note strict convexity ofy 7→ 1/y fory ∈ R implies strict convexity of p˜n , i.e. for anyd , d ′ ∈ Rn+
and ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have
p˜n(ρd + (1 − ρ)d ′) =
n∑
i=1
1
ρ(dAin(i) + d(i)) + (1 − ρ)(dAin(i) + d ′(i))
dAin(i)dout (i)
mn
<
n∑
i=1
(
ρ
dAin(i) + d(i)
+
1 − ρ
dAin(i) + d ′(i)
)
dAin(i)dout (i)
mn
= ρp˜n(d) + (1 − ρ)p˜n(d ′).
Also note we can rewrite the relaxed problem (16) as
min
d ∈Rn
p˜n(d) s .t . д(d) ≤ 0,дi (d) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n], (95)
where д(d) = ∑ni=1 d(i) − bn ,дi (d) = −d(i). Given λ, λi ≥ 0, we also define the Lagrangian
L(d, λ, λ1, . . . , λn) = p˜n(d) + λд(d) +
n∑
i=1
λiдi (d).
Finally, we set λ∗ = (h∗)2/mn , λ∗i = ((h∗)2 − r (i))+/mn (clearly, λ∗, λ∗i ≥ 0). Now to prove the
theorem, it suffices to establish the following KKT conditions (see e.g. [11, Section 5.5.3]):
(1) д(dr eln ),д1(dr eln ), . . . ,дn(dr eln ) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n], i.e. dr eln is a feasible point of (95).
(2) ∇L(dr eln , λ∗, λ∗1, . . . , λ∗n) = 0, i.e. the first-order condition is satisfied.
(3) λ∗д(dr eln ) = λ∗1д1(dr eln ) = · · · = λ∗nдn(dr eln ) = 0, i.e. complementary slackness holds.
We proceed to the proofs of these three statements.
(1) Clearly, дi (dr eln ) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n]. To show д(dr eln ) ≤ 0, we claim (and will return to prove) that
h∗ is a fixed point of h, i.e. h∗ = h(h∗). Assuming this claim holds, we have
д
(
dr eln
)
=
1
h∗
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥(h∗)2
dAin(i)
√
r (i) −
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥(h∗)2
dAin(i) − bn (96)
=
1
h(h∗)
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥(h∗)2
√
dout (i)dAin(i) −
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)≥(h∗)2
dAin(i) − bn = 0,
where the last two equalities use the fixed point claim and the definition of h, respectively.
Local non-Bayesian social learning with stubborn agents 57
(2) First, let i ∈ [n] satisfy r (i) > (h∗)2, so that dr eln (i) = −dAin(i) + dAin(i)
√
r (i)/h∗, λ∗i = 0. Then
∂L
∂d(i)
(
dr eln , λ
∗, λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
n
)
= −dout (i)d
A
in(i)
mn
1
(dAin(i) + dr eln (i))2
+ λ∗
= − dout (i)d
A
in(i)
mn(dAin(i)
√
r (i)/h∗)2
+
(h∗)2
mn
= − dout (i)d
A
in(i)
mn
(√
dout (i)dAin(i)/h∗
)2 + (h∗)2mn = 0.
Next, let i ∈ [n] satisfy r (i) ≤ (h∗)2, so that dr eln (i) = 0, λi = ((h∗)2 − r (i))/mn . Then
∂L
∂d(i)
(
dr eln , λ
∗, λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
n
)
= −dout (i)d
A
in(i)
mn
1
(dAin(i))2
+ λ∗ − λ∗i
= −r (i)
mn
+
(h∗)2
mn
− (h
∗)2 − r (i)
mn
= 0.
(3) For any i ∈ [n], we have
λ∗iдi (dr eln ) = −dAin(i)
( (h∗)2 − r (i)
mn
)
+
(√
r (i)
h∗
− 1
)
+
.
Clearly, the first (·)+ term is zero if r (i) > (h∗)2, the second is zero if r (i) < (h∗)2, and both
are zero if r (i) = (h∗)2. Finally, λ∗д(dr eln ) = 0 holds by (96).
We return to establish the fixed point claim. We in fact prove the slightly stronger result
h(x) ≤ h(h(x)) ∀ x ∈ R+. (97)
The fixed point claim then follows, since h∗ ≥ h(h∗) by definition and h∗ ≤ h(h∗) by (97) with
x = x∗, where x∗ is a maximizer of h. Thus, it suffices to prove (97). Towards this end, fix x ∈ R+.
We first assume x ≥ h(x) and will return to address the other case. For any y, z ∈ R ∪ {∞}, we
define
N (y, z) =
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)∈[y2,z2)
√
dout (i)dAin(i), D(y, z) =
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)∈[y2,z2)
dAin(i),
where by convention N (y, z) = D(y, z) = 0 if y, z are such that {i ∈ [n] : r (i) ∈ [y2, z2)} = ∅ (i.e. if
the sums are over empty sets). Then by definition of h, N , and D, we have
h(h(x)) = N (h(x),∞)
bn + D(h(x),∞) =
N (x ,∞) + N (h(x),x)
bn + D(x ,∞) + D(h(x),x) .
Again by definition of h, N , and D, and recalling r (i) = dout (i)/dAin(i), we also have
N (h(x),x) =
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)∈[h(x )2,x 2)
√
r (i)dAin(i) ≥ h(x)
∑
i ∈[n]:r (i)∈[h(x )2,x 2)
dAin(i)
= h(x)D(h(x),x) = N (x ,∞)
bn + D(x ,∞)D(h(x),x)
Thus, combining the previous two equations, we obtain
h(h(x)) ≥
N (x ,∞) + N (x,∞)bn+D(x,∞)D(h(x),x)
bn + D(x ,∞) + D(h(x),x) =
N (x ,∞)
bn + D(x ,∞) = h(x).
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If instead x ≤ h(x), we can use the same argument to obtain
h(h(x)) = N (x ,∞) − N (x ,h(x))
bn + D(x ,∞) − D(x ,h(x)) , N (x ,h(x)) ≤
N (x ,∞)
bn + D(x ,∞)D(x ,h(x)),
⇒ h(h(x)) ≥
N (x ,∞) − N (x,∞)bn+D(x,∞)D(x ,h(x))
bn + D(x ,∞) − D(x ,h(x)) =
N (x ,∞)
bn + D(x ,∞) = h(x).
C.2 Proof of Lemma C.2
The first and fourth inequalities are immediate, since dr eln is the solution of (16), d
opt
n is the solution
of (14), and (16) enlarges the feasible set of (14). The second inequality is immediate by definition
of doptn . Thus, it only remains to prove the third inequality.
Towards this end, first recall that for each i ∈ [n],
drandn (i) =
bn∑
j=1
1(Wj = i), P˜n(Wj = i) = d
r el
n (i)∑n
k=1 d
r el
n (k)
=
dr eln (i)
bn
∀ j ∈ [bn], (98)
where the second equality holds by Lemma C.1. Also note, by definition ofmn and drandn ,
E˜n
(
1 − p˜n
(
drandn
))
=
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
E˜n
drandn (i)
dAin(i) + drandn (i)
=
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
E˜n
∑bn
j=1 1(Wj = i)
dAin(i) +
∑bn
k=1 1(Wk = i)
=
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
bn∑
j=1
E˜n
1(Wj = i)
dAin(i) +
∑bn
k=1 1(Wk = i)
. (99)
We can then bound the (i, j)-th summand in (99) as
E˜n
1(Wj = i)
dAin(i) +
∑bn
k=1 1(Wk = i)
= E˜nE˜n

1(Wj = i)
dAin(i) + 1(Wj = i) +
∑bn
k=1,k,j 1(Wk = i)
{Wk }bnk=1,k,j

= E˜n
dr eln (i)/bn
dAin(i) + 1 +
∑bn
k=1,k,j 1(Wk = i)
≥ d
r el
n (i)/bn
dAin(i) + 1 + E˜n
∑bn
k=1,k,j 1(Wk = i)
=
dr eln (i)/bn
dAin(i) + 1 + (bn − 1)dr eln (i)/bn
>
1
2bn
dr eln (i)
dAin(i) + dr eln (i)
,
where in the first line we mean E˜n[·|X ] = E[·|X , {dout (i ′),dAin(i ′)}i′∈[n]] for any random variable X ,
the second equality holds by (98), the first inequality is Jensen’s, the third equality again uses (98),
and the second inequality uses 1 ≤ dAin(i) (by assumption) and the obvious inequality (bn−1)/bn < 2.
Substituting into (99), we thus obtain
E˜n
(
1 − p˜n
(
drandn
))
>
1
2
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
dr eln (i)
dAin(i) + dr eln (i)
=
1
2
(
1 − p˜n
(
dr eln
))
,
which, after rearranging, completes the proof.
C.3 Proof of Lemma C.3
For anyw ∈ (w1, . . . ,wbn ) ∈ [n]bn , define
дn(w) = 1maxj ∈[n] r (j)
bn∑
j=1
dout (w j )
dAin(w j ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = w j )
.
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Observe that, ifW is the [n]bn -valued random vector with i.i.d. coordinates {Wj }j ∈[bn ] satisfying
P˜n(Wj = k) = d
r el
n (k)∑n
k ′=1 d
r el
n (k ′)
=
dr eln (k)
bn
∀ j ∈ [bn],k ∈ [n]
(where the second equality holds by Lemma C.1), then the random variable дn(W ) satisfies
дn(W ) = 1maxj ∈[n] r (j)
bn∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
1(Wj = i)dout (i)
dAin(i) +
∑bn
k=1 1(Wk = i)
(100)
=
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
∑bn
j=1 1(Wj = i)
dAin(i) +
∑bn
k=1 1(Wk = i)
=
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
n∑
i=1
dout (i)
mn
drandn (i)
dAin(i) + drandn (i)
=
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
(
1 − p˜n
(
drandn
))
.
Thus, we can analyze дn(W ), then recover p˜n(drandn ) by an affine transform. Working with дn(W )
is convenient because дn is a self-bounding function, defined as follows.
Definition C.4. [10, Section 3.3] Let X be some measurable space, l ∈ N, and f : Xl → [0,∞).
We say f is a self-bounding function if there exists auxiliary functions f−i : Xl−1 → R, i ∈ [l] such
that, for any x = (x1, . . . ,xl ) ∈ Xl ,
0 ≤ f (x) − f−i (x−i ) ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ [l],
l∑
i=1
(f (x) − f−i (x−i )) ≤ f (x),
where x−i = (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xl ) ∀ i ∈ [l].
To verify дn is self-bounding, we use the most obvious choice of auxiliary functions: let
дn,−i (w−i ) = 1maxj ∈[n] r (j)
bn∑
j=1, j,i
dout (w j )
dAin(w j ) +
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk = w j )
,
wherew−i = (w1, . . . ,wi−1,wi+1, . . . ,wbn ) forw ∈ (w1, . . . ,wbn ) ∈ [n]bn , i.e. we simply ignore the
i-th coordinate ofw . Towards bounding дn(w) − дn,−i (w−i ), we first observe
bn∑
j=1, j,i
dout (w j ) ©­« 1dAin(w j ) +∑bnk=1 1(wk = w j ) − 1dAin(w j ) +∑bnk=1,k,i 1(wk = w j )ª®¬ (101)
=
bn∑
j=1, j,i
−1(wi = w j )dout (w j )
(dAin(w j ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = w j ))(dAin(w j ) +
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk = w j ))
(102)
=
bn∑
j=1, j,i
−1(wi = w j )dout (wi )
(dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi ))(dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk = wi ))
(103)
=
−dout (wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi )
×
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk = wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk = wi )
(104)
∈
(
−dout (wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi )
, 0
)
, (105)
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where in (102) we computed the difference of fractions in (101), in (103) we replaced w j by wi
(which is permitted due to the indicator 1(wi = w j )), and in (104) we rearranged the expression;
the upper bound in (105) is obvious, while the lower bound holds since the second factor in (104) is
less than 1. Using the upper bound in (105), we can then obtain
дn(w) − дn,−i (w−i ) =
∑bn
j=1, j,i dout (w j )
(
1
dAin (w j )+
∑bn
k=1 1(wk=w j )
− 1
dAin (w j )+
∑bn
k=1,k,i 1(wk=w j )
)
maxj ∈[n] r (j) (106)
+
1
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
dout (wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi )
(107)
<
1
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
dout (wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi )
<
r (wi )
maxj ∈[n] r (j) ≤ 1. (108)
On the other hand, using the lower bound in (105), along with (106)-(107), we immediately obtain
дn(w) − дn,−i (w−i ) > 0. Together with (108), the first condition in Definition C.4 holds. To verify
the second condition in Definition C.4, we use the leftmost expression in (108) to obtain
bn∑
i=1
(
дn(w) − дn,−i (w−i )
)
<
1
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
bn∑
i=1
dout (wi )
dAin(wi ) +
∑bn
k=1 1(wk = wi )
= дn(w).
Having verified that дn is self-bounding, we aim to show дn(W ) concentrates around its mean.
For this, we will use the following concentration inequality.
Theorem C.5. [10, Theorem 6.12] LetX1, . . . ,Xl be independentX-valued random variables, define
X = (X1, . . . ,Xl ), and let f : Xl → [0,∞) be self-bounding. Then for every t ∈ (0,Ef (X )],
P(f (X ) ≤ Ef (X ) − t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2Ef (X )
)
.
Applying the theorem to our setting, we obtain for any t ∈ (0, E˜nдn(W )],
P˜n(дn(W ) ≤ E˜nдn(W ) − t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2E˜nдn(W )
)
. (109)
Now for δ > 0 define
t(δ ) = δ2 + δ
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2 .
Observe that, by Lemma C.2 and (100),
t(δ ) ≤ δ2 + δ
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
(
1 − E˜np˜n
(
drandn
))
=
δ
2 + δ E˜nдn(W ) < E˜nдn(W ).
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Thus, for any δ > 0, we can set t = t(δ ) in (109). Furthermore, we have
дn(W ) ≤ E˜nдn(W ) − t(δ ) = E˜nдn(W ) − δ2 + δ
mn
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2
⇔ maxj ∈[n] r (j)дn(W )
mn
≤ maxj ∈[n] r (j)E˜nдn(W )
mn
− δ2 + δ
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2
⇔ 1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
≤ 1 − E˜np˜n
(
drandn
)
− δ2 + δ
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2
⇐ 1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
≤ 1 − p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 −
δ
2 + δ
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2 =
1 − p˜n(doptn )
2 + δ
⇔ p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ ,
where the second and third implications hold by (100) and Lemma C.2, respectively, and the others
are simple manipulations. Hence, by monotonicity and (109), we obtain for any δ > 0,
P˜n
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)
≤ exp
(
− t(δ )
2
2E˜nдn(W )
)
Finally, we bound the exponential term. For this, we first note
t(δ )
E˜nдn(W )
=
δ
2(2 + δ )
1 − p˜n(doptn )
maxj ∈[n] r (j)E˜nдn(W )/mn
=
δ
2(2 + δ )
1 − p˜n(doptn )
1 − E˜np˜n(drandn )
≥ δ2(2 + δ ) ,
where the first inequality is the definition of t(δ ), the second holds by (100), and the inequality
holds by definition of doptn . Combining the previous two inequalities, we thus obtain
P˜n
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥ 1 + δ + p˜n(d
opt
n )
2 + δ
)
≤ exp
(
− δ
2
4(2 + δ )2
mn(1 − p˜n(doptn ))
maxj ∈[n] r (j)
)
,
so choosing cδ = δ 2/(4(2 + δ )2) completes the proof.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.4
Define ϑˆoptTn (ϕ) and ϑˆ randTn (ϕ) as in (24) but using the degree sequences {dout (i),dAin(i),d
opt
n (i)}i ∈[n]
and {dout (i),dAin(i),drandn (i)}i ∈[n], respectively. (In words, these are the beliefs of the root nodes in
the trees induced by the optimal and randomized bot strategies, respectively.) The proof proceeds
in two steps. First, we use the analysis of Theorem 3.1 to show
θ
opt
Tn
(i∗) P−−−−→
n→∞ 0 ⇔ Eϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) −−−−→
n→∞ 0, θ
rand
Tn (i∗)
P−−−−→
n→∞ 0 ⇔ Eϑˆ
rand
Tn (ϕ) −−−−→n→∞ 0. (110)
Second, we again leverage the analysis of Theorem 3.1, and also invoke Theorem 4.3, to show
Eϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) −−−−→
n→∞ 0 ⇔ Eϑˆ
rand
Tn (ϕ) −−−−→n→∞ 0. (111)
Combining (110) and (111) then completes the proof.
We note the proof of (110) will specifically use Lemmas A.1, A.2, and A.3 from the Theorem 3.1
analysis; these lemmas require (A1), (A2), and (A4), but not (A3) (hence the assumptions of the
corollary). To prove (111), we will use the analysis leading to (47) in Appendix B.2.1; this analysis
does not require any of the four assumptions and thus applies.
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D.1 First step for proof of Corollary 4.4
We only prove the first equivalence in (110); the proof does not rely on the choice of bot degrees
{doptn (i)}i ∈[n], so the same logic establishes the second equivalence. The proof combines a standard
result (Xn → 0 in P⇔ EXn → 0 for uniformly-bounded/non-negative random variables {Xn}n∈N)
with the fact that θoptTn (i∗) and ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) behave similarly per the proof of Theorem 3.1.
First, assume EϑˆoptTn (ϕ) → 0. Then for any ϵ > 0 and all n large,
P
(
θ
opt
Tn
(i∗) > ϵ
)
≤ P
(
ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) > ϵ/2
)
+ P
(
ΩCn,1
)
+O
(
nζ −1/2
)
≤ 2
ϵ
Eϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) + P
(
ΩCn,1
)
+O
(
nζ −1/2
)
−−−−→
n→∞ 0,
where the first inequality is Lemma A.3 (with x = 0), the second is Markov’s, and the limit holds by
assumption EϑˆoptTn (ϕ) → 0 and by (A1)-(A2).
Next, assume θoptTn (i∗) → 0 in P. We desire an inequality analogous to Lemma A.3, but pointing
in the opposite direction; we derive one using logic similar to the proof of Lemma A.3. First,
define ϑoptTn (i∗) as in (21) but using {dout (i),dAin(i),d
opt
n (i)}i ∈[n]; in words, ϑoptTn (i∗) is like θ
opt
Tn
(i∗)
but ignores the prior parameters. We can then write the following:
P
(
θ
opt
Tn
(i∗) ≥ ϵ/2
)
≥ P
(
ϑ
opt
Tn
(i∗) > ϵ
)
≥ P
(
ϑ
opt
Tn
(i∗) > ϵ
τ optn > Tn ) P (τ optn > Tn )
≥ P
(
ϑ
opt
Tn
(i∗) > ϵ
τ optn > Tn ) P (τ optn > Tn Ωn,1) P(Ωn,1)
= P
(
ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) > ϵ
)
P
(
τ
opt
n > Tn
Ωn,1) P(Ωn,1),
Here the first inequality holds for n large by Lemma A.1 and monotonicity, the next two hold by
monotonicity (here τ optn is the first time at which the graph is no longer treelike; see Algorithm 3),
and the equality holds by Lemma A.2 (which says ϑoptTn (i∗) and ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) have the same distribution
when the graph is treelike). Now by assumption θoptTn (i∗) → 0 in P, Lemma A.2, and (A1), we have
lim
n→∞P
(
θ
opt
Tn
(i∗) > ϵ/2
)
= 0, lim
n→∞P
(
τ
opt
n > Tn
Ωn,1) = lim
n→∞P(Ωn,1) = 1.
Combining the above, and since ϵ > 0 was arbitrary, we conclude ϑˆoptTn (ϕ) → 0 in P. Hence, because
ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) ∈ [0, 1] a.s ., we have for any ϵ > 0 and for all n sufficiently large,
0 ≤ EϑˆoptTn (ϕ) ≤
ϵ
2P
(
ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) ≤ ϵ2
)
+ P
(
ϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) > ϵ2
)
<
ϵ
2 +
ϵ
2 = ϵ .
D.2 Second step for proof of Corollary 4.4
To prove (111), we use the following notation: for dn = (dn(1), . . . ,dn(n)) ∈ Nn0 , define
p˜∗n(dn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + dn(i)
,
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which is simply the random variable p˜∗n defined in (8), viewed as a function of the bot degrees dn
(similar to how we defined p˜n(d) in (13)). For such dn , we also define the random variable
д(dn) = θ
Tn
Tn−1∑
t=0
(
t∑
l=1
(
t
l
)
ηl (1 − η)t−l p˜∗n(dn) (p˜n(dn))l−1 + (1 − η)t
)
(112)
=
θp˜∗n(dn)
ηp˜n(dn)
1 − (1 − η(1 − p˜n(dn)))Tn
Tn(1 − p˜n(dn)) +
θ
Tn
(
1 − p˜
∗
n(dn)
p˜n(dn)
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
,
where the second equality follows as in (47) from Appendix B.2.1; note from the first expression
that д(dn) monotonically increases in p˜∗n(dn) and p˜n(dn). Also, by (46) in Appendix B.2.1,
Eϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) = Eд
(
d
opt
n
)
, Eϑˆ randTn (ϕ) = Eд
(
drandn
)
.
Hence, we aim to show Eд(doptn ) → 0 ⇔ Eд(doptn ) → 0. By the monotonicity observed above, this
requires showing p˜n(drandn ) and p˜n(doptn ) are comparable, for which we will invoke Theorem 4.3.
In contrast, there is no obvious relationship between p˜∗n(drandn ) and p˜∗n(doptn ) in the general case.
However, in the case of a sublinear budget (i.e. bn = o(n)), we can derive useful bounds on these
terms. Thus, we begin by restricting to this case; we then return to address the case bn = Ω(n).
D.2.1 Sublinear budget case. We begin by lower bounding p˜∗n(dn). We claim that for any {dn}n∈N
satisfying dn ∈ Nn0 and
∑n
i=1 dn(i) ≤ bn for each n (note doptn ,drandn both satisfy this),
∃ N ∈ N s .t . ∀ n ≥ N , p˜∗n(dn) ≥ 1/2. (113)
Suppose instead ∀ N ∈ N ∃ n ≥ N satisfying p˜∗n(dn) < 1/2. For such n, we have
1
2 >
1
n
∑
i ∈[n]
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + dn(i)
≥ 1
n
∑
i ∈[n]:dn (i)=0
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + dn(i)
=
1
n
|{i ∈ [n] : dn(i) = 0}| ,
where the second inequality holds as all summands are non-negative. On the other hand, we have
bn ≥
∑
i ∈[n]
dn(i) =
∑
i ∈[n]:dn (i)∈N
dn(i) ≥ |{i ∈ [n] : dn(i) ∈ N}| = n − |{i ∈ [n] : dn(i) = 0}| ,
where we used the fact that dn(i) ∈ N0 ∀ i . Combining the previous two inequalities, we obtain
∀ N ∈ N ∃ n ≥ N s .t . bn ≥ n − |{i ∈ [n] : dn(i) = 0}| > n/2,
which contradicts bn = o(n), completing the proof of (113).
We next show Eд(doptn ) → 0 ⇒ Eд(drandn ) → 0. First, we claim that for any constant c > 0,
lim
n→∞P
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
≤ c/Tn
)
= 0. (114)
Assume for the sake of contradiction that (114) fails. Then for some ϵ > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
P
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
≤ c/Tn
)
≥ ϵ,
⇒ lim sup
n→∞
Eд
(
d
opt
n
)
≥ ϵ lim sup
n→∞
E
[
д
(
d
opt
n
)1 − p˜n (doptn ) ≤ c/Tn ] .
Now assume n is such that p˜∗n(doptn ) ≥ 1/2 (i.e. n is large enough that the lower bound derived
above holds). Then 1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
≤ c/Tn implies
д(doptn ) ≥ θ (1/2)η(1 − c/Tn)
1 − (1 − ηc/Tn)Tn
c
+
θ
Tn
(
1 − 1/21 − c/Tn
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
−−−−→
n→∞
θ
2η
1 − e−ηc
c
,
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where we used the fact that дn(doptn ) is monotone in p˜∗n(doptn ) and p˜n(doptn ), and for the limit we
used Tn →∞ by (A4). Combining the previous two lines, we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
Eд
(
d
opt
n
)
≥ ϵ θ2η
1 − e−ηc
c
> 0,
which contradicts the assumption Eд(doptn ) → 0. This establishes (114).
Next, we prove (114) holds with doptn replaced by drandn . For constants c,δ > 0, we clearly have
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
>
c(2 + δ )
Tn
,
1 − p˜n(drandn )
1 − p˜n(doptn )
>
1
2 + δ ⇒ 1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
>
c
Tn
.
Thus, by monotonicity and the inclusion-exclusion principle,
P
(
1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
>
c
Tn
)
≥ P
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
>
c(2 + δ )
Tn
,
1 − p˜n(drandn )
1 − p˜n(doptn )
>
1
2 + δ
)
≥ P
(
1 − p˜n
(
d
opt
n
)
>
c(2 + δ )
Tn
)
+ P
(
1 − p˜n(drandn )
1 − p˜n(doptn )
>
1
2 + δ
)
− 1 −−−−→
n→∞ 1,
where the limit holds by (114) and Theorem 4.3.
Finally, we show Eд(drandn ) → 0. First, we note that by the inclusion-exclusion argument of the
previous line, along with (A1), we have for any constant c > 0,
lim
n→∞P
(
Ωn,1, 1 − p˜n
(
drandn
)
> c/Tn
)
= 1.
Consequently, since д(drandn ) ≤ 1 a.s ., and assuming the limits exist,
Eд
(
drandn
)
≤ E
[
д
(
drandn
)Ωn,1, 1 − p˜n (drandn ) > c/Tn ] + P ((Ωn,1, 1 − p˜n (drandn ) > c/Tn )C )
⇒ lim
n→∞Eд
(
drandn
)
≤ lim
n→∞E
[
д
(
drandn
)Ωn,1, 1 − p˜n (drandn ) > c/Tn ] ,
so it suffices to show Eд(drandn ) → 0 conditioned on Ωn,1 and 1 − p˜n(drandn ) > c/Tn . Conditioning
on these events, and using the trivial upper bound p˜∗n(drandn ) ≤ 1, we have by (112),
дn
(
drandn
)
≤ θ
η(1 − c/Tn)
1 − (1 − ηc/Tn)Tn
c
+
θ
Tn
(
1 − 11 − c/Tn
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
−−−−→
n→∞
θ (1 − e−ηc )
ηc
,
where the limit uses Tn →∞ by (A4). Note the limit can be made arbitrarily small by choosing c
sufficiently large. In particular, given any ϵ > 0, we can choose c = cϵ such that
lim
n→∞E
[
д(drandn )
Ωn,1, 1 − p˜n (drandn ) > cϵ/Tn ] < ϵ,
which completes the proof of Eд(drandn ) → 0.
The proof of Eϑˆ randTn (ϕ) → 0 ⇒ Eϑˆ
opt
Tn
(ϕ) → 0 is essentially identical, so for brevity we only
outline it. First, we can use Eϑˆ randTn (ϕ) → 0 and the p˜∗n lower bound to prove (114) withd
opt
n replaced
by drandn . This immediately implies (114), simply by definition of d
opt
n (i.e. we need not invoke
Theorem 4.3). From (114), EϑˆoptTn (ϕ) → 0 follows in the same manner as above.
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D.2.2 Linear budget case. We next consider the case lim infn→∞ bn/n > 0. The basic idea is as
follows. Since average in-degree is constant by (A1), we can find a constant fraction of nodes whose
in-degrees are bounded by some constant d . We can then (naively) connect one bot to each of bn
nodes, each with in-degree bounded by d . In this naive strategy, a constant fraction of nodes will
have a constant fraction of bot in-neighbors. Consequently, p˜n → 1 cannot occur, which will imply
the naive strategy drives the typical belief to zero. Finally, since even this naive scheme drives the
belief to zero, the randomized and optimal schemes will as well.
More specifically, we will construct a naive choice of bot degrees dnaiven satisfying the following:
∃ ϵ ∈ (0, 1),N ∈ N s .t . ∀ n ≥ N , Ωn,1 ⇒ p˜n(dnaiven ) < 1 − ϵ . (115)
We claim (115) is sufficient to show Eд(doptn ),Eд(drandn ) → 0. Indeed, for doptn we have
lim
n→∞Eд
(
d
opt
n
)
≤ lim
n→∞E
[
д
(
d
opt
n
)Ωn,1] + lim
n→∞P
(
ΩCn,1
)
≤ lim
n→∞
(
θ
η(1 − ϵ)
1 − (1 − ηϵ)Tn
Tnϵ
+
θ
Tn
(
1 − 11 − ϵ
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
)
+ lim
n→∞P
(
ΩCn,1
)
= 0,
where the second inequality uses p˜n(doptn ) ≤ p˜n(dnaiven ) by definition of doptn and p˜n(dnaiven ) < 1−ϵ
on Ωn,1 for large n by (115), along with the trivial inequality p˜∗n(doptn ) ≤ 1, and the equality holds
since Tn →∞ by (A2) and since P(Ωn,1) → 1 by (A1). For drandn , we have for any δ > 0,
lim
n→∞Eд
(
drandn
)
≤ lim
n→∞E
[
д
(
drandn
)Ωn,1, p˜n (drandn ) < (1 + δ + p˜n (doptn )) /(2 + δ )]
+ lim
n→∞P
(
ΩCn,1
)
+ lim
n→∞P
(
p˜n
(
drandn
)
≥
(
1 + δ + p˜n
(
d
opt
n
))
/(2 + δ )
)
(116)
≤ lim
n→∞
(
θ
η(1 − ϵ/(2 + δ ))
1 − (1 − ηϵ/(2 + δ ))Tn
Tnϵ/(2 + δ ) +
θ
Tn
(
1 − 11 − ϵ/(2 + δ )
)
1 − (1 − η)Tn
η
)
= 0,
where the logic is similar, but we also Theorem 4.3 to equate (116) to zero.
It only remains to prove (115). Towards this end, we first show that for any c ∈ (0, 1),
∃ d ∈ (0,∞),N ∈ N s .t . ∀ n ≥ N , Ωn,1 ⇒
{i ∈ [n] : dAin(i) ≤ d} ≥ cn, (117)
i.e. when n is large and Ωn,1 holds, a constant fraction of nodes have bounded degrees. Suppose
instead that (117) fails for some c ∈ (0, 1). Let d = 3ν1/(1 − c), where ν1 is the limiting mean degree
in (A1), and N = ⌈ν−1/γ1 ⌉, where γ is the rate of convergence in (A1). Then for n ≥ N , Ωn,1 implies
mn/n < ν1 + n−γ ≤ ν1 + N −γ ≤ 2ν1
By assumption that (117) fails, ∃ n ≥ N satisfying Ωn,1 and |{i ∈ [n] : dAin(i) ≤ d}| < cn. For such n,
2ν1 >
mn
n
>
∑
i ∈[n]:dAin (i)>d d
A
in(i)
n
>
d |{i ∈ [n] : dAin(i) > d}|
n
≥ d(1 − c)n
n
= 3ν1,
which is clearly a contradiction. Consequently, (117) holds.
Finally, we use (117) to prove (115). Let l = lim infn→∞ bn/n > 0. Then ∃ N1 ∈ N s.t. bn ≥
nl/2 ∀ n ≥ N1. If l > 2, set c = 1/2; otherwise, set c = l/2. Then c ∈ (0, 1), so by (117) we can find
d ∈ (0,∞),N2 ∈ N s.t. ∀ n ≥ N2, Ωn,1 ⇒ |{i ∈ [n] : dAin(i) ≤ d}| ≥ cn. Hence, for n ≥ max{N1,N2}
satisfying Ωn,1, we can find In ⊂ [n] satisfying
cn ≤ |In | ≤ bn , dAin(i) ≤ d ∀ i ∈ In . (118)
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For such n, we define dnaiven (i) = 1(i ∈ In) and observe
p˜n
(
dnaiven
)
=
∑
i ∈In
dout (i)
mn
dAin(i)
dAin(i) + 1
+
∑
i<In
dout (i)
mn
≤ d
d + 1
∑
i ∈In
dout (i)
mn
+
∑
i<In
dout (i)
mn
= 1 − 1
d + 1
∑
i ∈In dout (i)
mn
≤ 1 − 1
d + 1
|In |
mn
≤ 1 − 1
d + 1
cn
mn
,
where the first inequality holds by (118) and since y/(y + 1) increases in y, the second equality is
by definition ofmn , the second inequality holds since dout (i) ≥ 1 ∀ i , and the third inequality holds
by (118). Thus, for any n ≥ max{N1,N2,ν−γ1 }, so thatmn < 2ν1n on Ωn,1 as above, we obtain
Ωn,1 ⇒ p˜n
(
dnaiven
) ≤ 1 − c4ν1(d + 1) ,
and so ϵ = c/(4ν1(d + 1)) satisfies (115).
APPENDIX E EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
The basic workflow of the experiment in Section 3.3 proceeded as follows:
• Choose a sequence of time horizons Tn that increase linearly, then set n accordingly.
• Realize the degrees {dout (i),dAin(i),dBin(i)}i ∈[n] after selecting n.
• Define the empirical distributions fn , f ∗n using the degrees as in (7).
• Evaluate quantity of interest E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] empirically via (34) using fn , f ∗n .
We repeated this experiment 400 times to obtain 400 samples of E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ]; the plots in Figure 2
show empirical means and variances across these 400 samples. We used the following parameters:
• We set η = 0.9 to emphasize the effect of the network.
• We letdAin(i) = 1+Poisson(λA−1) ∀ i ∈ [n], so that E[dAin(i)] = λA; we choose λA independent
of n so that E[dAin(i)] = O(1), as required by (A1). In particular, we choose λA = 2.1.
• After realizing {dAin(i)}i ∈[n], we assign one outgoing edge to each i ∈ [n], then assign each
of the remaining
∑
i ∈[A] dAin(i) − n outgoing edges independently and uniformly at random.
Note that this implies dAin(i),dout (i) > 0 and
∑
i ∈[n] dAin(i) =
∑
i ∈[n] dout (i), as required by (5).
• We let dBin(i) = Poisson(λB ), with λB = λA(1 − pn)/pn , so that
EdAin(i)/(EdAin(i) + EdBin(i)) = λA/(λA + λB ) = 1/(1 − (1 − pn)/pn) = pn .
(This is not precisely what we desire, since (A3) assumes pn ≈ p˜n = En[ d
A
in (v∗)
dAin (v∗)+dBin (v∗)
] for v∗
sampled proportional to out-degree; however, as shown in the second plot in Figure 2, this
empirically yields distinct cases rates of convergence for (1 − pn) → 0.)
• We compare four cases of pn : pn = p and pn = 1 − ciT (−i+1)/2n for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, with p and ci
independent of n. Note that the three latter cases satisfy
(1 − pn) ∝ T (−i+1)/2n ∈
{
T −1/2n ,T −1n ,T
−3/2
n
}
,
as shown in Figure 2. Here p and ci were chosen via trial-and-error so that all four cases
behaved roughly the same at the smallest value of n (as in Figure 2). In particular, we chose
p = 0.9, c2 = 1.3, c3 = 1.9, c4 = 2.7.
• We let Tn ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 11}; here the minimum of 2 was chosen since Tn = 1 is a trivial case
and the maximum of 11 was chosen due to computational limitations.
• Given Tn , we let n = ⌈λ2TnA ⌉. Note that this implies Tn ≈ (logn)/(2 log λA), roughly the upper
bound in (A2). With our choice of Tn and λA, n ranged from 20 to (roughly) 12 million.
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In addition to the summary statistics shown in Figure 2, we also show histograms of error term
|E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn)| across the 400 trials in Figure 6. As discussed in Section 3.3, this term must
converge to zero (in probability) at a sufficiently fast rate to prove Theorem 3.2. In Figure 6, these
histograms appear to converge quickly to a point mass at zero in the case pn → p < 1; in other
cases, such behavior does not occur, further suggesting a fundamental difference between the cases.
Figure 7 shows an analogue of Figure 3 with budget bn = ⌈b˜ |En |⌉ for each b˜ ∈ { 11600 , 1800 , 1200 , 1100 }.
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Fig. 6. Histograms of 400 samples of the error term |E[ϑˆTn (ϕ)|T ] − L(pn )|. When pn → p < 1, the histogram
appears to decay quickly to a point mass on zero; in other cases, this does not occur.
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(a) b˜ = 1/100
(b) b˜ = 1/200
(c) b˜ = 1/800
(d) b˜ = 1/1600
Fig. 7. Varying budget for Figure 3 experiment.
